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Date: 3/14/2013 Fou udicial District Court - Elmore Coun User: HEATHER 
Time: 09:16 AM RnA Ri::>nnrt ... _. ~ ....... ,.... ....... 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CV-2009-0001408 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
10/22/2009 NCPC HEATHER New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief Cheri Copsey 
HEATHER Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings Cheri Copsey 
Paid by: Larry Severson Receipt number: 
0216192 Dated: 11/10/2009 Amount: $.00 
(Cash) For: State of Idaho (defendant) 
PETN HEATHER Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief Cheri Copsey 
AFFD HEATHER Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Cheri Copsey 
Petition 
MOTN HEATHER Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Cheri Copsey 
Counsel 
12/11/2009 NOTC HEATHER Notice of Intent of Partial Summary Dismissal and Cheri Copsey 
Order Appointing Counsel 
1/7/2010 CHJG HEATHER Change Assigned Judge Michael E. Wetherell 
1/27/2010 MISC HEATHER Renewed Order Appointing Conflicts Counsel Michael E. Wetherell 
1/29/2010 ORPD HEATHER Plaintiff: Severson, Larry Order Appointing Public Michael E. Wetherell 
Defender Public defender David J. Smethers 
ORPD HEATHER Order Appointing Conflict Public Defender Michael E. Wetherell 
3/15/2010 MOTN HEATHER Motion to Stay Proceedings, Request for Michael E. Wetherell 
Scheduling Order 
3/18/2010 ORDR HEATHER Order Staying Proceedings Michael E. Wetherell 
6/16/2010 MISC HEATHER Request for Extnesion to File Petition and Michael E. Wetherell 
Supporting Documents 
AFFD HEATHER Affidavit of Counsel Michael E. Wetherell 
ORDR HEATHER Order Michael E. Wetherell 
12/14/2010 MISC HEATHER Second Request for Extension to File Petition and Michael E. Wetherell 
Supporting Documents, Stipulation of the Parties 
STIP HEATHER Stipulation for Extension to File Petition and Michael E. Wetherell 
Supporting Documents 
12/20/2010 ORDR HEATHER Order George D. Carey 
4/18/2011 AMEN HEATHER Amended Verified Petititon for Post-Conviction Michael E. Wetherell 
Relief 
MISC HEATHER Petitioner's Request that the Court Take Judicial Michael E. Wetherell 
Notice 
MISC HEATHER Filing and Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed Michael E. Wetherell 
Material 
5/9/2011 STIP HEATHER Stipulation to Enlarge Time Richard Greenwood 
CHJG HEATHER Change Assigned Judge Richard Greenwood 
5/16/2011 ORDR HEATHER Order for Stipulation to Enlarge Time Richard Greenwood 
8/5/2011 ANSW HEATHER Answer to Amended Verified Petititon for Post Richard Greenwood 
Conviction Relief 
1/12/2012 CHJG HEATHER Change Assigned Judge Lynn G Norton 
1/13/2012 ORDR HEATHER Order of Judicial Notice and Scheduling Order Lynn G Norton 
Date: 3/14/2013 
Time: 09:16 AM 
Page 2 of 4 
Fou udicial District Court - Elmore County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0001408 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: HEATHER 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date 
1/19/2012 
2/8/2012 
2/9/2012 
2/13/2012 
2/24/2012 
3/23/2012 
3/26/2012 
3/30/2012 
4/5/2012 
5/2/2012 
5/9/2012 
5/14/2012 
Code 
AMEN 
OBJC 
AFFD 
HRSC 
NOTH 
MOTN 
BREF 
MOTN 
DCHH 
HRSC 
NOTH 
MISC 
REPL 
CONT 
AMEN 
CONT 
AMEN 
DCHH 
HRSC 
User 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
HEATHER 
MELISSA 
Judge 
Amended Order of Judicial Notice and Scheduling Lynn G Norton 
Order 
Objection to Scheduling Order; Motion to Enlarge Lynn G Norton 
Time to be Heard on Scheduling Order; Request 
for An Extension to File Motions, Affidavits, and 
Supporting Briefs; Request for Scheduling 
Conference 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support to Objection, Lynn G Norton 
Motion to Enlarge, Requests for Extension and 
Scheduling Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
02/24/2012 01 :30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing Lynn G Norton 
Motion to Take Judicial Notice of All Exhibits Lynn G Norton 
Introduced in the Underlying Criminal Case 
Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Partial Lynn G Norton 
Summary Dismissal 
Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary 
Dismissal 
Lynn G Norton 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
scheduled on 02/24/2012 01:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: R. Patchell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 4 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2012 09:00 Lynn G Norton 
AM) *State's Motion for Partial Summary 
Dismissal* 
Notice Of Hearing 
Response to Motion for Partial Summary 
Dismissal 
Reply Brief in Support of the State's Motion for 
Partial Summary Dismissal 
Continued (Motion 05/11/2012 09:00 AM) 
*State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal* 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Continued (Motion 05/09/2012 03:00 PM) 
*State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal* 
2nd Amended Notice of Hearing 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
05/09/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 59 *State's Motion for Partial 
Summary Dismissal* 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/16/2016 02:30 Lynn G Norton 
PM) Dispositive Motions 
Date: 3/14/2013 
Time: 09:16 AM 
Page 3 of 4 
Fou udicial District Court - Elmore Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0001408 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: HEATHER 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
6/8/2012 BREF DONNA Brief In Support Of The States Second Motion For Lynn G Norton 
Partial Summary Dismissal 
MOTN DONNA Second Motion For Order Granting Summary Lynn G Norton 
Dismissal 
6/29/2012 HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 08/06/2012 Lynn G Norton 
03:00 PM) *First Cause of Action* 
CONT HEATHER Continued (Motion 07/16/2012 02:30 PM) Lynn G Norton 
Dispositive Motions 
MISC HEATHER Partial Summary Dismissal of Claims Related to Lynn G Norton 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
7/3/2012 NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing Lynn G Norton 
NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing Lynn G Norton 
7/16/2012 CONT HEATHER Continued (Evidentiary 09/07/2012 03:00 PM) Lynn G Norton 
*First Cause of Action* 
DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
07/16/2012 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: Dispositive Motions 
7/27/2012 MISC HEATHER Second Partial Summary Dismissal of Claims Lynn G Norton 
8/8/2012 OTT HEATHER Order To Transport Lynn G Norton 
9/7/2012 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
09/07/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: S. Wolfe 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: *First Cause of Action* 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 09/19/2012 Lynn G Norton 
01:30 PM) 
9/10/2012 EXMN HEATHER Ex-parte Motion for Transcript Lynn G Norton 
MOTN HEATHER Motion to Take Judicial Notice Lynn G Norton 
9/11/2012 OTT HEATHER Order To Transport Lynn G Norton 
ORDR HEATHER Order for Transcript Lynn G Norton 
9/18/2012 WITN HEATHER Witness Disclosure Lynn G Norton 
9/19/2012 HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 10/05/2012 Lynn G Norton 
09:00 AM) 
DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
09/19/2012 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: M. Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 168 
9/20/2012 OTT DONNA Order To Transport Lynn G Norton 
Date: 3/14/2013 
Time: 09:16 AM 
Page 4 of 4 
Fou udicial District Court - Elmore CountY, 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0001408 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User 
10/5/2012 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on 
10/05/2012 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: M. Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 175 
10/15/2012 HEATHER Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Of Tape Paid by: 
David Smethers Receipt number: 0010577 
Dated: 10/15/2012 Amount: $70.00 (Check) 
11/14/2012 MISC HEATHER Plaintiffs Closing Argument 
12/3/2012 MEMO HEATHER Memorandum 
12/11/2012 MOTN HEATHER Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief 
ORDR HEATHER Order Extending Time to File Reply Brief 
12/18/2012 MEMO HEATHER Appellant's Reply Memorandum 
1/22/2013 MEMO HEATHER Memorandum Decision Dismissing Post 
Conviction Action After Evidentiary Hearing 
JDMT HEATHER Judgment 
CDIS HEATHER Civil Disposition Entered entered for: State of 
Idaho, State Tax Commission, Defendant; 
Severson, Larry, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/22/2013 
STAT HEATHER STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk 
action 
STAT HEATHER STATUS CHANGED: closed 
2/28/2013 NTOA HEATHER Notice Of Appeal 
APSC HEATHER Appealed To The Supreme Court 
APDC HEATHER Appeal Filed In District Court 
STAT HEATHER STATUS CHANGED: Reopened 
MOTN HEATHER Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public 
Defender and Waiver of Fees Based on 
Indigence 
3/1/2013 ORDR HEATHER Order Appointing State Public Defender, Order 
Waiving Fees 
User: HEATHER 
Judge 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
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Petitioner 
ILED 
22 AH 9: 43 
HARSA PLUHHER 
CLERK_,.f~~URT 
ri1,urv<(;'//t::!(~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE:±os.. c::\:\... JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE. STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF t \ :tt:> 0 c: g., 
\...a.;. ~ is ~" "-M.o C. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
c~v~·~~-~~ Petitioner, 
vs. 
Respondent. 
PETITION AND A VIT 
FOR POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
The Petitioner alleges: 
l. Place of detention if in custody:~ do,..bo tc, ~:C~~A; ,oT\-Q.R g ::o'\tr 
·2: Name and location of the Court which imposed judgement/sentence: 
-~--
~\ ro<,~ Co ..... .,.,:\'\Cnu<-:\~ov\x» . t f1\:\ ~ ,"::c \::>. 
3. The case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) 
.. (b) 
Case Number: C \( - dOO'd _.;. \ 1:>~ 
Offense Con~icted:5\ K:.:t ~"ee \'\\u..."' cl.~ ?o-.5;p,y :a':)~ oc>~ o <' f<\<t cl_ 
l .=r 
4. The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of sentence: 
a. Date of Sentence: 3 <-J\. n Q. 0 "S 
b. Terms of Sentence: S:·.1,.e.~ \ -~ !L w\ Q Q c..r:o\ \?. \ 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF -1 
Revised: 10/13105 
••• 
3. 5. Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea: 
[ ] Of guilty l'<1 Of not guilty 
6. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? 
IX1 Yes [ ] No 
· If SO, what was the DocketNumber of the Appeal?_~.-.Ja....,._,'-"A.........,23 _____ _ 
7. State concisely all the gr(?unds on which you base your application for post 
;onviction relief: (Use additi~nal sheets if necessary.) 
(a) :::t inS.:i~g,~\~ CX'r.>s·.dem.ccc ~ Co .... -~>;~\. 
(b )'::S, 1:n ~ 611)~ e, C: 2 J'-:c,l' t Cl IA :M CL 1' ~ ~ e' • \ Y.. -d) \ Q te '> kk\ iSb 
'1-'r-!: Co" ~s \)9,\,~· ... 
(c) ll '1,9, ~~\A<,, ~Y>ct <\ ::\g,.',,\_ ', n:, ~ 
. · Q..o :0.\ \ ){'\) 4 9,0 I . 
· 8. . Prior to this petition, have you filed with respect to this conviction: 
a. Petitions in State or Federal Court for habeas corpus? _ __.(\) . ............ o.__ __ _ 
b. 
C. 
Any other petitions, motions, or applications in any ~ther court? ~ e:;:, 
If you answered yes to a or b above, state the name and court in which each 
petition, motion or· appli_cation was filed: 
t;- \ Ch ('.)f'.N Ca .... "' \"3 . - ffil' . b\oY'f'JZ ::t:_ a _ ·
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 
Revised: I 0113105 
' . ' 
, 
~ '\ °'"(\! C oo=s ,b<?. \ ~ 9,, \\ :\'h..o %" C)<A n c\~ CY) \..) b .. ,s.h 
'1 OL.i b9~ ~C)lA. c Of¢~t:0i.'\-'\"A'\:>C: ~o'!>:\:Co{\l)~,::\~on 'I'-'~~.\~~:£\ 
{'Pj~9'~ \'6. c-~:\o Qt~f'y..Q_~\I~ ~Qf\C:~~ac: c\~~~ciliS~ 
Ce') '\CA~ \ \Ad. -\. o 0u \ \ ffi \ ~ :'\ "' ; o.. \ ( dcl<locR.Cov. o?R\j 
(~) ~c..~\'"'-,e \o ~c... \ \ fu~~"~°'\ (Co~"\:~ CN AQ~ \\°'~ Co,,,_N>q V\c.'.\q.~ :\o ~~ ~1 h,~h 
Qou.. ":\; . 
________ -pg._ 
Revised I 0/24/05 
9. If your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you, 
state .concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests: 
(a)~C,:J..,., clw ~o .aj\ ow S,§\·,\ 1.QV'v\\c: .:\ o ks, l \"' ':\\ 
·,'O ~-.~ Q4u ... ~~o-\~ · 
(b)S9'.\\ ..,..cR \a. ok=se f!:\. l}..:e ~\:(\is, °' '° ~ 
0u. <''.lno, \j ast,"°) .a.~%\• v:o.e ." \~. 
10. Are you seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, requesting the 
proceeding be at county expense? (If your answer is ''yes", you must fill out a 
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
[ ] Yes ~ [ ] No 
11. Are you requesting. the appointment of counsel to repre~nt you in this case? (If your 
answer is ''yes", you must fill out a Motion for the Appointn)en~ o~ Counsel and supporting 
affidavit, as well as a Motion to Proceed In Fomia Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
D<J Yes [ ] No 
12. State specifically the relief you seek: 
6) '::1~~'> \\e:,:no1::~~ ~owA P)l'<An·\ ~\l-,~9.'1'.\~{\~~-,)1.~ 
~-~~~~<;. \\c,r..o~ °'\ol 0. QO~~-~ COY"''"°::\~~ ~o '(r>O~IA~ 
o..~ 'V',QtAtf, t: t t'o "'d C:• '(\ ~ ()..,.. ~'{\g., f\.S (! ('l I p\6. 
(~)~ \4~.\o k4:~,C:a t ~"'~9,.\~~ -\:. ~S\.\.~ ~v-<'~'\~~) 
(~) ~c..·.\v..~ :\:o ~~°'-\ \ ~ I \ "'-~3~) 
________ -pg._ 
Revised I 0/24/05 
13. This Petition may be accompanied by affidavits in support of the petition. (Forms 
· for this are available.) 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Coµnty of 8/n1ar-e-
) 
) ss 
) . 
k rc &rs...__ 
I 
, being sworn, deposes and says that the party is the 
Petitioner in the above-entitled appeal and that all . statements in this PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF are true and correct to the b his or her knowledge and belief. 
{-.~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND .SWORN and AFFIRMED to before me this _/J_ day of. ili:foiie,:(. ;20Q:l. . ·. . . ·. . . . 
(SEAL) 
t"'r ... ---~~~-.., 1" JAMES G QUINN 
';, NOTARY PUBLIC 
I STATE IDAHO 
. ~~ 
otary Public for Idaho · . · ; /_ 
Commission expires: · 2ft) /13 . · 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
Revised: 10/13/05 
' . .. 
ILED 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVIcild~1411oN1 9: 43 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF b:) ~o~ 
) 
) ss 
) 
. HARSA PLUHHERT 
CLERK JFjf/fJ}f )>l_T 
,,gpun'(7 / /{!:lt'/IA---
-------.----' being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
-i( c·.o C ~~ q~:\ -. '1 :x ·c:~ g.~4 & ') 
~-- ~s:\ ~\o0o\~\.h':\bA 0o"""' D9'~~\:. oc\:>c,~~;\\\o~l''.mO.~ 
"::l. "' 0.,. c r- -,, "'\ oA, Q Y,::.. 2 ':\::bes~ he.~ ~ 'x::>"'"e: <l, l\'(' o"' 
~ l\C£>~ '-b-~ a 1', ::\""1,,co, ::\o S>ba !+l '\.)',ll,. :::\'n. ci g,, Q\,~ :co..sH'-:\~ a~ 
:::\~ (;a I' ~v--'> ~q_\!l-~:\·, ', (D \:\ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ \.1,)0...')~"\ 
~ £'\n,: n.A\ 1'Die<:\'t'-S:.- ® t\~l':u.~e. d Qo ro a\1\~c\ O~~~"'~' 
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Further your affiant sayeth not. 
.J-1, 
. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFJRMED TO before me this fJ. day of 
oc-/-o~ef' .2on. -
' 
r, 
.~ 
JAMES G OUiNN 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
l;.dL;:~ 
otary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST CONVICTION PETITION - 2 
Revised: 10/13/05 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-001408 
NOTICE OF INTENT OF 
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
AND ORDER APPOINTING 
COUNSEL 
Currently before this Court is Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief. 
In conjunction with this motion, Petitioner requests counsel appointed at public expense. 
BACKGROUND 
After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the Petitioner was 
found guilty of First Degree Murder, Felony, and Poisoning, Felony; the victim in both 
counts being his wife. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without parole. 
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and 
conviction, which was upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009). 1 
1 Additional facts from the underlying criminal case are found in that decision and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
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1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in 
nature. It is distinct from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 
136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373, 
375 (1991). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief 
must bear the burden of proving the allegations upon which the petition for post-
conviction relief is based by a preponderance of evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 
134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition 
differ from those of a civil action, in that "[t]he application must contain much more than 
a short and plain statement of the claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.2d 476, 
482 (S. Ct. 2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. 
App 2002). 
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by 
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his or her claims. Berg v. State, 
131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); LC. § 19-4903. Facts within the 
personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits 
included in or attached to the application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and 
correct. Id.; I.C. § 19-4902. "The applicant's factual showing must be based upon 
evidence that would be admissible at hearing." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 875 
P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 
(Ct.App.1982). 
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and 
must rely on substantial, even if conflicting, evidence in the record. Martinez v. State, 
125 Idaho 844, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994); Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 
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983 (1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible 
evidence, need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 
(Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau, supra. If the allegations fail to frame a genuine issue of 
material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary prima facie elements of a claim for 
relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its 
reasons for so doing." LC. § 19-4906(b); LC.R. 57(c); Roman, supra; Parrott, 117 Idaho 
272, 787 P .2d 25 8 ( 1990). However, if the application raises a material issue of fact, the 
district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on 
each such issue. LC.§ 19-4907(a); Martinez, at 844. 
DISCUSSION 
Petitioner's Application is based on the following claims: (1) corpus delecti; (2) 
ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence; 
(4) due process: State's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence; (5) due process: State 
use of perjured testimony; (6) Court error in failure to declare mistrial; and (7) ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel: failure to appeal both counts. 
In further support of his second claim, ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner 
alleges counsel erred in the following ways: (a) facilitation of involuntary and unknowing 
waiver of Petitioner's right to testify; (b) failure to object to prosecutor misconduct; (c) 
failure to move for mistrial ( for introduction of inadmissible evidence); ( d) failure to call 
witnesses; and ( e) cumulative error by trial counsel. 
I. Appointment of Counsel 
In conjunction with his application, Petitioner requests court-appointed counsel. 
"The Court of Appeals has ruled that when a district court is presented with a request for 
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appointed counsel, the court must address this request before ruling on the substantive 
issues in the case," or "before denying the post-conviction relief on its merits." 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (S. Ct. 2004). 
A. Standards for Appointment of Counsel 
Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides "a court-appointed attorney may be made 
available to the applicant." Id. ( emphasis added); see Quinlan v. Idaho, 138 Idaho 726, 
730, 69 P.3d 146, 150 (S. Ct. 2003). Thus, the decision whether to grant or deny a 
request for court-appointed counsel is in the discretion of the court. Plant v. State, 143 
Idaho 758, 152 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2006), citing Charboneau, supra. 
However, without addressing the merits or substance of a petitioner's allegations, 
a court must obviously perform a cursory review to evaluate the form of the claims. The 
factors a court must consider in making this decision are somewhat convoluted. For 
example, in Warren v. State, the court recognized that LC. § 19-4904 applied, and held 
that the court could "deny a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings if the court concludes that the claims are :frivolous." Id. 135 Idaho 836, 25 
P.3d 859 (Ct. App. 2001); see also Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 683-84, 978 P.2d 
241, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1999). In determining whether a claim was ":frivolous," the 
Warren Court turned to I.C. § 19-853, which asks whether a reasonable person would 
proceed with the action at his/her own expense. Id. 
Subsequent cases have not specifically overruled Warren, but have refused to 
apply § 19-853 in the analysis. 2 Charboneau requires a court to consider whether the 
claims filed by a pro se applicant are conclusory and incomplete. See id. at 792-93, 102 
2 The Court finds this particularly puzzling, given the specific reference to post-conviction proceedings contained in 
LC. 19-852(b)(3). 
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P.3d at 1111-12. In this determination, a court must be lenient If an applicant alleges 
facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in 
order to give the applicant an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the 
necessary supporting facts. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. On the 
other hand, if claims are so patently frivolous that they could not be developed into viable 
claims even with the assistance of counsel, the court may decline to appoint counsel. 
Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491,493, 95 P.3d 642,644 (Ct. App. 2004). 
B. Analysis of "Possibility of Valid Claim" 
Petitioner makes multiple claims of misconduct or insufficiencies on the part of 
the State. Although each of these claims will be discussed as to the sufficiency of the 
allegations and possibility of a valid claim, the Court finds that each of these claims 
appears to be categorically invalid a post-conviction claim. The types of claims allowed 
in a post-conviction relief action are limited. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b) states that "[ a ]ny 
issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not 
be considered in post-conviction proceedings[.]" See also Watkins v. State, 101 Idaho 
758, 620 P.2d 792 (1980); Henderson v. State 123 Idaho 138, 139, 844 P.2d 1388, 1389 
(Ct. App. 1992). In addition, mere trial errors are not properly raised in the post-
conviction setting; rather, only fundamental errors are valid claims, which may be raised 
even though they could have been raised on appeal. LC. § 19-4901; Smith v. State, 94 
Idaho 469,491 P.2d 733 (S. Ct. 1971). 
For instance, the sufficiency of a charging Information, correctness of jury 
instructions, disputed motion to suppress, or a jeopardy challenge are all unrecognized as 
claims in support of post-conviction relief. Roman v. State, 1994, 125 Idaho 644, 873 
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P.2d 898 (S. 1994); Cootz v. State, 924 P.2d 622, 129 Idaho 360 (1996); Nelson v. 
State, 1993, 124 Idaho 596, 861 P.2d 1261 (1993); Hedger v. State, 124 Idaho 49, 855 
P.2d 886 (1993). Particularly relevant to this action, "prosecutorial misconduct, which 
could and should have been raised on direct appeal, [cannot] be raised in a post 
conviction proceeding[.]" Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (S. Ct. 1986). 
Petitioner litigated multiple claims and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in his 
underlying appeal (this Court counts five different types of alleged misconduct and error, 
each consisting of multiple, specific allegations). See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009). Each of Petitioner's claims related to prosecutor misconduct 
should have been brought on direct appeal, and does not constitute the "possibility of a 
valid claim" in this post-conviction setting. 
Moving on to each individual claim, Petitioner's first claim is the doctrine of 
corpus delicti, which specifically pertains to the State's burden to prove the first two 
elements of the crime of First Degree Murder. A petitioner may not relitigate the same 
factual questions in his post-conviction application which he has previously presented in 
a direct appeal. Gilpin-Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 863, 908 P.2d 162, 165 (Ct. 
App. 1995); Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 835 P.2d 661 (S. Ct. 1992). In his direct 
appeal Petitioner presented this exact same argument before the Supreme Court, and it 
was unanimously rejected. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414, 433 (S. Ct. 
2009). Accordingly, these specific facts and arguments as alleged by the Petitioner do 
not give rise to the possibility of a valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment 
of counsel. 
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Petitioner also claims that the State failed to preserve evidence of poisoning. 
Specifically, Petitioner alleges the Hydroxycut was tested only by the State, which testing 
methods Petitioner describes as "questionable." Petitioner further supports this claim 
with an undocumented assertion that "Hydroxycut is know [sic] to have caused over 250 
female deaths." The Court finds this claim is incompletely pied, and that any assertions 
made by the Petitioner (none of which support a claim of failure to preserve evidence) are 
wholly speculative and unsupported by any admissible evidence. Finally, any allegations 
or claims of prosecutorial misconduct should have been brought on direct appeal. 
Accordingly, these specific facts and arguments as alleged by the Petitioner do not give 
rise to the possibility of a valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment of 
counsel. 
Petitioner next alleges the State committed misconduct by "delaying." However, 
in support of this claim Petitioner mentions nothing about delay of trial. Rather, he raises 
a completely separate claim: that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. In 
support of this unrelated claim, Petitioner alleges that the State was asked by a member of 
the grand jury whether the Petitioner was aware of the criminal investigation. Petitioner 
alleges the State responded that they were unaware, as they had not had an opportunity to 
speak with the Petitioner. As stated above, any allegations or claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct should have been brought on direct appeal. In addition, these allegations are 
unsupported by any admissible evidence, fail to address any elements of the prima facie 
case for a claim of "delay" ( a claim of which this Court doubts the existence) or failure to 
disclose evidence. Moreover, this claim appears to be nonsensical. Accordingly, these 
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specific facts and arguments as alleged by the Petitioner do not give rise to the possibility 
a valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment of counsel. 
Petitioner claims the State committed reversible error by using perjured 
testimony. In support of this claim Petitioner alleges Detective Wolfe knowingly gave 
false testimony during the grand jury proceedings regarding food testing. No specifics 
have been provided and no admissible evidence offered in support. This allegation 
should have been raised on direct appeal, is incompletely pled, and unsupported by 
evidence. Where the allegations alleged fail to raise the possibility of a valid claim, they 
will not form a basis for appointment of counsel. 
Petitioner also claims the Court erred by failing to declare a mistrial. The entirety 
of Petitioner's explanation and allegations in support are as follows: "Again Motion in 
Limine Judges Order/Statement during hearing." This is another nonsensical pleading by 
the Petitioner, who has previously displayed his ability to craft a comprehensible 
sentence. Here, Petitioner does not offer any factual support or possible basis for a 
mistrial; and his allegations are unsupported by any admissible evidence. Accordingly, 
this specific argument as alleged by the Petitioner does not give rise to the possibility of a 
valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment of counsel. 
Finally, Petitioner makes several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Petitioner alleges error by his appellate attorney where he/she/they failed to appeal both 
counts of conviction. Although Petitioner has not offered any other allegations in support 
of this claim for ineffective assistance, the Court interprets Charboneau, supra, as 
requiring the Court to waive the deficient performance and prejudice elements of an 
ineffective assistance claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
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(1984). Petitioner also alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel as follows: (a) 
facilitation of involuntary and unknowing waiver of Petitioner's right to testify; (b) 
failure to object to prosecutor misconduct; (c) failure to move for mistrial (for 
introduction of inadmissible evidence); (d) failure to call witnesses; and (e) cumulative 
error by trial counsel. 
This Court finds each of these allegations is incompletely pled, and patently 
frivolous to the point that they are unable to be developed into a valid claim. However, 
because of the recent court rulings dramatically increasing and expanding the law relating 
to appointment of counsel and mandated hearings for any defendant who uses the words 
"ineffective assistance of counsel" in a petition for post-conviction relief, and the risk 
imposed on the district courts to be found to have abused their discretion if they do not 
comply, the Court will err on the side of caution. 
Counsel will be appointed at public expense to assist Petitioner in his attempt to 
correct the deficiencies in his claim, including completely pleading the necessary facts 
and providing evidence in support. The Court reminds Petitioner and his newly 
appointed counsel that "a petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to 
search the record for possible non-frivolous claims." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679, 
23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning set forth above, Petitioner's request for counsel is 
GRANTED. Appropriate conflicts counsel for the Elmore County Public Defender is 
hereby appointed to assist the Petitioner by filing an Amended Petition or responsive 
filing as necessary. 
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Petitioner and his newly-appointed counsel are hereby provided with notice of 
this Court's intention to summarily dismiss all claims asserted in his petition, except 
those related to ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. This dismissal is 
based on the reasoning above, and Petitioner, with the help of counsel has thirty (30) days 
from the filing of this order to file a response to the proposed dismissal, if any response is 
warranted. Petitioner and his counsel are reminded of the standard of review, above, 
which will be used in analyzing any future filings. If no response is filed within the 
stated time period, the Court will dismiss all claims, except those related to ineffective 
assistance, without further notice or argument. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this /~ay of December, 2009. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office _l}__ Interdepartmental Mail 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Elmore County Public Defender's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Larry Severson 
IDOC #76709-H213A 
ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dated this 11th day of December, 2009. 
Interdepartmental Mail 
U.S. Mail 
MARSA PLUMMER 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-001408 
RENEWED ORDER APPOINTING 
CONFLICTS COUNSEL 
This Court has received Petitioner's pro se response to this Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
Petitioner filed an Application for Post Conviction Relief and Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel on October 22, 2009. On December 11, 2009, the Court granted Petitioner's request for 
counsel and gave notice of its intent to dismiss, allowing Petitioner and counsel thirty (30) days 
in which to respond. 
DISCUSSION and ORDER 
This matter is now initiated and the Court may not have ex parte communications with 
the Petitioner. The State has not been provided with the "response" and the Court may not 
review and rule on any matters without the knowledge and input of opposing counsel. 
Moreover, the Court has ordered the appointment of conflicts counsel for the Petitioner and will 
no longer accept pro se filings on his own behalf. 
RenewedOrderApptCounsel l 
However, where counsel has not yet responded, the Court will suspend any action 
dismissing Petitioner's claims at this time. The Elmore County Public Defender is hereby 
ORDERED to appoint conflicts counsel in this matter. Counsel has thirty (30) days from the 
issuance of this Order to take some action in this matter. Copies of Petitioner's most recent 
filing will be provided to conflicts counsel and the State for such action as they may deem 
appropriate. 
" SO ORDERED AND DATED this.Z7 day of January 2010. 
RenewedOrderApptCounsel 2 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
James Floyd, #21258 
ICC Unit 15B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
U.S. MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
1000 S. Roosevelt Street 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S. Mail 
Dated this 17th day of February, 2010 
MARSA PLUMMER 
Clerk of the District Court 
,rlj ~\k tcf, 
~~-\----
2082134587 01-28-2010 
,t p2010 09:52 Ratllff Law ,Chtd. 
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P.002/011 
. ._.. 
TERRY S. RATLIFF, ISB No.: 3598 
RATLIFF LAW OFJi'ICES, CBTD. 
290 South Second East 
Mountain Home, ID 8364 7 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY M. SEVERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 2009-1408 
ORDER APPOINTING 
CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER 
TilE COURT having heard and considered cotm.Sel for Defendant's Motion for 
Appointment of Conflict Public Defender brought before this Court by Terry S. Ratliff of the finn 
of Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., and good cause being shown; 
NOW, TIIEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above named Defendant is 
hereby appointed DAVID J. SMETHERS as Conflict Public Defender in the above entitled 
matter, at county expense, at the hourly rate of$ 65.00. 
DATED this~y of January, 2010. 
ORDER APPOINTING CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER-1 
[4] 0002/0002 
2082134587 11:29:31 a.m. 01-28-2010 313 
.,1 otnlst:zo10 oe:sz Ratlff Law Offlc:es. Oltd. (FAX)2085878940 P .G03#011 
cq.TDJCATE or SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on tbisQ)~ of Jmma.ry, 2010, served a copy of the 
within md foregoing documents to: 
Kristina Schindele 
Elmore County 
Prosecuting Attorney 
190 South 4* East 
.Mountain Home JD 83647 
Terry S . .Ratliff 
RA TI.JFF LAW OFFICES, CHID. 
290 South 2• East Street 
Mauntain &me, ID 83647 
Fax No. (208)587-6940 
Marsa Plummer 
C/0 Emore County Courthouse 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
AowiaW £efJlt1 compse1; 
David J. Smethers 
1000 S. R.oo9evelt Street 
Boise, ID 83705 
~ax: (208) 336-1263 
. By: 
By: 
)0 Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
--
Certffied Mail 
__ U.S.Mail 
__ Facsimile Tnmsmission . 
XJ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
__ Certified Matl 
__ U.S.Mail 
__ Facs:iroile Transmission 
By: ..l2_Hand delivery 
__ Federal Express 
_Certified Mail 
_U.S.Mail 
_Facsiroi1e 
By: _Hand delivery 
__ Federal ExpmJ8 
Certified Mail 
:&:u.s. Mail 
__ Facsimile 
ORDER.AP.POINTING CONll'LICT PUBUC DEl'ENDER-2 
DAVID J. SMETHERS 
I 000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 705 
208-695-9318 
Attorney for Petitioner 
r,E 
~: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O HE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON 
Petitioner 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2009-001408 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS, 
REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING ORDER 
Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney ofrecord, and requests this 
Court for an ORDER staying the proceedings, and taking no action granting partial 
summary dismissal in this case until a SCHEDULING ORDER is issued by this Court. 
The RENEWED ORDER APPOINTING CONFLICTS COUNSEL was filed on 
1-27-10. Conflict counsel contacted the Elmore County Public Defender's office to 
obtain materials necessary to pursue this action. Conflict counsel was informed that a 
portion of the trial counsel's file had been damaged in a flood, and was no longer 
available. Conflict counsel needs time to obtain copies of all pleadings filed to date, 
transcripts of all relevant hearings, and all materials associated with the case and appeal 
filed in the criminal case. Petitioner requests the proceedings in this matter be stayed to 
afford conflict counsel time to amass and review materials necessary for this case. 
' 
. 'l 
Further, petitioner requests this Court to issue a SCHEDULING ORDER after 
consultation with all parties. 
~r-David J. S thers 
Attorney for Petitioner 
3 -.t3 -10 
Date 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the [ <O day of ~ , 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was: 
Hand delivered Faxed ~ailed to the: 
---
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
~ -:rl-1:::.J1:~===:::::::::::,.~----
David J. Sme~ers 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-001408 
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS 
After consideration of Petitioner's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Request for 
Scheduling Order, this Court will refrain from dismissing an claims (pursuant to this Courts 
Notice of Partial Summary Dismissal filed December 11, 2009) for an additional ninety (90) 
days. However, no scheduling order will be issued until an amended petition is filed and 
response made by the State. 
./-c-
so ORDERED AND DATED this /J' day of March 2010. 
StayProceedings I 
1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
1000 S. Roosevelet Street 
Boise, ID 83705 
US MAIL 
rd 
Dated this d-D day of March, 2010 
MARSA PLUMMER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bct)Iunt 
Deputy Clerk 
DAVID J. SMETHERS 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 705 
208-695-9318 
ISB #4711 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON ) 
) 
Petitioner ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2009-001408 
REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO 
FILE PETITON AND SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS 
Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, and requests this 
Court for an ORDER extending the time heretofore set for the filing of the post 
conviction relief PETITION and supporting documents in this case for the following 
reasons: 
-Petitioner has requested a stay of the proceedings on a previous occasion. 
-Counsel obtained a partial transcript of the proceedings in this case, and said transcript 
was in excess of three thousand pages. 
-Counsel has been unable to obtain transcripts for all relevant proceedings in this case to 
date. 
-As stated in the REQUEST FOR A STAY OF THE PROCEEDINGS, the petitioner's 
file in for the underlying jury trial proceedings was partially destroyed and the contents 
must be reconstructed. 
REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS Page 1 of 2 
, 
" 
-The plaintiff has been very active in the post conviction proceedings; counsel's 
communications with the plaintiff have generated issues 
exploration and research. 
matters that need further 
-The plaintiff is incarcerated at the Idaho State Penitentiary, making communication and 
exchange of materials more difficult. 
-Recent decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have 
defined, narrowed, and established new precedent in matters of post conviction relief, 
placing a heavier burden on the plaintiff at the pleading stage, and made it more difficult 
to survive the anticipated summary judgment motion(s) by the state. 
Petitioner requests a six month extension to December 16, 2010, for submission 
of the PETITION and supporting documents. Counsel has communicated with 
handling attorney for the state Kristina Schindele, and the state does not object to 
this continuance. See counsel's AFFIDAVIT accompanying this MOTION. A hearing 
is requested, or in the alternative, an ORDER granting petitioner's MOTION is submitted 
with this filing. 
/vi--~~ DavidJ.Stn thers 
Attorney for Petitioner 
fo-( ,6-/D 
Date 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ( 0 day of ~ , 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was: _?/,,,,.~---
~and delivered Faxed Mailed to the: 
----
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS Page 2 of 2 
06/16 14:19:39 2 
22 
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LARRY SEVERSON ) 
) 
Petitioner ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2009-001408 
ORDER 
After consideration of petitioner's REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO FILE 
PETITION AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS and counsel's AFFIDA VlT, a six 
month extension to file the petition and supporting documents is granted to December 16, 
2010. No further extensions will be granted without good cause being shown. So 
ordered. 
/ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
INTERDEPARTMENT MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
US Mail 
liAA.. -r'"J Dated this lLo day ofl 1,11\J • 2010 
ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS Page 1 of 2 
I 
... 
06/16 14:19:39 3 
MARSA PLUMMER 
Clerk of the District Court 
By (j J 0:lu.i: 
Deputy clerk 
ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS Page 2 of 2 
ILE 
!O 11·• AM 8: 28 
DAVID J. SMBTHBRS 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 8370S 
208-695-9318 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OF THB FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP THB 
STATB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUNTY OF BLMORB 
LARRY SEVERSON ) 
) CASB NO. CV-2009-001408 
Petitioner ) 
) SECOND REQUEST POR BXTBNSION TO 
vs. ) 
) FILB PBTmON AND SUPPORTING STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) DOCUMENTS, STIPULATION OF 
R.elpondent. ) 
THBPARTIBS 
Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, and requests this 
Court for an ORDBR extending tho time heretofore sot f'or the filirli of the post 
conviction relief PETITION and supporting documents in this cuo for the following 
reasons: 
1. Petitioner requested and recei:ved an extension on a prior occasion. 
2. The time requested wu insuffioient for counsel to review the entire transcript and 
eleven banker's boxes oftrlal materials, and prepare necessary t1Unas and materials. 
3. Counsel ie attempting to obtain a CD of the jury trial tra11script to assist in preparation 
of said filings and materials. 
4. Petitioner continues to bo an active participant in preparation and presentation ofhls 
case. his incarceration has mado communications more difficult. 
.5. Counsers heavy cue load has contributed to the need for another extension. 
REQUEST FOR BXTBNSION, STIPULATION Page l of 2 
6. Recent cue law has continued to define. narrow, and establish new burdens for 
petitioners in post conviction relief. 
7. The State has stipulated to petitioners request, (see attached stlpulatlon). 
A proposed ORDBR. accompanies this request, in tho alternative, a hearing ia requested. 
oavidJ.Sera 
Attorney for Petitioner 
/L ... l'f-(o 
Date 
CBRTIPICATE OP SBRVICB 
I hereby certify that on the { 'J day of ~. 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document waa: 
--
Hand delivered Faxed ~ Mailed to the: 
Elmore County Prosecutois Office 
David I. Smeth 
REQUEST FOR BXTBNSION. STIPULATION Pago 2 of 2 
31 'i 
DAVID J. SMBTHBRS 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise. Idaho 83 70.S 
208-69S-9318 
Attorney for Petitionor 
ILE 
1 l+ AH 8: 28 
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OP THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP THB 
STATB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP BLMORB 
LARRY SEVERSON ) 
) CASB NO. CV-2009-001408 
Petitioner ) 
) STIPULATION FOR BXTBNSION TO 
VI. ) 
) FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) DOCUMBNTS 
R.eapondent. ) 
At petitloner'a request, the above-named parties horeby stipulate to an extension of tour 
(4) months from December 16. 2010, for petitioner to file his PBTITION and aupporth1g 
documents. ll/. IJd. 
-~-~.,,._.l.~......_=-' _ ____.ll......,.'":<-...2-{l) 'TlJt{CU,7, Da.vidi~etheri Date Kristina M. Schindel 
Attorney for Petitioner Attorney for the State 
CBR'fIPICA·ra OF SERV!Cli 
I hereby ~erti.fythat on the / 3 day or 4-...,..... • 2010, a. true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was: 
Hand delivered Faxed ~ailed to the: 
--" 
Blmore County Prosecutor's Office 
~,f c,....,...:, -·--
David J. Sme~ 
STIPULATION Page I of 1 
Jll 
I 
9/!i 
IN THB DISTRICf COURT OF mB POlJR.TH 1UDICIAL DISTRICT OP 
STATB OP mAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF BLMOR.B 
LAU.Y SBVD.SON ) 
) 
Petitioner ) 
) 
VI. ) 
) 
STATBOPJDAHO ) 
) 
R.eapondent. ) 
CASB NO. CV-2009-001408 
ORDBR. 
Aft.er comideration ofpetitionet1 SBCOND RBQUBST FOR BXTBNSION TO 
PILB PETITION AND StJPPOR.TlNG DOClJMBNTS and the STIPtJLA TION OF THB 
PARTIBS, thil Court flnda good cauao to pant petltionea'a request. The aforementioned 
~onorboflm:Aprll 18, 2011, So <mlarod. 
 Lz]ilf/'"u>/0 4~~mi~M7i~i~i&miiiYH:.Liil: _________ Dm 
~- District Judge 
OR.DBR Pap 1 of 2 
€9Z~9EE80? ::>11d OOOM3l "I~ 1 Z'111VS WV zg:n E~·JiilQ·moz 
9/9 
GIBJ<'I CQ.TlnCAD OIMAlLJNG 
I certify that a true and correct copy of tho fortaoina document wu ,ent to the followina: 
Blmore County Prolecutot'1 Oftlce 
Mountain Home. Idaho 83d47 
INTBRDBPAR.TMBNT MAIL 
David 1. Smethen 
1000 S. R.ooaevolt St 
Boiee, Idaho 83705 
US Mail 
Dated thll e day of l00Gsn6010 
~$.A Pf I fl4MFR Clerk of Diatrict Court 
ORDBR Pago 2 of 2 
2011-Apr-18 02 12 PM SALLAZ & GA EWOOD PLLC 2083361263 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney At Law 
IS8#4711 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83 705 
(208) 336-l 14S 
FAX (208) 336-1263 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
SEVER~N. LARRY M •• 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Respondent. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2009-1408 
AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
1. Petitioner. Larry M. Severson. ls currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional 
Institution in Boise, Idaho. 
2. Mr. Severson is servlns a sentence Imposed by the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District. State of Idaho, County of Elmore. the Honorable Michael B. Wetherell. 
presiding. 
3. The Elmore County District Court Number for that case is CR-2002-158. 
4. Mr. Severson was indicted on one count of flrst-de;ree murder; the Indictment was 
later amended over petitioner's objection to include possible murder by suffocation. 
AMtNDED PETITION f'OR POST eONVICTION RtLIEF Pagel of 11 
1/11 
2011·Apr·18 02 12 PM SALLAZ & G EWOOD PLLC 2083361263 
~ After several chanaes ln attorneys. the Elmore County Public Defender's Office was 
appointed to represent Severson at the trial. Ed Frachiseur was desig11ated as lead counsel and 
Ellison Matthews wu later appointed as co-counsel. 
• 6. Severson objected to the appointment of Frachiseur arguing that he had a conflict of 
interest. Severson petitioned the Court numerous times to allow Scott D. Summer to assist in his 
representation. which was denied by the Court. 
7. The state was represented by Aaron J. Bazzoli and Ron Howen. 
8. Severson did not testify at the juey trial. 
9. Aft~ a seventeen day jury trial, Severson was found guilty on Counts I and U. 
10. On November 22, 2004, a Motion For Judarncnt Of Acquittal was flied in the district 
court. 
11. November 24, 2004, a Motion For New Trial was flied. 
12. On November 24, 2004, and Additional Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was flied, 
and an Amended Motion for New Trial was tlled on December 13, 2004. 
13. On February 22, 220S, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
the Motion For Acquittal and New Jury Trial. 
14. Prior to sentencina, Frachiseur withdrew as counsel for Severson, and public 
defender Rob Lewis was appointed on April S, 2005. 
15. On June 22, 2005. the district court sentenced Mr. Severson to a flxed life on Count 
I, and five years on Count II. 
16. On June 22, 2005, the Judgment and Commitment were filed. 
17. On July 18, 2005, a Notice of Appeal was filed. 
18. Attorneys Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen represented Mr. Severson on appeal. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELI&F Page 2 of ll 
2/ 11 
2011· -18 02:12 PM SALLAZ & GA TE WOOD PLLC 2083361263 
19. The Supreme Court affinncd the Judament of conviction for first-degree murder and 
poisoning food and/or medicine in 2009 Opinion No. 7S flied May 29, 2009. 
20. With respect to this conviction. Mr. Severson has not flied any other petitions for 
post-conviction relief. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Pt1tltloner Wa Dt1nled tl,e Effect/VII As1i1tonce of 
Couns.i at Trial In Violation of the Sl.xth 
A.m1ndm1nt Right to IYJ'•ctlvt1 A.11/1tance of 
Co11ns11/ Under Strickland v. Wa1hln1ton du11 to 
Coun11/1' Rttfu:,al to Allow tl,e Defendant to 
TestVJ, at Jury Trial. (I.C § 19490/(a)(l)) 
21. At trial, Severson was precluded ftom testifying by lead counsel Frachlseur. 
22. Severson informed Frachiseur and Matthews (hereafter the plural .. counsel .. ), prior to 
the jury trial that he wanted to testify at trial. 
23. Severson infbnned counsel during trial that he desired to testify at tr!al. Severson 
was told by Frachiseur that he was not allowed to speak with counsel while court was In session, 
and Severson was ordered by Frachiseur to write his comments. suggestions, and concerns on a 
notepad supplied by counsel. 
24. Severson wrote voluminous notes, suggestions, and concerns, (hereafter "notes"), on 
the notepad during the state's case and during the defendant's case. 
25. Severson's notes listed issues Severson desired to have addressed in cross 
examination of the state's and defendant's witnesses, inconsistencies in the testimony of state's 
witnesses, and evidence and testimony that would be included in Severson's testimony. 
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26. Counsel read and acknowledged the information in these notes during the first week 
of the state•s presentation of evidence. after which Severson did not observe Frachiseur read any 
of the notes. 
27. Severson had a good rapport with Matthews, who informed Severson during one of 
their many consultations as follows- the decisions re,iarcling the notes, namely if the information 
would be used, and how the information would be uaed., was solely Fraohiscur's duo to his rank 
as lead counsel for the defense. 
28. Severson attempted to communicate with Fraohiseur in excess of fifty (SO) times 
durlna the trial about issues he wanted raised on cross examination of state's witnesses, 
inconsistencies in said witnesses testimony, and matters Severson intended to present during hfs 
testimony. and Frachiseur either ignored Severson. pointed to the legal pad. ( indicating to 
Severson that he should limit his comments to notes). or made hand aestures that appeared to 
Severson to be disregarding these concerns. 
29. Severson asked counsel to examine the notes he had written during trial after the jury 
had rendered its verdict; Severson was informed that the notes were not available. 
30. Prior to the state resting their case, the Court recited information concerning 
Severson's riaht to testify. riaht not to testify. and spoke of consulting with his attomey•a. 
31. The Court did not ask Severson ifhe understood his right to testify. ask Severson if 
he had any questions concemlns his right to testify, ask Severson ifhe had any questions for his 
counsel about his rlght to testify. or elJcit a response from Severson at the time of this recitation. 
32. The Court then uked if there was anything further from counsel, at which time the 
Bailiff commented about an Exhibit that had been redacted. 
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33. The Court did not asain mention or address Severson·s right to testify prior to the 
defense resting. 
34. The Court did not obtain an affirmative waiver trom Severson after the Court's 
recitation about said right to testify- which Included admonitions concemina consultation with 
counsel. 
35. Prior to the state restina their case the Court inquired about defense witnesses, at. 
which time Frachiseur responded, and Matthews remf nded Frachlseur that Severson wanted to 
testify. 
36. Frachlseur responded that the state need not be made aware that Severson would take 
the stand at this point in the case, and that the state did not need to know that Severson would 
testify until he was actually called to the stand. which indicated to Severson that he would testify. 
37. Severson was not aware of the meanina and ramifications of .. consultatlon. asked 
Frachiseur what it meant. and was told by Frachiseur to be quiet as he was trying to listen to the 
judge, and Frach.iseur stated he would explain later. 
38. Frachiseur then Informed Severson that Severson had the right to testify, but it was 
ultimately up to Fnwhlseur whether Severson would be called to testify. 
39. At that time Severson told Frachiseur that he wanted to testify. 
40. Frachlseur rested the defense's case without calling Severson 
4 I. Severson wrote a note to Frachiseur about the fact he was not called to testify after 
the defense rested, Frachiseur fanored the note, and Severson was told by Frachiseur during Jury 
deliberations that Severson did not need to testify as the jury would acquit him. 
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42. After the jury returned with guUty verdicts on both counts. Attorney Scott Summers 
explalned to Severson that Severson had a constitutional right to testify and the choice was not 
Frachiscur•s. 
43. Severson then notified the Court that he had been precluded from testifying by 
Frachiseur, at which time Frachiseur motioned the Court to allow him to withdraw as Scverson's 
attorney. 
44. Rob Lewis was appointed for purposes of sentencing. 
45. Larry Severson•, affidavit establishing his personal knowledge of the events in 
paraaraphs 1-44 and attestlna to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted with this 
, petition will be flied on or before April 26, 2001 l, Said affidavit was not filed with this petition 
due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severson has 
been difficult due to his custody status at the ldal10 State Correctional Institution, and the 
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Petltlo11er Was Denied th, E;ffectlve Assistance of 
Counsel at Trial In J/folation o/th11 Sixth 
Amendment Right to lfffect/1111 Ass/stone• of 
Coun11/ Under Strickland v. Washinpon due to 
Counsels' FalluN to Eff11ctlv,ly Cha//11nge Tlu1 
State '.r Evidence Through Cross Exam/1,atlon 0/ 
The Stat•'s Wltna8111, And Preaent Exculpatory 
Evidence. (I.C § I94901(a)(l)) 
46. Severson realleges the facts in paraaraphs 1-45 above. 
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47. Frachiseur told the jury in the openina statement that a defense witness would testify 
that Severson•s financial situation was good at the time of the victim's death. Frachiseur did not 
• call this financial adviser FNU Bond during the defense case to establish Severson's business 
was doina well and earnina a profit. 
48. Marla Spence, and employee of the Elmore County Coroner testified about the two 
death certificates in this case. Ms. Spence's testimony concerning these documents was 
comprised of hearsay without the proper foundation being established, and counsel should have 
asserted Severson's riaht to confrontation of witnesses. 
49. Dr. Olen Oroben testified about samples taken from the victim that were sent to two 
labs for forensic testing, counsel objected without statfna the proper grounds. and the evidence 
was admitted. 
SO. Detective Mike Barclay testified without objection about pills located in a manila 
envelope that were eating through the surface leaving the jury with the perception that 
poisonous/caustic pllls had been located. 
S 1. Barclay then testified without objection about tests performed at the state lab where 
no medications were detected. 
52. John Urban, a chemist for the FDA performed tests on various capsules and 
substances, and testified without objection about other unknown persons that performed tests and 
other unknown persons that handled items relevant to this case, and eventually opined that a 
Drano like substance was deteoted. 
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53. Jolm Heftkemper. a research chemist for the FDA testified without objection about a 
number of tests perfbrmed by unknown persons resulting In cumulative evidence about a Drano 
like substance. 
S4. During the cross examination of state's witness Or. John Welch, Frachiaeur informs 
the Court that the defense is still receivlna evidence. ( a two inch thick notebook). during trial, 
but does not request a continuance or move for excluafon or the evidence as a sanction for 
violation of the rules. Matthews later made the same observations when observing that five 
volumes of exhibits weighing forty pounds must be examined over the lunch hour. 
55. David Bourne, a criminal investigator for the FDA testifies without objection about 
residue that was purportedly found by others that was sent to a laboratory In Ohio. 
S6. Matthews objected to an improper comment made by the prosecutor about Severson 
refusing to tum over capsules to the FDA so the .. investigation .. was concluded, at which time 
Matthews stated he should ask for a mistrial, but there was too much time invested, at which 
time the Court then instructed the state how the incident should have been handled. 
S7. State's witness Steven Bock testifled about the flnancina and re-financina of the 
Severson's residence on Poppy Street that was accomplished by the victim with Sock's 
assistance. Counsel refused to ellclt testimony in cross examination establishing the fraudulent 
nature of the application. Bock testifies without objection as to the victims• motivations for re-
financing, speculates about Severson's girlfliend. and statements made by Severson about the 
victim's medical conditions. 
58. Mary Bledsoe testified for the state concerning the purchase of two rings by 
Severson using a credit card issued to Mary L. Severson. 
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.. 59, Leann Watkins testf:tled that Severson had informed her he was divorced, hi wife was 
dying, and Severson was upset that a relationship had ended. 
60. Jennifer Watkins testified that Severson misled her about his marital status, 
committed acts arguably constitutina stalking after the demise of their relationship. and misled 
her concerning the victim's health problems. 
61. Jennifer Watkins was not cross examined by Severson's counsel. 
62. Tracy Besler testified for the state and spoke of Severson's comments to her about 
medication killing her, Severson's gifts of flowers and onrds, and having a relationship with the 
witness. 
Larry Severson's affidavit establishing his personal knowledge of the events in 
paragraphs t-63 and attesting to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted with this 
, petition will be tlled on or before April 26, 20011. Said affidavit was not flied wtth this petition 
due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severson has 
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, and the 
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Was D1nled tl,e E;(fectlv, Assistance of 
Counsel at Trial In Jllo/atlon of tht! Sixth 
Amendment Right to FJ!ectiv, Assistance of 
Cou11.sel Under Strickland v. Washington due to 
Counsels' Failure to Object to Evidence That Was 
Inadmissible, Lacking Proper Foundat/011, HlfhlJI 
Prejudicial, and Failure To Object To The 
Improper Comments By The State In Closl11g 
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A1'funutntl, Which Contributed To tlie Ju.ry 
V,rdlt:t In Th/$ Case. (I.C. 6 19-490/(a)(I)) 
63. Severson realleges the facts in paragraphs 1-62 above. 
64. Severson submits the Justice W. JONES dissent and Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL ·s 
concurrence in the dissent to establish that Severson received ineffective assistance of counsel 
due to counsel's failure to object in the state's closing arauments. 
Larry Severson's affidavit establfshina his personal knowledge of the events In 
paraaraphs 1-64 and attesting to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted with this 
. petition will be filed on or before April 26, 20011. Said affidavit was not filed with this petition 
due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severson h85 
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, and the 
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Alternatively, the Cumulative Meet of the 
Deficient Performance Above Prejudiced tl,e 
Petitioner and Thm Dttprlved Him of the /Q/ectJve 
Aulstanc, ofCoun,el at Trial In Jllolatlon oftl,e 
Sixth Amendment Und,r Strickland v. 
Washington. (J.C. 6 19490J(a)(l)) 
6S. Petitioner realleges the facts in paragraphs 1 .. 64 above. 
66. The cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficient performance caused Severson to be 
prejudiced. 
Larry Severson 's affidavit establishing his personal knowledae of the events In 
paragraphs 1-66 and attesting to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted with this 
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• petition will be tlled on or before April 26, 2001 1, Said affidavit was net filed with this petition 
due to difficulties in locatina materials related to this cue. communication with Severaon hu 
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution. and the 
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: P,tltloner r1quuts thefo/lowln1 r1ll«ft 
A. That the judsment be vacated and a new trial be granted; and/or 
B. For such other and further relief u tho Court deems just and proper. 
Respectfully submitted thia lt day of~. 2011. 
/.._.,-J:itz §. 
David J. S era 
' Attorney for Larry Severson 
VERIFICATIQN OF PETITION 
I. Larry Severson. beina duly sworn under oath. state: 
I know of the contents of the foregoing Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and 
that the matters and allegations set forth are true and t to the best of my knowledae and 
belief. 
D SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
.I.J.J~"'"-__ , 2011 
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2086812147 
KIUSTlNA M. SCBINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSBCVTING ATJ'ORNKY 
190 South 4th But 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) S87•2144 ext. 503 
Pacsimile: (208) 587•2147 
ISB#dOPO 
iOCS•CMMl011 
t-; 
' 
lN THB DISTRICf COURT OF THB POUR.TH 1UDIC1AL DISTRICT OP THB 
STAT! OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUNTY OP BLMORB 
LARRY MARVlN SBVER.SON, 
vs. 
STATB OP IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-001408 
S'llPULATIONTO BNLAROB TlMB 
COMBS NOW. The State of Idaho. by and through Kristina M. Schindele, Bbno:re County 
ProscoutingAttorney, and the Defendant, by and tbroughhfs attorney of record, DavidJ. Smethers, 
andharebystipulatetbattho8tate'1answertothoAmendedVerifl«IPetitionPoat..CmmctionReliof 
will be duo within sixty days of tho filing of Petitioner's aftldavit in support of the amended petition 
in this matter. 
DATBDThi~~ofMay2011. 
KRISTINA M. SCHIND.ELB 
BI.MO OUNTY PRO E 
STIPULATION TO BNLARGB TIMB • Pago l 
1/<4 
-- - -, - -- - -~ - ~- I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2086872147 01 :27:150 a.m. OO•OG-2011 
DATBD'Thia ] dayofMay20U. 
BYt_fd-b 
David 1. S 
Attorney for Petltlonor 
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147 
ISB #6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY MARVIN SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-001408 
ORDER FOR STIPULATION TO 
ENLARGE TIME 
BASED UPON the stipulation of the parties filed in this matter, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the State's answer to the Amended Verified Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief will be due within sixty days of the filing of Petitioner's affidavit in support 
of the amended petition in this matter. 
DATED This LiL_ day of May 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the 
following parties by the following means: 
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney 
190 S. 4th East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
David J. Smethers 
I 000 S. Roosevelt, BOISE Idaho 
Fax.336-1263 
DATED thisl~ay of May 2011. 
First Class Mail 
'A Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
)(J First Class Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court 
BY:d~1AK 
Deputy Clerk 
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 SOUTH 4 TH EAST V, , 1 
MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO 83647 
TELEPHONE: (208) 587-2144, ext 503 
FACSIMILE: (208) 587-2147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY M. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
ANSWER TO AMENDED VERIFIED 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
COMES NOW, Kristina M. Schindele, Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
does hereby answer Petitioner's ("Severson") Amended Verified Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief ("Amended Petition") in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO SEVERSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Severson are denied by the state unless specifically 
admitted herein. 
11. 
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO SEVERSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
1. Answering paragraph 1 of the Amended Petition, the Idaho Department of 
Correction's website indicates Severson is currently incarcerated at the Idaho 
Correctional Center in Boise, Idaho. 
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2. Answering paragraph 2 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson is currently serving sentences imposed by the Honorable Michael Wetherell 
pursuant to Severson's convictions for the first-degree murder and poisoning of his wife, 
Mary Severson. 
3. Answering paragraph 3 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the case 
number assigned to Severson's underlying criminal case is Elmore County Case No. 
CR-2002-0000158. 
4. Answering paragraph 4 of the Amended Petition, the state admits a grand 
jury indicted Severson on one count of first-degree murder. The grand jury also indicted 
Severson on one count of poisoning food and/or medicine. As to the first-degree 
murder charge, the indictment read: "That the Defendant, LARRY SEVERSON, on or 
about the 15th day of February 2002, in the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did 
willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with the premeditation, and with malice aforethought, 
kill and murder Mary Severson., [sic] a human being, by overdosing her with sleeping 
pills in violation of Idaho Code Section § [sic] 18-4001, 4002, AND 4003." 
(Capitalization original.) The state further admits that the indictment in relation to the 
first-degree murder charge was later amended, over Severson's objection, to add the 
allegation "and/or by suffocation." 
5. Answering paragraph 5 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that 
Severson had a number of different attorneys during the course of his criminal 
proceedings and that the Elmore County Public Defender's Office was ultimately 
appointed to represent him. The state further admits Ed Frachiseur was appointed as 
"lead counsel" and that Mr. Frachiseur hired Ellison Matthews to serve as co-counsel. 
Mr. Frachiseur and Mr. Matthews represented Severson through trial, and on his post-
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trial motions, but both Mr. Frachiseur and Mr. Matthews withdrew prior to sentencing 
because Severson filed an affidavit with the assistance of attorney Jay Clark, claiming 
wanted to testify at trial but his attorneys would not let him. 
6. Answering paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson filed a motion asserting Mr. Frachiseur had a conflict of interest. The state 
further admits Severson sought to have attorney D. Scott Summer, who he initially 
retained to represent him, continue to represent him despite the appointment of the 
public defender. 
7. Answering paragraph 7 of the Amended Petition, the state admits Aaron 
Bazzoli, the then-elected Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ron Howen 
prosecuted Severson on behalf of the State of Idaho. 
8. Answering paragraph 8 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson did not testify at trial. 
9. Answering paragraph 9 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the jury 
found Severson guilty of both counts alleged in the Indictment. 
10. Answering paragraph 10 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on November 22, 2004. 
11. Answering paragraph 11 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson filed a motion for new trial on November 24, 2004. 
12. Answering paragraph 12 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson filed an "Additional Motion for Judgment of Acquittal" on November 24, 2004, 
and filed an amended motion for a new trial on December 13, 2004. 
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13. Answering paragraph 13 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that, 
on February 22, 2005, the trial court entered a memorandum decision and order 
denying Severson's motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial. 
14. Answering paragraph 14 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that, 
prior to sentencing, Mr. Frachiseur filed a motion to withdraw, which the trial court 
granted. The state further admits the court appointed Rob Lewis to represent Severson 
following Mr. Frachiseur's withdrawal. 
15. Answering paragraph 15 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the 
court imposed sentence on June 22, 2005, and that the sentence imposed was fixed life 
for first-degree murder (Count I) and a fixed 5-year sentencing for poisoning (Count 11). 
16. Answering paragraph 16 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the 
Judgment and Commitment was entered on June 22, 2005. 
17. Answering paragraph 17 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson filed a notice of appeal on July 18, 2005. 
18. Answering paragraph 18 of the Amended Petition, the state admits State 
Appellate Public Defenders Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen represented Severson 
on appeal. 
19. Answering paragraph 19 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Severson's convictions for first-degree murder and 
poisoning and that the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion was filed May 29, 2009, and 
includes the designation 2009 Opinion No. 75. 
20. Answering paragraph 20 of the Amended Petition, the state denies 
Severson "has not filed any other petitions for post-conviction relier in that he did file a 
different petition in this same case on October 22, 2009. The state is, however, 
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unaware of any other post-conviction petitions filed by Severson in relation to Case No. 
CR-2002-0000158. 
21. Answering paragraph 21 of the Amended Petition, the state denies 
"Severson was precluded from testifying by lead counsel Frachiseur." The state further 
denies the allegations set forth in relation to the heading "FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION," 
appearing between paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Amended Petition. 
22. Answering paragraph 22 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny what Severson claims he told either Mr. 
Frachiseur or Mr. Matthews "prior to the jury trial" regarding his position on testifying. 
23. Answering paragraph 23 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny what discussions occurred between Severson 
and Mr. Frachiseur during trial or what direction Mr. Frachiseur gave to Severson 
regarding the manner in which he should communicate to counsel "while court was in 
session." 
24. Answering paragraph 24 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny the number or content of any "notes" written by 
Severson during trial and no such "notes" are attached to either the Amended Petition 
or Severson's accompanying affidavit as evidence in support of Severson's allegation. 
25. Answering paragraph 25 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny what Severson claims was included in his "notes" 
and no such "notes" are attached to either the Amended Petition or Severson's 
accompanying affidavit as evidence in support of Severson's allegation. The state 
affirmatively asserts that, regardless of the content of Severson's alleged "notes," 
"counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of objection to 
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testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that will not be second-
guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of 
ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App. 
1994); .§fil! also Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
26. Answering paragraph 26 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny whether or when "[c]ounsel read and 
acknowledged the information" in Severson's "notes." 
27. Answering paragraph 27 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny the quality of Severson's "rapport'' with Mr. 
Matthews. The state is also without sufficient information to admit or deny what, if 
anything, Mr. Matthews told Severson regarding Mr. Frachiseur's decision-making 
authority vis-a-vis the "notes." To the extent Mr. Matthews advised Severson that Mr. 
Frachiseur had authority to decide "if' and "how the information would be used," such 
advice is consistent with the applicable law governing counsel's authority and 
responsibilities for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. 
28. Answering paragraph 28 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny if, or the number of times, Severson "attempted to 
communicate" with Mr. Frachiseur "about issues he wanted raised on cross examination 
of state's witnesses, inconsistencies in said witnesses testimony, and matters Severson 
intended to present during his testimony." The state is also without sufficient 
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information to admit or deny Severson's allegations regarding Mr. Frachiseur's 
response to Severson's alleged efforts. 
29. Answering paragraph 29 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny whether Severson "asked counsel to examine the 
notes he had written during trial after the jury had rendered its verdicr or whether 
Severson ''was informed that the notes were not available." 
30. Answering paragraph 30 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding what the trial court advised Severson in relation to his right to testify. 
31. Answering paragraph 31 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the trial court's advisements on Severson's right to testify. 
32. Answering paragraph 32 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the trial court's comments to counsel and any comments made by 
"the Bailiff ... about an Exhibit that had been redacted." 
33. Answering paragraph 33 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding any discussion relating to Severson's right to testify. 
34. Answering paragraph 34 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding any discussion relating to Severson's right to testify. 
35. Answering paragraph 35 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding any inquiry made by the trial court "about defense witnesses" and 
any response by Mr. Frachiseur. The state is without sufficient information to admit or 
deny what, if any, conversations occurred between Mr. Matthews and Mr. Frachiseur 
regarding Severson's alleged desire to testify. 
36. Answering paragraph 36 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding any statements made on the record by Mr. Frachiseur about whether 
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Severson would testify. The state is without sufficient information to admit or deny 
what, if any, conversations occurred between Mr. Frachiseur and Severson at that time 
regarding whether Severson would testify. 
37. Answering paragraph 37 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny whether Severson understands the "meaning and 
ramifications of 'consultation[']" or whether he asked Mr. Frachiseur about such. The 
state is also without sufficient information to admit or deny if, or how, Mr. Frachiseur 
responded if Severson, in fact, asked him about such. 
38. Answering paragraph 38 of the Amended Petition, the state denies 
Severson's allegation that Mr. Frachiseur informed him that it was his decision whether 
Severson would testify. The state's denial is based upon Mr. Frachiseur's motion to 
withdraw filed March 21, 2005, wherein Mr. Frachiseur states Severson's claim that he 
"ignored his stated desire to testify and rested the defense's case without permitting him 
to testify, all in alleged violation of his stated desire to testify at trial" is "false." 
39. Answering paragraph 39 of the Amended Petition, the state denies 
Severson told Mr. Frachiseur "that he wanted to testify." The state's denial is based 
upon the contents of Mr. Frachiseur's motion to withdraw, relevant portions of which are 
set forth in paragraph 38, supra. 
40. Answering paragraph 40 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Severson did not testify at trial. 
41 . Answering paragraph 41 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny whether Severson "wrote a note" to Mr. 
Frachiseur after the defense rested regarding his desire to testify. The state is also 
without sufficient information to admit or deny if, or how, Mr. Frachiseur responded to 
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such a note if it was written. The state, however, affirmatively asserts Mr. Frachiseur 
deprive Severson of his right to testify as indicated by Mr. Frachiseur his 
to withdraw, relevant portions of which are set forth in paragraph 38, supra. 
42. Answering paragraph 42 of the Amended Petition, the state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny what, if anything, Mr. Summers told Severson 
after trial about his right to testify. 
43. Answering paragraph 43 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that 
Severson filed an affidavit on March 18, 2005, in which he advised the trial court that he 
"consistently declared to [his] attorneys of record that [he] wanted to testify on [his] own 
behalf," that he expected to testify and that he had no "idea" that he ''was not going to 
be allowed to testify." The state further admits that Mr. Frachiseur filed a motion to 
withdraw based upon the allegations in Severson's affidavit. The state affirmatively 
asserts Mr. Frachiseur denied the allegations set forth in Severson's affidavit as 
explained in Mr. Frachiseur's motion to withdraw wherein he describes Severson's 
allegations as ''false." 
44. Answering paragraph 44 of the Amended Petition, the state admits Rob 
Lewis was appointed to represent Severson after Mr. Frachiseur (and Mr. Matthews) 
withdrew, and that Mr. Lewis represented Severson at sentencing. 
45. Answering paragraph 45 of the Amended Petition, the state denies that 
Severson filed an affidavit "establishing his personal knowledge of the events" alleged in 
his Amended Petition and "attesting to the authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits 
submitted with this petition ... on or before April 26, 2011." The state is without 
sufficient information to admit or deny Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his 
affidavit with his petition. The state affirmatively asserts that the state received an 
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unsigned affidavit from Severson on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State 
received a proclaimed "Verification of Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on 
15, 2011. 
46. Answering paragraph 46 of the Amended Petition, the state incorporates 
its prior responses to paragraphs 1-45. The state further denies the allegations set forth 
in relation to the heading "SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION," appearing between 
paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Amended Petition. 
47. Answering paragraph 47 of the Amended Petition, the transcript of Mr. 
Frachiseur's opening statement speaks for itself. The state admits Mr. Frachiseur's 
opening statement did include the following: "the Severson's were in pretty good 
financial shape." The state, however, denies that Mr. Frachiseur ever represented that 
the defense would call Severson's "financial adviser," whose first name Severson does 
not even know, to "establish Severson's business was doing well and earning a profit." 
The state affirmatively asserts that Severson has failed to support his claim that his 
"business was doing well and earning a profit'' with any evidence and has failed to 
provide an affidavit from his "financial adviser," "FNU Bond," indicating what his/her 
testimony would have been had s/he been called as a witness. Further, "counsel's 
choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of objection to testimony 
fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed 
on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective 
counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924,877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 
788 P.2d at 245-46. 
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48. Answering paragraph 48 of the Amended Petition, the transcript of Marla 
Spence's testimony speaks for itself. The state admits Marla Spence was, at the time of 
an employee of the Elmore County Coroners office and that her duties that 
capacity included completion of a death certificate for Mary Severson. The state further 
admits that Ms. Spence testified about Mary's death certificate and that the death 
certificate was admitted. The state denies that the death certificate was admitted 
without proper foundation and denies that Severson was denied his "right to 
confrontation of witnesses" as a result of the admission of the death certificate. The 
state affirmatively asserts "counsel's . . . manner of cross-examination, and lack of 
objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that will not 
be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a 
claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 
430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46. 
49. Answering paragraph 49 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of Dr. Glen Groben. The state denies Dr. Groben's 
testimony regarding the "samples taken from the victim that were sent to two labs for 
forensic testing," was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for 
finding the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's . . . manner of cross-
examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or 
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show 
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
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other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P .2d at 245-46. 
50. Answering paragraph 50 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of Detective Michael Barclay. The state denies 
Detective Barclay's testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate 
any basis for finding the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's . . . manner of 
cross-examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or 
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show 
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46. 
51. Answering paragraph 51 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of Detective Barclay. The state denies Detective 
Barclay's testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis 
for finding the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's . . . manner of cross-
examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or 
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show 
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P .2d at 245-46. 
52. Answering paragraph 52 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of John Urban. The state denies Mr. Urban's 
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testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for finding 
the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's ... manner of cross-examination, and 
lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that 
will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under 
a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review. ~. 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 
430•31 I 788 p ,2d at 245•46, 
53. Answering paragraph 53 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of John Heitkemper. The state denies Mr. 
Heitkemper's testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any 
basis for finding the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's ... manner of cross-
examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or 
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show 
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46. 
54. Answering paragraph 54 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding statements made by Mr. Frachiseur during cross-examination of Dr. 
John Welch and "observations" made by Mr. Matthews in relation to the "weigh[t]" and 
need to examine exhibits. The state denies there was any basis for continuing the trial 
or for sanctions based upon the timing of disclosure of evidence, and Severson has 
failed to articulate any basis for concluding counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
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motion to continue or a motion for mistrial. See Wolf v. State, 2011 WL 1900460 *3 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. 
App.1996) ('Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is 
generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test"). 
55. Answering paragraph 55 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of David Bourne. The state denies Mr. Bourne's 
testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for finding 
the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's ... manner of cross-examination, and 
lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that 
will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under 
a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 
430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46. 
56. Answering paragraph 56 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding any "comment made by the prosecutor about Severson refusing to 
turn over capsules to the FDA," and Mr. Matthew's and the trial court's response to the 
comment. Paragraph 56 does not include any allegation as to why Severson would be 
entitled to relief based on the facts asserted therein, and the state denies any relief is 
warranted. 
57. Answering paragraph 57 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of Steven Bock. Severson's allegation regarding a 
''fraudulent" application for financing related to "the Severson's residence on Poppy 
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Street" is unsupported by evidence. The state denies any identified portions of Mr. 
Sock's testimony were objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for 
finding the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's . . . manner of cross-
examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or 
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show 
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46. 
58. Answering paragraph 58 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of Mary Bledsoe. Paragraph 58 of the Amended 
Petition contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Bledsoe's testimony, and 
the state denies any. 
59. Answering paragraph 59 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of Leann Watkins. Paragraph 59 of the Amended 
Petition contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Watkins' testimony, and the 
state denies any. 
60. Answering paragraph 60 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding the testimony of Jennifer Watkins. Paragraph 60 of the Amended 
Petition contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Watkins' testimony, and the 
state denies any. 
61. Answering paragraph 61 of the Amended Petition, the state admits 
Jennifer Watkins was not cross-examined by defense counsel. The state affirmatively 
asserts "counsel's ... manner of cross-examination ... fall[s] within the area of tactical, 
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or strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis 
for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show 
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46. The state further asserts 
Severson has failed to identify what cross-examination should have been conducted 
and has failed to articulate or provide an affidavit from Ms. Watkins stating what her 
testimony would have been had she been cross-examined. 
62. Answering paragraph 62 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks 
for itself regarding testimony of Tracy Besler. Paragraph 62 of the Amended Petition 
contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Besler's testimony, and the state 
denies any. The state also denies that Severson filed an affidavit "establishing his 
personal knowledge of the events" alleged in his Amended Petition and "attesting to the 
authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits submitted with this petition ... on or 
before April 26, 2011." The state is without sufficient information to admit or deny 
Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his affidavit with his petition. The state 
affirmatively asserts that the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson on 
June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed "Verification of 
Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011. 
63. Answering paragraph 63 of the Amended Petition, the state incorporates 
its prior responses to paragraphs 1-62. The state further denies the allegations set forth 
in relation to the heading "THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION," appearing between paragraphs 
62 and 63 of the Amended Petition. 
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64. Answering paragraph 64 of the Amended Petition, the state denies the 
dissenting opinion of Justice W. Jones joined by Pro Tern Justice Kidwell "establish that 
Severson received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object in 
the state's closing argument." The state affirmatively asserts the majority opinion of the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Severson's direct appeal from his convictions establishes 
otherwise. The state also denies that Severson filed an affidavit "establishing his 
personal knowledge of the events" alleged in his Amended Petition and "attesting to the 
authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits submitted with this petition ... on or 
before April 26, 2011." The state is without sufficient information to admit or deny 
Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his affidavit with his petition. The state 
affirmatively asserts that the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson on 
June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed "Verification of 
Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011. 
65. Answering paragraph 65 of the Amended Petition, the state incorporates 
its prior responses to paragraphs 1-64. The state further denies the allegations set forth 
in relation to the heading "FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION," appearing between 
paragraphs 64 and 65 of the Amended Petition. 
66. Answering paragraph 66 of the Amended Petition, the state denies the 
"cumulative effect of trial counsel's [sic] deficient performance caused Severson to be 
prejudiced." The state affirmatively asserts Severson is required to establish prejudice 
as to each of his claims and that he has failed to allege, much less demonstrate, 
prejudice as to each of his claims. The state also denies that Severson filed an affidavit 
"establishing his personal knowledge of the events" alleged in his Amended Petition and 
"attesting to the authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits submitted with this petition 
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. .. on or before April 26, 2011." The state is without sufficient information to admit or 
deny Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his affidavit with his petition. The 
state affirmatively asserts that the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson 
on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed "Verification of 
Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Severson's petition should be dismissed because he has failed to comply with 
the requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(a), by failing to file an affidavit setting forth the 
"[f]acts within [his] personal knowledge." 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent any of the claims in Severson's Amended Petition do not relate 
back to his original petition, the claims should be dismissed as untimely. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Severson's Amended Petition contains bare and conclusory allegations 
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-
4906. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent any of Severson's claims should have been raised on direct 
appeal, the claims are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-4901 (b). 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) that Severson's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) that Severson's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed; 
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c) for such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary the case. 
DATED this 5tti day of August 2011. 
NGATIORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to 
the following parties by the following means: 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
Facsimile No. 336-1263 
__ First Class Mail 
--r Hand Delivery 
_V"_ Facsimile 
e:;1-
DATED this _"J_ day of August 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRYM. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
ORDER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
This matter is before the Court following Petitioner Severson's filing of a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief on October 13, 2009, pursuant to LC. § 19-4901, et seq. (Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA)). After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the 
Petitioner was found guilty of First-Degree Murder, Felony, and Poisoning, Felony; the victim 
and both counts being his wife. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without parole. 
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction, 
which was upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson, 
147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case 
are found in that decision and incorporated herein by reference. 
The Petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 13, 2009. On 
December 11, 2009, this Court appointed a public defender for the Petitioner and David Smethers 
was appointed as conflict counsel for the Elmore County Public Defender following a renewed order 
on January 27, 2010. Mr. Smethers requested a stay in proceedings and that the Court take no 
action granting partial summary dismissal until a scheduling order is issued by this Court. 
Proceedings were stayed for an additional ninety days but the order stated that no scheduling 
order would be issued until an amended petition was filed and response made by the State. 
Another request for extension to file petition was granted until December 16, 2010. An 
additional four-month extension was granted until April 18, 2011. 
While the Petitioner never moved the Court for permission to amend the petition , this 
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Court finds the requests for extensions and subsequent orders granted leave to file an amended 
petition. Since the amended petition relates back to the original petition flied within one 
year of the decision on appeal, such amended petition is timely. 
An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed on April 18, 
2011. An affidavit in support of post conviction petition was filed on October 22, 2009 with the 
original petition. The amended petition alleged that an affidavit was not filed with the amended 
petition "due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with 
Severson has been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, 
and the voluminous materials associated with this post-conviction relief." The Respondent's 
Counsel requested the court take judicial notice of ''the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged 
documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Counsel 
also included a notice of filing of judically noticed material on April 18, 2011 which included the 
trial transcript including the opening and closing arguments, and the Clerk's Record and 
Supplemental Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal. The court will take judicial 
notice of the matters in the notice of filing of judicially noticed material. 
An order to enlarge time for the State's Answer until sixty days after the filing of the 
Petitioner's affidavit was granted. The State filed its Answer to the amended verified petition on 
August 5, 2011. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 66 of the Respondent's Answer denies that the Petitioner 
filed an affidavit but affirmatively asserts "the state received an unsigned affidavit from 
Severson on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed 'Verification of 
Petition' signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011." No affidavits or other statements 
were filed with the court except the affidavit of the Petitioner filed on October 13, 2009. 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature. 
It is distinct :from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 
P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991). Like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden of 
proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). 
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SCHEDULING ORDER FOR AMENDED PETITION 
Either party has until February 10, 
summary disposition of the application. 
to motions, affidavits and supporting briefs 
If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavit( s) and a response brief, it must do 
so within fourteen (14) days of being served the motion for summary disposition. 
The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief within seven (7) days of being served 
the response brief. 
If no motions, affidavits, or supporting briefs for summary disposition are filed by 
January 31, 2012, the Court will consider this matter submitted to the Court for decision pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 19-4901, et seq. 
ANY OBJECTION TO THIS SCHEDULING ORDER MUST BE FILED AND 
SERVED WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS 
ORDER. IF THERE IS A TIMELY OBJECTION, THEN THE OBJECTING PARTY MUST 
NOTICE A SCHEDULING CONFERENCE FOR HEARING IN ELMORE COUNTY. 
FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT WILL WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO THIS 
SCHEDULING ORDER. 
~ 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this J3 day of January, 2012. 
Lynn~ 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the 
following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83 705 
U.S.MAIL 
Dated this 13th day of January, 2012. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI7Ji' Pl, 
THE 
LARRYM. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
AM&tJD€0 
ORDER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
This matter is before the Court following Petitioner Severson's filing of a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief on October 13, 2009, pursuant to I.C. §19-4901, et seq. (Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA)). After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the 
Petitioner was found guilty of First-Degree Murder, Felony, and Poisoning, Felony; the victim 
and both counts being his wife. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without parole. 
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction, 
which was upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson, 
147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case 
are found in that decision and incorporated herein by reference. 
The Petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 13, 2009. On 
December 11, 2009, this Court appointed a public defender for the Petitioner and David Smethers 
was appointed as conflict counsel for the Elmore County Public Defender following a renewed order 
on January 27, 2010. Mr. Smethers requested a stay in proceedings and that the Court take no 
action granting partial summary dismissal until a scheduling order is issued by this Court. 
Proceedings were stayed for an additional ninety days but the order stated that no scheduling 
order would be issued until an amended petition was filed and response made by the State. 
Another request for extension to file petition was granted until December 16, 2010. An 
additional four-month extension was granted until April 18, 2011. 
While the Petitioner never moved the Court for permission to amend the petition , this 
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Court finds the requests for extensions and subsequent orders granted leave to file an amended 
..,..,.,, .. "''"· Since the amended petition relates back to the original petition filed within one 
year of the decision on appeal, such amended petition is timely. 
An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed on April 18, 
2011. An affidavit in support of post conviction petition was filed on October 22, 2009 with the 
original petition. The amended petition alleged that an affidavit was not filed with the amended 
petition "due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with 
Severson has been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, 
and the voluminous materials associated with this post-conviction relief." The Respondent's 
Counsel requested the court take judicial notice of "the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged 
documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Counsel 
also included a notice of filing of judically noticed material on April 18, 2011 which included the 
trial transcript including the opening and closing arguments, and the Clerk's Record and 
Supplemental Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal. The court will take judicial 
notice of the matters in the notice of filing of judicially noticed material. 
An order to enlarge time for the State's Answer until sixty days after the filing of the 
Petitioner's affidavit was granted. The State filed its Answer to the amended verified petition on 
August 5, 2011. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 66 of the Respondent's Answer denies that the Petitioner 
filed an affidavit but affirmatively asserts ''the state received an unsigned affidavit from 
Severson on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed 'Verification of 
Petition' signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011." No affidavits or other statements 
were filed with the court except the affidavit of the Petitioner filed on October 13, 2009. 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature. 
It is distinct from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 
P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991). Like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden of 
proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). 
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SCHEDULING ORDER FOR AMENDED PETITION 
Either party has until February l 
summary disposition of the application. 
to file motions, affidavits and supporting briefs 
If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavit( s) and a response brief, it must do 
so within fourteen (14) days of being served the motion for summary disposition. 
The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief within seven (7) days of being served 
the response brief. 
,-.,,.. If no motions, affidavits, or supporting briefs for summary disposition are filed by 
~im<~_,o 
:Jaftum~, 2012, the Court will consider this matter submitted to the Court for decision pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 19-4901, et seq. 
ANY OBJECTION TO THIS SCHEDULING ORDER MUST BE FILED AND 
SERVED WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS 
ORDER. IF THERE IS A TIMELY OBJECTION, THEN THE OBJECTING PARTY MUST 
NOTICE A SCHEDULING CONFERENCE FOR HEARING IN ELMORE COUNTY. 
FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT WILL WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO THIS 
SCHEDULING ORDER. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this /<3fty of January, 2012. 
Lynn~ 
District Judge 
Scheduling Order - 3 -
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the 
following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83 705 
U.S. MAIL 
Dated this 19th day of January, 2012. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
FEB-07 2012(TUE) Hi: 39 Sa 11 az & Gatewood, PLLC. (FAX)208 3361263 
DAVID J. SMETI-IBRS 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
208-336-1145 
208-336-1263 
Attorney for Petitioner 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D1STR1CT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON ) 
) CASE NO. CV·2009-001408 
Petitioner ) 
) OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING ORDER; 
vs. ) MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME TO BE HEARD 
) ON SCHEDULING ORDER; REQUEST FOR 
STATE OF IDAHO ) AN EXTENSION TO FILE MOTIONS, 
) AFFIDAVITS, AND SUPORTING BRIEFS; 
Respondent. ) REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, and requests this 
Court for relief from the AMENDED ORDER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND 
SCHEDULING ORDER file stamped January 19, 2012, as set forth in the caption of this 
motion for the following reasons: 
-Counsel for the petitioner received the aforementioned order on January 23, 2012; 
·Counsel for the petitioner will not be able to submit the requisite documents by February 
10, 2012, (sec affidavit of counsel, attached); 
The petitioner requests this Court to enlarge the time to be heard on the 
scheduling order, grant an extension on the time to file motions, affidavits, and 
supporting briefs, and grant a scheduling conference in this matter. A hearing is 
requested, or petitioner requests to be heard at the time of the requested scheduling 
conference. 
OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING ORDER; MOTION 1'0 ENLARGE TIME TO BE 
I-IEARD ON SCHEDULING ORDER; REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION TO FILE 
MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND SUPORTING BRIEFS; REQUEST FOR 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 1 of 2 
P. 002/005 
I 6 
FEB-07-2012 TUE) 16:39 Sallaz & Gatewood. PLLC. (FAX)208 3361263 
I ~{_,, 
~' David J. Smc crs 
~;2-l'L-
Datc 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the '7 day of 7-4 . 2012, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was: 
Hand delivered ~axed Mailed to the: 
-- -~--
Elmore CounLy Prosecutor's Office 
~-/-..£--~----
David J. Smetherl 
OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING ORDER; MffflON TO ENLARGE TIME TO BE 
HEARD ON SCHEDULING ORDER; REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION 1'0 FILE 
MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND SUPOR.TING BR1EFS; REQUEST FOR 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 2 of2 
P. 003/005 
David J. Smethers 
SMETHERS LAW OFFICE 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83 705 
Telephone: (208) 336-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THESTA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
SEVERSON, LARRY M. 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW, the above named Petitioner, by and through counsel of David J. 
Smethers, and does hereby respond to each point in the state's MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL sequentially by page as follows: 
MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Page 1- The state admits in their motion that petitioner's first claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel has merit and unreservedly concedes this issue should be heard by 
this Court. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
Page I7-
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL - I 
ORIGINAL 
3/ 
The state argues that petitioner's amended petition does not sufficiently relate 
to the petition. initial petition and the amended petition speak 
petition cites ineffective assistance 
specific categories that adequately preserves these issues for post conviction 
determination. The amended petition further expands and develops these issues. The 
state was on notice and can show no prejudice from the issues covered in the amended 
petition. Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time of the initial filing. 1 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, (hereafter "IRCP'115(b) permits the Court to 
allow the pleadings to be amended and "shall do so freely when the merits of the action 
will be subserved thereby ... ". Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd, 135 Idaho 495, 
500, 20 P.3d 679,684 (2000), holds, "The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be 
decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements." The Court has 
wide discretion in permitting amendments to the pleadings, 2 and the standard for 
allowing amendments is abuse of discretion.3 
Pages 18-21 
Petitioner reiterates all arguments at "Page 17" on the issue of the amended 
petition relating back to the initial petition. Once again, at the time the petitioner filed the 
initial petition, he was not represented by counsel. 
All issues listed by the state in this section of their brief establish that trial counsel 
was ineffective for the reasons stated in petitioner's initial and amended petition, these 
1 Present counsel had great difficulty amassing the materials necessary for this case due to the fact the 
petitioner was represented by some nine attorneys at different stages of the criminal proceedings, part of the 
file was destroyed in a flood in the Elmore County's Public Defender's Office, and the court reporter's CD 
of the trial transcript was compromised and not available to counsel. 
2 Obray v Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533 (1977). 
3 Sweitzer v Dean, 118 Idaho 568 (1990). 
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citations by the state supports petitioner's claims in this post conviction action. On page 
the last sentence of the continuation paragraph, the state argues, majority 
ineffective assistance claims no resemblance to 
specific ineffective assistance of counsel claims Severson alleged in his original 
Petition." The state does not specifically list which of these 16 "majority" claims "bear 
no resemblance" to the claims in the initial petition. Once again, a pro se defendant 
initiating at post conviction cannot be held to the standards required after appointment of 
counsel. 
It is noteworthy that on page 21, l st full paragraph, the state once again concedes 
that petitioner's original petition was sufficient to establish ineffective assistance as to the 
issue of failing to request a mistrial, (by arguing that the initial petition was sufficient, 
petitioner is not conceding the amended petition does not properly relate back to said 
initial petition). 
Pages 21-26 
The state does an commendable job of citing appropriate case law and attendant 
precedential rulings, then makes a series of bland, broad, and dismissive statements 
arguing that petitioner has not met his burden in the Second through Fourth Causes of 
Action. Petitioner's affidavit establishes that material issues of fact exist as to whether 
trial counsels' performance was deficient, and a material issues of fact exist as to whether 
the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner's case. 
Page 26-27 
The state correctly asserts that at the time petitioner executed the affidavit he was 
unaware of the first name of financial adviser Bond that trial counsel promised would be 
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called to prove to the jury that the petitioner's financial condition was good at the time of 
death. 4 affidavit at page # is sufficient to preserve this 
this Court. state argues that 
a vital witness that would negate the state's evidence that the petitioner's main motive for 
killing the victim was financial was a "trial tactic" or "strategic choice(s)". This 
purported ''tactic" or "choice" confirms that counsel were deficient in their performance. 
Petitioner's affidavit at page 5, #35, establishes that the automotive repair business was 
showing a profit with gross income in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Page 28-
Testimony of Marla Spence regarding death certificates: Petitioner argues that 
Marla Spence appeared on the stand with death certificates, and the state was allowed to 
place these certificates in front of the jury without any regard for the rules of evidence. 
One essential element of the state's case was proving the death of the victim, conclusive 
evidence of this element was placed in front of the jury without challenge. This Court 
cannot fmd that holding the state to their burden of proof on an essential element that 
must be established by the state is a strategic decision. 
Page 29-40 
The state continues with the same arguments for some eleven pages, alleging the 
ineffective performance by counsel does not state a claim, tactical decisions, insufficient 
in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, et al. These arguments ignore the 
petitioner's affidavit and two petitions. The petitions and affidavit clearly place these 
subjects at issue in this case. 
Page41-43 
4 See Footnote 1 
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In the State v Severson, 147 Idaho 723, three members of the Supreme Court 
acknowledged numerous and egregious examples of prosecutorial misconduct at various 
stages of the trial. bare majority then reviewed the record to determine 
petitioner's counsel had preserved the record by making proper and timely objections to 
said misconduct. Proper objections to misconduct would preserve the issues for appellate 
review. Lack of an objection moved review of the misconduct to a fundamental error 
analysis as decided in State v Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, et al. This bare majority then 
decided and denied petitioner's appeal partially based on the fact that many instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct were not preserved for appellate review as trial counsel did not 
make proper and/or timely objections. The fact that the Supreme Court is able to use this 
default analysis of fundamental error establishes and proves ineffective assistance of 
counsel as alleged in petitioner's petitions. The UNIFORM POST CONVICTION 
PROCEDURE ACT exists because of and as a remedy for cases such as the petitioner's. 
Justice W. Jones and Justice Pro Tern Kidwell confirm and substantiate this argument in 
their nine page dissent: 
"I find the prosecutor's conduct relentless and a blatant abuse of power; time and time 
again the prosecutor continued to engage in a pattern of conduct which waivered on and 
over the edge of appropriate conduct. Severson's fifth issue on appeal asserted that he was 
denied a fair trial due to the serious and unrelenting acts ofprosecutorial misconduct.n, 
Severson, (supra), at p 38. 
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Petitioner argues the three justice majority in Severson implicitly ruled that but-
the ineffective and inadequate performance by counsel, the guilty verdict would have 
vacated on appeal. 
The petitioner's affidavit clearly establishes that the testimony he would have 
presented to the jury would have helped convince the jury of his innocence. The 
petitioner would have presented testimony that would have contradicted the state's 
evidence, and/or established an alternative explanation for said evidence, which would 
undoubtedly overcome a harmless error analysis. 
The fact trial counsel deemed it necessary to withdraw from the case after verdict 
but prior to sentencing is telling and dispositve. Petitioner's filing with the court after the 
jury trial stating that trial counsel did not allow petitioner to testify is sufficient standing 
alone to establish ineffective assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
Two recent US Supreme Court with decisions5 released March 21, 2012, portend 
future trends for cases where indigent citizens are represented by public defenders. These 
decisions dealt with public defenders' failure to fully apprise clients of plea bargains. 
These broad holdings signal that the appellate courts will now be required to examine all 
facets of representation by appointed counsel, i.e., the rights of indigent clients were 
greatly expanded by this ruling. That being said, in determining whether petitioner in this 
case deserves a hearing on his petition and amended petition, this Court can utilize well 
settled case law and relevant rules and statutes to decide said hearing is mandated under 
the facts in this record. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this)) day of March, 2012. 
5 Missouri v Frye and Lafler Cooper 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this~3day of March, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by the method indicated 
below: 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
190 S. 4th E. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
M United States mail 
f\j Facsimile: (208) 587-2147 
[ ] Other: 
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 SOUTH 4 TH EAST 
MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO 83647 
TELEPHONE: (208) 587-2144, ext 503 
FACSIMILE: (208) 587-2147 
I.S.8. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY M. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE 
STATE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
. COMES NOW,. Kristina Schindele, Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
hereby submits this reply brief in support of the state's motion for partial summary 
dismissal of Petitioner's ("Severson") amended petition for post-conviction relief 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c). 
On February 13, 2012, the state filed a motion for partial summary dismissal and 
supporting brief (hereafter "Motion"), in which it requested summary dismissal of all 
claims raised in Severson's amended petition with the exception of his first claim. 
Severson filed his response to the state's motion on March 26, 2012 (hereafter 
"Response"). Pursuant to the Court's Amended Order of Judicial Notice and Scheduling 
Order, the state hereby submits this reply. 
Reply Brief In Support Of Respondent's Motion For Partial Summary Dismissal • 1 
A. Severson Has Failed To Establish That Several Of His Claims Are Not Barred By 
The Statute Of Limitation 
In its Motion, the state requested summary dismissal of all of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims alleged in the Second Cause of Action in Severson's 
Amended Petition, with the exception of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to request a mistrial, based on the one-year statute of limitation and the fact that the 
claims in the amended petition did not relate back to Severson's original timely petition. 
In response, Severson argues his "initial petition cites ineffective assistance of counsel 
and lists eight specific categories that adequately preserves these issues for post 
conviction determination" and that his "amended petition further expands and develops 
these issues." (Response, p.2.) 
While Severson correctly notes that he listed "eight specific categories" in his 
original petition, a point the state acknowledged in its Motion (Motion, p.19), he is 
incorrect in his assertion that the claims in his amended petition simply "further expandO 
and develop[] these issues." As explained in the state's Motion, there is a significant 
difference between Severson's claim that counsel failed to "examine" a witness as 
alleged in his original petition and his claims in his amended petition that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to certain testimony, call an expert, or "recall witnesses." 
(Motion, pp.18-20.) Severson's implicit claim that there is a core of similarity between 
several of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he alleges in his amended 
petition and those alleged in his original petition is without merit. 
Severson also asserts in response to the state's statute of limitation defense that 
I.R.C.P. 15(b) allows liberal amendment. (Response, p.2.) This argument misses the 
point Nothing in I.R.C.P. 15(b) authorizes avoidance of a statute of limitation defense. 
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4 
To the contrary, amendment after the statute of limitation expires is only appropriate if 
amendment relates back to the original claim. See Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 
1 2, 1 6, 729 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Ct. App. 1986). If there is no relation back, as the 
state contends here, the claim is subject to dismissal based on the statute of limitation. 
Severson's claims to the contrary are without merit. 
Any suggestion by Severson that the fact he was not represented by counsel 
when he filed his original petition excuses non-compliance with the statute of limitation 
also lacks merit. (See Response, p.2.) This argument is not only unsupported by any 
authority, it seems contrary to the principle that post-conviction counsel cannot eliminate 
or abandon claims raised in a pro se petition without the petitioner's consent. See 
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008). 
For the reasons set forth in the state's Motion, and because Severson has failed 
to offer any reason for tolling the statute of limitation or provide an adequate basis for 
concluding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his amended petition relate 
back to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his original petition, the state 
requests summary dismissal of the claims alleged in paragraphs 47-55 and 57-62 
based on the statute of limitation.1 
1 On page 3 of his Response, Severson argues: "the state ... concedes that 
petitioner's original petition was sufficient to establish ineffective assistance as to the 
issue of failing to request a mistrial." Nowhere in its Motion does the state "concedeO" 
Severson has "establish[ed] ineffective assistance as to the issue of failing to request a 
mistrial." To be clear, with respect to Severson's claim that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request a mistrial, the only "concession" the state makes is that the claim was 
raised in the original petition and, therefore, would not be subject to dismissal based on 
the statute of limitation, which is precisely why this claim is not included in the state's 
specific request for dismissal as stated on page 21 of its Response, which excludes 
paragraph 56 of the amended petition where that particular claim is alleged. This 
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8. Severson Has Failed To Allege A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Claim Other Than Claim One 
In response to the state's argument that he has failed to allege a genuine issue 
of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any claim with the exception of 
his first claim, Severson commends the state for its citation to "appropriate case law and 
attendant precedential rulings" but asserts the state "then makes a series of bland, 
broad, and dismissive statements arguing that petitioner has not met his burden in the 
Second through Fourth Causes of Action." (Response, p.3.) The state would, of 
course, disagree with Severson's characterization of its Motion given that the reasons 
for dismissal are stated with particularity as is required. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1 ); DeRushe v. 
State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P .3d 1148, 1150 (2009). If anything suffers from a lack 
of specificity, it is Severson's response to the state's Motion, which, with a few 
exceptions that will be discussed below, consists of the generic response: "Petitioner's 
affidavit establishes that material issues of fact exist as to whether trial counsels' 
performance was deficient, and a material [sic] issues of fact exist as to whether the 
deficiency prejudiced the petitioner's case." (Response, p.3; see also p.4.) Merely 
saying something is so does not make it so. 
1. Claim Alleged In Paragraph 47 
Severson acknowledges the state is correct in its assertion that when he 
"executed the affidavit'' filed in support of his petition, he ''was unaware of the first name 
of financial adviser Bond that trial counsel promised would be called to prove to the jury 
that the petitioner's financial condition was good at the time of the victim's death." 
"concession" is far different than conceding that Severson has actually established 
counsel was ineffective in this regard. 
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(Response, pp.3-4.) Severson has not cured this deficiency but instead asserts his 
is "sufficient to preserve this issue for a decision by this Court." (Response, 
Severson is incorrect. The law clearly requires Severson to support his claim with 
evidence. What Severson thinks a witness could testify to is not evidence - it is 
speculation that is wholly inadequate for purposes of establishing a genuine issue of 
material fact that would entitle Severson to an evidentiary hearing. Self v. State, 145 
Idaho 578,581,181 P.3d 504,507 (Ct. App. 2007); Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,844 
P.2d 706 (1993). Without admissible evidence of what "FNU Bond" would actually 
testify to, Severson cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that counsel 
was deficient for failing to call this person as a witness, much less that he was 
prejudiced by counsel's failure to do so. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed. 
2. Claim Alleged In Paragraph 48 
In response to the state's request for summary dismissal of Severson's claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to "assert[] Severson's right of confrontation of 
witnesses" in relation to Marla Spence's testimony regarding "the two death certificates" 
and failing to object based on foundation (Amended Petition, p.7), Severson argues: 
Marla Spence appeared on the stand with death certificates, and 
the state was allowed to place these certificates in front of the jury without 
any regard for the rules of evidence. One essential element of the state's 
case was proving the death of the victim, conclusive evidence of this 
element was placed in front of the jury without challenge. This Court 
cannot find that holding the state to their burden of proof on an essential 
element that must be established by the state is a strategic decision. 
(Response, p.4.) 
This argument fails for several reasons. First, Severson cannot seriously 
contend that Mary Severson did not die, much less that the death certificates were the 
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only "conclusive evidence" of her death. Second, whether or not the state established 
proper foundation for the death certificates has nothing to do with Severson's claim that 
right to confrontation was violated as a result of the state introducing the certificates; 
thus, Severson offers no explanation as to why that portion of his claim should not be 
dismissed. Third, even assuming the state did not lay proper foundation for the death 
certificates, Severson has failed to explain why counsel's failure to object based on 
foundation would be deficient. Severson's argument assumes the state would be 
unable to lay foundation, which is highly unlikely, making an objection on this basis a 
waste of time and a decision not to object more than reasonable. Fourth, and still 
assuming the state did not lay proper foundation for the death certificates, Severson 
provides no reason for concluding he was prejudiced as a result of the certificates being 
introduced into evidence. The question at trial was not whether Mary Severson was 
dead; the question was whether Severson murdered her. Moreover, evidence 
regarding the medical examiner's conclusion as to how Mary died came from trial 
testimony from the medical examiner himself, not the death certificates. 
Severson's claim that he has a raised a genuine issue of material fact entitling 
him to an evidentiary hearing regarding the introduction of the death certificates is 
without merit. 
Severson has failed to present any admissible facts or evidence to support any of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in his Second Cause of Action. His 
own affidavit, which does not even address the vast majority of the claims, does not 
provide a sufficient factual basis for any of the claims. For these reasons and those set 
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forth in the State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal, the Second Cause of Action 
should be summarily dismissed in its entirety. 
C. Severson's Third Cause Of Action Should Be Summarily Dismissed 
In response to the state's request for summary dismissal of his third cause of 
action, in which Severson appears to allege ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 
to object during closing argument, Severson essentially just repeats the allegations from 
his amended petition. (Response, pp.5-6.) No additional response is required from the 
state with respect to this claim, and the state submits it is entitled to summary dismissal 
of this claim for the reasons set forth in its Motion. 
D. Severson's Remaining Arguments Lack Merit 
In his Response, Severson contends, "[t]he fact trial counsel deemed it 
necessary to withdraw from the case after verdict but prior to sentencing is telling and 
dispositve [sic]." (Response, p.6 (emphasis original).) Severson does not explain what 
counsel's withdrawal is supposed to be "dispositive" of for purposes of the partial 
summary dismissal sought by the State. To the extent Severson believes counsel's 
withdrawal proves counsel was ineffective, this claim is specious. 
Severson also argues that his ''filing with the court after the jury trial stating that 
trial counsel did not allow petitioner to testify is sufficient standing alone to establish 
ineffective assistance." (Response, p.6.) The purpose of this argument is unclear. To 
the extent Severson is suggesting that his allegations alone prove he is entitled to relief, 
such an assertion is erroneous. While Severson's allegation may be sufficient to entitle 
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him to an evidentiary hearing at which he can attempt to prove he is entitled to relief, his 
allegations do not entitle him to relief based solely on the pleadings. 
Severson's final "argumenr references two recent United States Supreme Court 
cases - Missouri v. Frye, --- U.S. ---, 2012 WL 932020 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 
2012 WL 932019 (2012), and argues the "broad holdings" of these cases "signal that 
the appellate courts will now be required to examine all face ts of representation by 
appointed counsel, i.e., the rights of indigent clients were greatly expanded by this 
ruling." (Response, p.6.) Both~ and Cooper involved evaluation of trial counsel's 
obligations vis-a-vis communicating and advising clients on plea offers and can in no 
way be interpreted as "requir[ing]" appellate courts to "examine all facets of 
representation by appointed counsel," or as "expanding" a defendant's rights. Further, 
these cases have absolutely no bearing on any claim in Severson's petition, much less 
any relevance to whether he has established a genuine issue of material fact entitling 
him to an evidentiary hearing. 
For the reasons set forth in the state's Motion, and in this reply, the state is 
entitled to summary dismissal of all the claims alleged in Severson's amended petition 
with the exception of his first claim. 
DATED this 30th day of March 2012. 
KRISTI A M. SCHINDELE 
EL E COUNTY RROS CUTI NG ATTORNEY 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to 
the following parties by the following means: 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
Facsimile No. 336-1263 
davidj@smetherslaw.com 
The Honorable Lynn Norton 
Bench Copy 
lnorton@adaweb.net 
__ First Class Mail 
_)'tand Delivery 
~Facsimile 
_..;;;;:::, {?()\. A-J 
~mail 
DATED this 30th day of March 2012. 
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
1 South 4th East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147 
ISB No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY MARVIN SEVERSON, ) Case No. CV-2009-001408 
Petitioner, ) 
) SECOND MOTION 
vs. ) FOR ORDER GRANTING 
) SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, The State ofldaho, by and through Kristina M. Schindele, Elmore County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves this Court for an order granting summary dismissal of Petitioner 
Larry Marvin Severson's initial petition for post-conviction relief. The State is asking the Court to 
summarily dismiss all of the claims raised in Severson' s initial petition with the exception of Severson' s claim 
that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing or refusing to pennit Severson to testify in his own 
defense at trial. The State is filing a memorandum setting forth the bases for this motion contemporaneously 
herewith. 
DATED This 81h day of June 2012. 
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TING ATTORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following 
parties by the following means: 
David J. Smethers 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1000 South Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
Facsimile No.336-1263 
davidj@smetherslaw.com 
The Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
Bench Copy 
lnorton@adaweb.net 
DA TED this 8th day of June 2012. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMO OUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
SECOND MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
46 
THE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ELMORR'., ,. ~ A , , .- _ 
6'1{n Ml\ " c.t.Lt 
CLERK OF THE~J§··. T DEPUT 
LARRYM. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Appearances: 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
CLAIMS RELATED TO INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
David Smethers for Petitioner in person, Mr. Severson telephonically 
Kristina Schindele for Respondent 
This matter came before the Court on May 9, 2012 for a hearing on the Respondent's 
Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal on the Petitioner's Amended Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
This was Mr. Severson's first appearance before the court in this proceeding and he 
stated that he had not abandoned the claims in the original petition; the claims in the amended 
verified petition were in addition to the claims in the original petition. Since the Court Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss was filed two and one-half years prior to this hearing and the Petitioner had 
since been appointed counsel, and because the court had never addressed the status of the 
amended petition, the Respondent was granted additional time to address the claims in the 
original petition since the record was not clear that the amended petition was not meant to 
substitute for the original petition. However, the Court heard arguments on the Motion for Order 
Granting Summary Dismissal that had been filed addressing the amended petition. This decision 
only addresses the claims in the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the original Petition. The court will issue a 
decision on the remaining claims in the original petition after additional briefing. 
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Additionally, the Respondent's brief in support of the motion referenced Mr. Severson's 
subsequent affidavit that had never been filed with the Court. The Petitioner filed an Affidavit 
M. Severson at the hearing and Mr. Severson acknowledged that he knew of the contents 
and had signed the affidavit. The Court considered the Respondent's Motion for Order Granting 
Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support filed February 13, 2012 (hereinafter 
"Respondent's Motion"), the Petitioner's Response to Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal 
filed March 25, 2012 (hereinafter "Response"), the Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of the 
State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed March 30, 2012 (hereinafter "Reply), the 
Affidavit of Larry M. Severson filed on the day of the hearing (hereinafter "Severson's second 
affidavit"), the Petitioner's Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition filed on 
October 22, 2009 (hereinafter "Severson's first affidavit"), and the pleadings which include the 
Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief filed October 22, 2009 (hereinafter "Petition"), 
the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter 
"Amended Petition"), and the Respondent's Answer to Amended Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief filed on August 5, 2011. 
BACKGROUND 
After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the Petitioner was found 
guilty of two felonies, First-Degree Murder and Poisoning; the victim of both counts being the 
Petitioner's wife. The Petitioner was represented by a series of counsel between indictment and 
the trial 1 but was represented at trial by Elmore County Public Defender E.R. Frachiseur and 
Ellison Matthew.2 Petitioner is currently serving a sentence oflife without parole. Following his 
conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction, which was 
upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
694,215 P.3d 414 (2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case are found in that 
decision and incorporated herein by reference. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its Remittitur 
on September 4, 2009. 
The Petitioner filed a sworn prose Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief on 
October 13, 2009, within one year of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on the direct appeal 
(hereinafter "Petition"). The Petition makes the following claims: (1) corpus de/ecti (sic); (2) 
1 Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal, pp. 12-13, fus. 3-5. 
2 Id p. 13, fu. 5, Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, ff 5-6. 
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ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence; ( 4) due 
State's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence; due process: State use of perjured 
testimony; ( 6) court error and failure to declare a mistrial; and (7) ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel: failure to appeal both counts. 
The ineffective assistance claims of trial counsel in paragraph 7 of the Petition more 
specifically alleges (a) facilitation of involuntary and unknowing waiver of Petitioner's right to 
testify; (b) failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct; (c) failure to move for mistrial (for 
introduction of inadmissible evidence); ( d) failure to call witnesses; and ( e) cumulative error by 
trial counsel. 
A Notice of Intent of Partial Summary Dismissal and Order Appointing Counsel was 
filed on December 11, 2009 by Judge Wetherell. In this Notice, the Court found each of the 
claims in the original petition incompletely pied and patently frivolous to the point that they were 
unable to be developed into a valid claim. Still, the Court stated it would err on the side of 
caution and appoint counsel since some of the claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Counsel was appointed to provide the Petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and 
properly allege the necessary supporting facts as required in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
792, 102 P .3d 1108, 1111 (2004 ). Mr. Severson filed a handwritten Petitioner's Response to 
Court's Notice of Intent on January 7, 2010 before counsel had actually been appointed. The 
response was not sworn so is not considered by this Court as an affidavit. 
A renewed order appointing conflict counsel was filed on January 27, 2010. There was 
difficulty completing the record in this case so there were a number of extensions of time 
granted. An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed with the 
assistance of counsel on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter "amended petition"). The amended petition 
was verified by Mr. Severson as true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief as 
required by I.C. § 19-4902(a). The amended petition alleges (1) ineffective assistance of 
counsel: defense counsel's refusal to allow defendant to testify at the jury trial; (2) ineffective 
assistance: defense counsel's failure to cross examine State's witnesses and present exculpatory 
evidence; (3) ineffective assistance: defense counsel's failure to object to inadmissible evidence 
and the State's closing argument; and (4) in the alternative, the cumulative effect of the defense 
counsel's performance in the first three allegations thus deprived petitioner of effective 
assista.nce of counsel at trial. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 3 -
The amended petition alleged that an affidavit was not filed with the amended petition 
to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severson has 
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, and the 
voluminous materials associated with this post-conviction relief." The Respondent's Counsel 
filed a request for the court to take judicial notice of"the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged 
documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Filing and 
Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed Material by counsel on April 18, 2011 included the trial 
transcript with opening and closing arguments, the Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court 
appeal, and the Supplemental Clerk's Record in that appeal. The court considered these 
judicially noticed materials. For this matter, the court considered admitted State's Exhibits 1-3, 
1-4, 1-5, 1-6, and 4-7 through 4-12. The court also examined State's Exhibits 9-2 through 9-8 
which were not admitted into evidence. 
The amended petition stated the Respondent's affidavit establishing personal knowledge 
and attesting to authenticiy of all documents and exhibits submitted with this petition will be 
filed on or before April 26, 2011. An order to enlarge time for the State's Answer until sixty 
days after the filing of the Petitioner's affidavit was granted. The State filed its Answer to 
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on August 5, 2011. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 
66 of the Respondent's Answer denies that the Petitioner filed an affidavit but affirmatively 
asserts "the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 
2011, the State received a proclaimed 'Verification of Petition' signed by Severson and notarized 
on June 15, 2011." This affidavit was filed with the Court on the day of the hearing and was 
considered by the court. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911, allows 
individuals convicted and/or sentenced for a crime to petition the Court for relief in the following 
situations: ( l) the sentence is in violation of the constitution; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (3) 
the sentence exceeds the maximum provided by law; (3) there is evidence of material fact, not 
previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice; (5) 
the sentence has expired; (6) the petitioner is innocent, subject to the provisions for DNA testing 
in the statute; (7) or the sentence is subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error. 
LC. § l 9-490l(a). After the Court's review an application for post-conviction relief, if satisfied 
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that the applicant is not entitled to relief and that no purpose would be served by any further 
proceedings, the Court can indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its 
reasons for doing so. § 19-4906(b ). The applicant shall have an opportunity to respond to 
the Court's notice of intent to dismiss within twenty (20) days of the proposed dismissal. Id. 
Summary disposition under I.C. § 19-4906 is the "procedural equivalent of a summary judgment 
motion under I.R.C.P. 56." Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000); see also 
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994). In "determining 
whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, the Court reviews the facts in a 
light most favorable to the petitioner and determines whether the facts would entitle petitioner to 
relief if accepted as true." Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. 
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if "the petitioner 
has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon 
which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Id. Idaho's Supreme Court has stated that an 
application for post-conviction relief requires more than a short and plain statement of the claim 
but, rather, requires verification ''with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, 
or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application." 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 628-29 (Ct. App. 2002). If the 
application fails to include such evidence supporting its allegations, the application will be 
subject to dismissal. Id. at 271, 61 P.3d at 629. A Court is not required to accept the applicant's 
"mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law" in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss. Id. ( citing Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 989, 901 (Ct.App. 1994)); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 
716 P.2d 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1986). At summary disposition of a post-conviction petition, 
affidavits must satisfy Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure which requires affidavits to be made upon 
personal knowledge setting forth facts that would be admissible at trial. Where petitioner's 
affidavits are based upon hearsay rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without 
an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80-81, 844 P.2d 706, 709-10 
(1992). 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is not a substitute for an appeal from the 
sentence or conviction. ",Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, 
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forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the 
on the basis a substantial factual showing, affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, that the 
asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and 
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." I.C. § 19-4901 (b ). 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature. 
It is distinct from the criminal action which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 
494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991). 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden 
of proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27,995 P.2d 794, 797 
(2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action, 
and that "[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the 
claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008) (quoting Goodwin, 138 
Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628). 
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by 
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 
517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 19-4903. Facts within the personal knowledge 
of the applicant and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the 
application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and correct. Id.; I.C. § 19-4902. The 
applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing. 
Martinez, l 25 Idaho at 846, 87 5 P .2d at 941 ; Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P .2d 
546, 551 (Ct. App. 1982). 
A petition for post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will survive 
a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as 
to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P .3d 
1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). The test for 
evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel is two-
pronged. Related to whether counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner has the burden 
of proving (1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide range of professional 
norms; a.11d (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of t.he deficient conduct. Pratt, 134 
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Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. See also Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629 (citing Aragon 
1 Idaho 11 1176 988)). objective standard embraces a 
strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent (Schoger, 148 Idaho 
at 624, 226 P.3d at 1271) and had sound trial strategy. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case 
requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, 
the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 
1177. The appellate courts require substantive proof of ineffective assistance of counsel rather 
than mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of one's trial. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 
P.2d 365, 368 (1994). To survive a motion for summary dismissal of a petition claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that material facts exist as to each of the 
above elements. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. 
Related to whether counsel's failure to cross examine, call witnesses, or object during the 
trial constitutes "deficient performance," the element of deficient performance "requires a 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984). Error is only presumed when a defendant is denied counsel or when counsel 
represents conflicting interests. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924-25, 877 P.2d at 368-69. Severson raised 
the issue of counsel with conflicting interests on his direct appeal and the Idaho Supreme Court 
did not find error. Severson v. State, 147 Idaho 694, 702-707, 215 P.3d 414, 422-27 (2009). 
Therefore, the matter cannot be relitigated in this action, prejudice is not presumed, and the 
accused bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice to the outcome. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 
877 P.2d at 368. "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as basis 
for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is 
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 
337, 344-345 (citing Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368). 
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and must rely 
on substantial evidence in the record, although the evidence may be conflicting. Martinez, 125 
Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 943; Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,314,658 P.2d 983,985 (Ct. App. 
1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, 
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need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 
1 Drapeau, 1 Idaho at 651 at 1, supra. If the allegations fail to frame a 
genuine issue of material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary prima facie elements of a 
claim for relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and 
the reasons for so doing." LC. § 19-4906(b); LC.R. 57(c); Roman, supra; Parrott v. State, 117 
Idaho 272, 276, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260, 262 (1990). However, if the application raises a 
material issue of fact, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific 
findings. LC.§ 19-4907(a); Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 943. 
DISCUSSION 
This decision only addresses the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Petitioner's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on October 22, 2009, as rephrased in the Amended 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel on April 18, 2011. 
The Respondent concedes in the Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment 
that material issues of fact were adequately raised by the Petitioner on the issue of whether trial 
counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own 
defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the 
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraph 9(a) in the original petition. 
The court grants an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 
A. Petition 7(g): Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
In the original petition in paragraph 7(g) (continuation on page 3), the Petitioner alleged 
"Appellate counsel failed to appeal both counts." (Petition, pp. 2 and 3). The affidavit filed with 
the petition states, "This issue played a possible role in the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling. See 
ruling. Supreme Court recognized and made mention of this when ruling on other issue." 
(emphasis added) (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 8). No additional facts related to this claim 
were asserted in the affidavit filed in court on the day of the hearing and the amended petition 
did not expand upon this ineffective assistance claim. A footnote in the direct appeal decision 
reads, "Severson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for 
poisoning Mary" although the next footnote recites the evidence related to the poisoning. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 714 fns. 24, 25,215 P.3d at 435 fns. 24, 25. The Supreme Court 
concluded, 
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(Id.) 
There was substantial circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Severson was the person who suffocated or overdosed 
Mary. The fact that the State did not provide direct evidence to that effect does 
not prohibit this conclusion. (citation omitted) The evidence produced at trial 
revealed that it was unlikely that Mary's overdose was self-imposed, but there was 
substantial evidence linking Severson to her murder. The evidence revealed that 
Severson had a motive to kill his wife, was preparing people for her death, had 
recently tried to poison her, had tried to conceal the circumstances surrounding 
her death, and had the opportunity and means to kill her. 
A petition for post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will survive 
a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as 
to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. A Court 
is not required to accept the applicant's "mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law" in deciding whether to grant a motion to 
dismiss. Id The pleading and affidavit related to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does 
not meet Severson' s burden of proof ( 1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide 
range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient 
conduct. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. The Petitioner's assertion that the alleged 
failure "played a possible role" in Supreme Court's ruling only because the Supreme Court 
"made mention of this" is conclusory and falls far short of the Petitioner's burden of proving 
either that there was a failure to appeal or, if there was a failure, that the Peitioner was 
prejudiced. Additionally, it appears in reading the Supreme Court's decision that the court did 
consider the sufficiency of the evidence related to poisoning on appeal. Summary dismissal of 
the allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is appropriate since the petitioner has 
not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claim that 
appellate counsel was ineffective. This allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is 
DISMISSED. 
B. Petition 7(a) and 9(t): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by Failure to Raise 
Corpus Delicti Issue During Trial 
The Petitioner claims in paragraph 7(a) of the petition "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
(Petition, p. 2). Later in the petition, paragraph 9 states, "If your application is based upon the 
failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to 
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do when representing your interests." (Petition, p. 3). Severson used a continuation page titled 
"what trial counsel failed to do" and listed failure to raise corpus delecti [sic] issue during 
trial." (Petition, unnumbered continuation page). Petitioner's affidavit filed October 2009 
addresses "corpus delicti procedure" on pages one and two that alleges the same argument raised 
on direct appeal related to the State's burden of proof to show corpus delicti. (Severson Aff., 
Oct. 22, 2009, pp. 1-2). The facts in this first affidavit only addresses the State's burden of 
proof and does not mention defense counsel in any way, much less raise specific facts of how 
defense counsel was ineffective in not raising this issue. Neither the amended petition nor the 
affidavit filed the day of the hearing expand upon this claims of ineffective asssistance of 
counsel. Placing the words "ineffective assistance" in front of the same argument is not enough 
to create a valid claim or prove fundamental error. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a)(4) allows claims when ''there exists evidence of material facts, 
not previously presented and heard .... " ( emphasis added). Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b) states that 
"[a]ny issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not 
be considered in post-conviction proceedings[.]" See also Watkins v. State, 101 Idaho 758, 759, 
620 P.2d 792, 794 (1980); Henderson v. State, 123 Idaho 138, 139, 844 P.2d 1388, 1389 
(Ct.App. 1992). The Petitioner litigated the issue of corpus delicti in his underlying appeal. See 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 712-715, 215 P.3d at 432-35. In homicide cases, the corpus delicti 
consist of two elements: (1) the death of the individual "named in the charge as ... being dead;" 
and (2) the death was caused by a criminal act of the defendant." Id. at 712-713, 215 P.3d at 
432-33. In the direct appeal, the Supreme Court noted these two elements may be satisfied based 
solely on circumstantial evidence. Id at 713, 215 P.3d at 433. Stevenson argued in the direct 
appeal that the state failed to meet its burden of proving corpus delicti and the Supreme Court 
analyzed the evidence at trial and found there was substantial and competent evidence to support 
the jury's conclusion that Severson was guilty of first-degree murder. Id. at 712-715, 215 P.3d at 
432-35. 
A "convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the same factual questions in his 
application in virtually the same factual context already presented in a direct appeal." Gilpin-
Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 863, 908 P.2d 162, 165 (Ct.App. 1995), citing Whitehawk v. 
State, 116 Idaho 831,833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct.App. 1989). The Petitioner has alleged only 
material facts previously presented and heard to support the conclusory allegation of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel so the allegation of ineffective assistance by failing to raise corpus delicti 
is DISMISSED. 
The Amended Petition Claims are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations 
The Respondent alleges some of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claimed in the amended petition are untimely because the amended petition sets forth "a new 
cause of action unrelated to the original transaction or occurrence pied" so the amendment was 
untimely filed seven months after Remittiur since it does not related back to the date of the 
original pleading. (Mtn. for Order Granting Partial Summ. Dismissal, p. 17) Idaho Code § 19-
4902(a); I.R.C.P. I5(c); Idaho First Nat'/ Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,281, 
824 P.2d 841,856 (1991) (citing Black Canyon Raquetba/1 Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank, 
119 Idaho 171,804 P.2d 900 (1991); Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267,688 P.2d 1172 (1984)). 
The Respondent's Motion sets out sixteen ways in which the amended petition sets forth "new 
causes of action" more broadly than the petition (Respondent's Motion, pp. 18-210) citing the 
requirement of Monahan v. State that "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be 
individually pied with specificity" and the practice of ''us[ing] one broad category such as 
'failure to investigate' as a springboard to raise any argument ... as 'part and parcel' of the 
claim" should be discouraged. 145 Idaho 872,877 n.2., 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 n.2. (Ct. App. 
2008). 
The Court distinguishes this case from Monahan because Monahan addressed an unpled 
assertion of ineffective assistance that was actually tried at an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 875. 
The petition in Monahan was amended to delineate seventeen separate claims of ineffective 
assistance and those amendments related back to the original petition-the appropriateness of 
this amendment was not contested in the appeal. The holding of Monahan only addressed the 
fact that the pleadings were not amended at the evidentiary hearing to include an unpled but tried 
claim, therefore, that unpled claim raised only in the reply brief was not properly raised on 
appeal. Id. 
This court recognizes that the amended petition filed with the assistance of counsel 
contained much more specificity and addresses more witnesses and objections than the cursory 
claims of the original petition. However, this court finds the ineffective assistance claims in the 
amended petition arose "out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence ... attempted to be set 
forth in the original pleading" and a.111ended petition relates back to the date of the original 
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pleading. I.R.C.P. 15( c ). Idaho Code § 19-4908 requires all grounds for relief must be raised in 
original, supplemental, or amended application. Judge Wetherell appointed ..,v,.u,"''"'' to 
the Petitioner with developing the ineffective assistance claims of the original petition into a 
valid claim, which resulted in the amended petition. Counsel's amended petition resulted in the 
claims being pled with specificity as required by Monahan. Therefore, this Court denies the 
Respondent's request to summarily dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the 
amended petition as untimely. 
D. Second Cause Of Action: Failure To Cross Examine State's Witnesses And 
Present Exculpatory Evidence 
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is stated 
"concisely and in detaif' in paragraphs 9( c) as failure to examine, 9( d) failure call expert 
witness, and 9(g) as failure to recall witnesses. Severson's Second Cause Of Action (paragraphs 
46-62) in the amended petition a further details these claims of ineffective assistance by trial 
counsel as failure to effectively challenge the state's evidence through cross examination of the 
state's witnesses and present exculpatory evidence. 
The affidavit filed with the original petition alleges counsel failed to call witnesses to 
testify about tampered diet pills but does not allege the names of any witnesses. It alleges 
counsel failed to recall a witness to testify as to damage to Mary's mouth seen the night before 
her death but does not allege which witness had this information and does not provide any 
additional affidavits. Additionally, the first affidavit alleges defense counsel refused to recall a 
witness to testify about verbal conversions with Mary about tampered diet pills but again, does 
not allege which witness. (Severson Aff., Oct. 22, 2009, p. 4). 
In the affidavit filed May 9, 2012, Severson alleges that he wrote notes during the trial on 
a pad of paper. (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 1110-11). Severson states he wrote notes of issues 
he wished to have addressed during cross-examination of the state's witnesses, inconsistencies 
and the testimony of the state's witnesses, false statements made by the state's witnesses, 
additional evidence, and testimony he wanted elicited from defense witnesses. Id., ,r 15. 
Additionally, Severson states the judge inquired about defense witnesses near the end of the 
state's case and lead defense counsel announced the defense was resting. Id., 11 20, 24. 
As to all the claims addressed below of failure to call witnesses or cross examine, and 
whether one or more constitutes "deficient performance," the element of deficient performance 
"requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
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'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
687 984). is not presumed this case, accused bears the burden 
demonstrating prejudice to the outcome. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368. The 
applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 941; Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 617,651 P.2d at 551. 
To justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent 
on the applicant to tender written statements from potential witnesses who are able to give 
testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge. Id. See also Self v. State, 145 Idaho 
578, 581, 181 P.3d 504, 507 (Ct. App. 2007). No affidavits of these three witnesses were filed in 
support of Severson's vague assertions. An objective standard of whether counsel's performance 
was within professional norms embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was 
competent and diligent (Schoger, 148 Idaho at 624, 226 P.3d at 1271) and had sound trial 
strategy. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). Idaho's 
appellate courts recognize "[t]rial counsel's decision of which witnesses to call is encompassed 
in that aspect of trial counsel's role denominated 'trial tactics' or 'strategic choices.'" Campbell 
v. State, 130 Idaho 546,548, 944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct.App. 1997) (citing State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 
231,234,628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). The decision to impeach a witness is a tactical decision. 
State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 152, 609 P.2d 1140, 1143 (1980). Likewise, the decision of 
what evidence should be introduced at trial is also tactical. Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 38, 
121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2005). "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed 
or serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
unless that decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 
365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 
368 (1994)). When faced with a tactical decision, the court utilizes the "strong presumption" 
that the decision fell within the acceptable range of choices available to trial counsel. Hairston v. 
State, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999). To prove that such deficiency 
prejudiced Petitioner's case requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 
114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. 
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1. Failure to Call Witnesses to Testify 
"""'''"'r,,nn makes specific allegations that to 
FNU Bond, Bazzolli, and Felicia LNU. 
a. FNU Bond 
Paragraph 47 of the amended petition alleges counsel was ineffective by failing to call 
FNU Bond as a witness during trial. Severson states that in the opening statement, the lead 
defense counsel "told the jury the defense witnesses would testify that his financial condition 
was good at the time of Mary Severson's death, Frachiseur did not call FNU Bond, who would 
have testified that my automotive repair business was showing a profit every year, and the gross 
income was in the hundreds of thousands." (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 135). What was 
actually said in the opening by defense counsel was, "We will establish through the testimony 
often of the same witnesses the State has that Larry and Mary needed money like we all need 
money.. . . And there will be evidence designed to show you whether or not financial difficulties 
motivated the alleged crime. Our expert witness in this area, forensic accounting, forensic 
bookkeeper ... who will testify that the Severson's were in pretty good financial shape." (Trial 
Tr., pp. 47-48). Later in the opening statement, the accountant bookkeeper was identified as 
"Mr. Bays." (Id, p. 51) 
The State presented Mr. Christiansen (Tr. pp. 1880-1906) who testified about the lease of 
Mr. Severson's business and Mr. Bock who testified about the Severson's financial situation (Tr. 
pp. 1907-2032). Mr. Frachiseur elicited on cross examination of Mr. Bock financial records 
related to the Severson's assets and liabilities. This testimony included the Auto Works profit 
and loss statements, which showed the business making money (Tr. pp. 1963-1964), and assets 
of the business increasing from $325,500 to $515,500 (Tr. p. 2008). State's Exhibits 4-8 through 
4-14 were Auto Works profit and loss statements from February 2000 through August 2000, 
showed a steady increase in profits of over $54,000 during that period, and were admitted into 
evidence (Tr. p. 2042). The State also introduced State's Exhibit 1-3 that showed net assets of 
$82,981.00; State's Exhibit 1-4 that showed net assets of $325,500.00; State's Exhibit 1-5 that 
showed net assets of$309,000; and State's Exhibit 1-6 that showed net assets of $390,000.00 
(Tr. p. 1949). Mr. Frachiseur then established on cross examination that the profit and loss 
statements were verified by using actual income figures and Mr. Bock explained the increase in 
net assets (Tr. pp. 2008-2010). The court had ruled before trial that the financial information 
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 14-
related to Auto Works was not admissible through this witness (Tr. pp. 2033). However, based 
answers to Frachiseur's cross-examination questions to Bock, the court 
.... ,
1
"'"'~""" its ruling, admitted the financial documents over State's objection for all purposes, and 
allowed the parties to argue their meaning to the jury (Tr. pp. 2033-2043). 
The court had a conversation about disclosure of documents reviewed by Mr. Bays and 
Mr. Bays testimony at the end of the trial (Tr. pp. 2296-2299) and it appeared Mr. Frachiseur still 
intended to call Mr. Bays. The State objected to the testimony of Mr. Bays on Friday, November 
5, 2004 (Tr. pp. 2785-2791). In response to that objection, Mr. Frachiseur stated, 
It is our position that the State has in fact already proved a large part of what Mr. 
Bays, what we anticipate that he will be testifying to for the Defense; that is, they 
have put in the account statements, the deposit records for various bank accounts 
pertaining to personal accounts and business. I do not intend to have him testify 
to those documents that are already in evidence and testimony. We would have in 
that respect would merely be a summation of what the state has already put in and 
we can do that for jury, and they can do it for themselves without the necessity of 
someone to point their way .... 
(Tr. p. 2792). "Mr. Bays will simply be talking about the status of the real estate as far as the 
equity therein at or about the time of Miss Severson's death." (Tr. p. 2793). Mr. Bays testimony 
was again discussed at pages 2979 through 2981 and it was clarified that Mr. Bays would only 
testify to the equity in the residence. (Tr. p. 2981). The defense rested without calling Mr. Bays 
or offering any additional explanation. 
Severson alleges that when Severson asked Frachiseur after closing why he did not 
explain the solvency, Fraschieur replied, "he forgot." Id. No affidavit from FNU Bond was filed 
in support of Severson's opposition to the motion for summary dismissal. In considering 
summary dismissal on post-conviction application, the court must accept as true verified 
allegations of fact in application or in supporting affidavits, unless they have been disproved by 
other evidence in the record. LC.§ 19-4906(b). Considering Mr. Frachiseur's statement on the 
record that the State had admitted all of the evidence the defense would had offered, which 
included the matters Mr. Severson cited in paragraph 35 of his second affidavit, the record 
supports that the decision to not call Mr. Bays to present evidence of the solvency of Auto Works 
was a tactical decision enjoying the "strong presumption" that the decision fell within the 
acceptable range of choices available to trial counsel. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511, 988 P.2d at 
1185. 
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After the weekend and prior to closing arguments, it appears the defense did not call Mr. 
to testify about the equity in the residence. It is unclear from the record why. 
Severson alleges Mr. Frachlseur said "he forgot." "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be 
second-guessed or serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel unless that decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 
Idaho 365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 
365,368 (1994)). The defense could have forgotten, as Severson alleges, or he could have made 
a tactical decision not to present the evidence of value of the residence. The judge in a post-
conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary disposition, but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353,355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 
2008). The court finds that Mr. Severson's affidavit supports that Mr. Frachiseur forgot to call Mr. 
Bays on the last day of trial but the court does not find that he would have been called to testify to the 
matters alleged in Mr. Severson's second affidavit, but only the narrow issue of equity in the 
residence. 
To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case requires a showing of a 
"reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Related to whether 
counsel's failure to call a witness, the element of deficient performance "requires a showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Mr. 
Severson does not allege how the outcome would have been different, especially since evidence 
was admitted to the jury that before Mary Severson died, Mr. Severson's business was solvent 
with over half a million dollars in assets. If there was an omission by counsel, it did not arise to 
a deficiency so serious that it deprived the defendant of the Sixth Amendment guarantees. Based 
upon the evidence and pleadings in this matter, there is not a material question of fact of whether 
counsel's omission of the value of the residence caused a different outcome of the trial and 
prejudiced the Petitioner in the way alleged in his second affidavit. The motion to summarily 
dismiss the Second Cause of Action as to FNU Bond is GRANTED as to paragraph 4 7 of the 
amended petition. 
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Aaron Bazzom 
Severson's affidavit states there was a difference between Detective Wolfs grand jury 
testimony and Detective Barclay's testimony at trial related to whether Mary Severson's stomach 
could be tested for the presence of prescription medications. (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 148). 
Severson's affidavit states he requested that Frachiseur call Aaron Bazzolli, one of the 
prosecutors of this case, as a witness to examine Bazzolli about this difference in testimony 
between the two witnesses being possible perjury. Id. 148. 
During Detective Barclay's testimony which begins in the trial transcript at page 503, 
there is a lengthy discussion on the record related to discrepancies in testimony between 
Detective Barclay, Deputy Sterling and Detective Wolfe (Tr. pp. 559-563). Detective Barclay 
was examined by Mr. Bazzoli about evidence collection (Tr. p. 503-519). The court allows the 
prosecution to call witnesses to explain testimony which may have been incorrect and Detective 
Wolfe is then called to the stand by Mr. Howen (Tr. pp. 565-656), an inconsistency in testimony 
was not allowed because of defense objection (Tr. pp. 648-649), and the color of a pudding bowl 
was clarified (Tr. p. 652). Detective Wolfe is also recalled by the State later in the trial (Tr. pp. 
1462-1547, 1562-1575). 
The Court had also issued a pretrial order addressing inconsistencies in Detective Wolfe's 
grand jury testimony. (Decision RE: Various Pending Pre-Trial Motions of the Defendant, June 
3, 2004, App. Record pp. 842-856). The Court's pretrial ruling relating to the inconsistencies 
was that the defense had not established any willful statement made to mislead or knowledge that 
the statement was false. The Court had previously ruled that Detective Wolfe's statement did not 
constitute perjury in addressing the defense's motion to dismiss. 
"Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as basis for post-
conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is shown 
to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review." Osborne, 130 Idaho at 372-373, 941 P.2d at 344-
345. The Court had already made a pretrial ruling that there was no perjury. While the 
inconsistency could have been the subject of cross examination of Detectives Barclay and Wolfe 
at trial, the Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that failing to call the prosecutor as a 
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witness during trial to testify about potential perjury was deficient performance, especially given 
pretrial ruling that the statements did not constitute perjury. 
An objective standard of whether counsel's performance was within professional norms 
embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent (Schoger, 
148 Idaho at 624,226 P.3d at 1271) and had sound trial strategy (Davis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775 
P .2d at 1248) recognizing counsel's decision on which witnesses to call and whether to impeach 
is encompassed in trial counsel's role denominated "trial tactics" or "strategic choices." 
Campbell, 130 Idaho at 548,944 p.2d at 145; McKenney, 101 Idaho at 152,609 P.2d at 1143. 
The motion to summarily dismiss the Second Cause of Action as to calling Aaron Bazzolli as a 
witness is GRANTED. 
c. Felicia LNU 
Severson's affidavit also states that at the time of closing argument, Severson told 
Frachiseur that "Felicia LNU, the wait person who served Mary Severson and I pizza the night 
before her passing, could have testified that Mary Severson had an injury on her mouth prior to 
the night of her death." (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 140). Severson did not offer an affidavit 
of Felicia LNU that she would have testified as he alleges. 
Felicia Gartung testified for the defense that she served the Seversons at Smokey 
Mountain Pizza on February 14, 2002 (Tr. pp. 2748-2757). This was the night before Mary 
Severson died (Tr. p. 1163). Ms. Gartung testified that Mary Severson "put her hand to her 
mouth and said that it would be soft" and had pasta for dinner (Tr. p. 2752). On cross-
examination, Ms. Gartung stated she did not observe Mary Severson having difficulty eating or 
complain that her mouth was hurting (Tr. p. 2756). She also testified on cross-examination that 
she did not observe any bruising around Mary Severson's mouth at the time (Tr. p. 2757). 
From the description of the witness and testimony in Mr. Severson's second affidavit, the 
court finds the defense did call this witness but her cross-examination testimony clearly 
contradicted what Mr. Severson alleges in his second affidavit. 
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by 
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 
517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 19-4903. The applicant's factual showing must 
be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing. Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875 
at 941; Drapeau v. State, 103 Ida.ho 612,617,651 P.2d 546,551 (Ct. App. 1982). The 
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Petitioner's statement of what another witness saw or how they would have testified is outside 
....... ivu.vA and has not met his burden 
showing that counsel's performance was deficient by not calling or recalling Felicia LNU. 
Therefore, the motion to summarily dismiss the Second Cause of Action as to Felicia LNU is 
GRANTED. 
2. Failure to Cross Examine the State's Witnesses 
The petition and amended petition allege that counsels' performance was deficient by 
failing to cross examine the state's witnesses including Steven Bock, Jennifer Watkins, FNU 
Buchholtz, and Mellea LNU. More broadly, Severson alleges counsel failed to question 
unnamed witnesses about Mary Severson's unhappiness and whether unnamed witnesses had 
any knowledge of Petitioner purchasing Drano. 
Related to counsel's failure to cross examine witnesses as deficient performance, an 
objective standard of whether counsel's performance was within professional norms embraces a 
strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent with sound trial 
strategy. "Trial counsel's decision of which witnesses to call is encompassed in that aspect of 
trial counsel's role denominated 'trial tactics' or 'strategic choices."' Campbell v. State, 130 
Idaho 546,548,944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct.App. 1997) (citing State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231,234, 
628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case requires 
a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 7 61, 7 60 P .2d at 1177. 
a. Steven Bock 
The Amended Verified Petition alleges at paragraph 57 that Steven Bock testified without 
objection as to Mary Severson's motivations for refinancing a house, speculation about the 
Petitioner's girlfriend, and statements made by Severson about the victim's medical conditions. 
Severson states Steven Bock testified for the state about Mary Severson refinancing a house 
located in Mountain Home, Idaho. (Severson Aff., May 8, 2012, 136). Severson states the 
testimony in trial was that Mary Severson's income on the loan application was $97,000. Id, ,r 
36(b ). Severson alleges the information was fraudulent because her actual income was $12,000 
per year, that Steven Bock arguably committed fraud in assisting Mary Severson in aquiring the 
loan "by altering my pay stubs to show Mary Severson's name and Social Security number as 
income." Id 1136(a), (b) and (c). Severson's affidavit states he requested Frachiseur to 
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cross examine Bock, that Frachiseur told Severson he would ask Bock about the fraudulent 
PntinP<:! but that Frachiseur did not cross examine Bock on these issues. Id. 136(a) and (d). 
Bock testified (Tr. pp. 1907-2032) and Mr. Frachieseur did object to the testimony p. 1923, 
1927, 1929-1930, 1921-1932, 1937-1938, 1949, 1966-1967, 1980-1981, 1982, 1983-1990)with 
some of the objections sustained. 
The loan applications are State's Exhibits 1-3 through 1-6 and were discussed in the 
transcript and admitted at page 1949. While the parties addressed pay stubs and W-2s marked as 
State's Exhibits 9-2 through 9-8, those exhibits were never admitted into evidence (Tr. pp. 1907-
2032). Mr. Frachiseur only had Mr. Bock identify that those documents were used to verify the 
figures on the loan applications. 
The Petitioner's statement that Bock arguably committed fraud by altering pay stubs to 
show Mary Severson's name and Social Security number as her income in paragraphs 36(a), (b) 
and (c) is conclusory, speculative, and not based upon personal knowledge. Therefore, this 
portion of Severson's allegation is unsubstantiated and would not be admissible at trial and will 
be disregarded. However, Severson's allegation of facts of Mary Severson's income is within 
his personal knowledge and would be admissible. However, Severson does not completely 
allege how counsel's failure to cross examine as to Mary Severson's incorrect income on the 
loan application was deficient and, if it was deficient, how bringing out the fact of her "real" 
income shows a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. The conclusory allegation that counsel should 
have asked about this issue on cross examination does not present a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel so the allegation in paragraph 57 of the amended petition is 
DISMISSED. 
b. Jennifer Watkins 
Paragraphs 60 and 61 of the amended petition alleges defense counsel did not cross 
examine Jennifer Watkins after she testified that Severson misled her about his marital status, 
committed acts arguably constituting stalking after the demise of their relationship, and misled 
her concerning the victim's health problems. Severson's affidavit states Severson told both 
Frachieur and Matthews that he wanted Jennifer Watkins cross examined about "falsehoods and 
inconsistencies." Id. ,r 39 and 39(a). The only specific area for cross examination he notes in his 
affidavit is that Jennifer Walkins had married someone else approximately one month after Mary 
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death. Id ,r 39(b). Severson states this cross-examination would establish that the 
,., .... v ...... did not have 
,.,,,., ... ,.. •• Watkins was 
motive to harm his wife in order to 
with another male. Id 
because 
The court had previously ruled concerning relationships or marriages entered into after 
the alleged crime, for limited purposes, was admissible but "evidence of a sexual relationship 
was not admissible unless, of course, the Defense attempt to impeach the witness with this 
information, at which point the Court would advise the jury the State did not advise them of the 
sexual relationship because the Court had prohibited them from doing so unless the issue was 
raised by the Defense." (Tr. p. 1988-1989; Orders RE: Various Motions, Sept. 17, 2004, App. 
Record, pp. 1484-1507). Jennifer Watkins testifed at the end of the State's Case in Chief (Tr. 
pp. 2595-2621) and was not cross examined by the defense. Ms. Watkins testified that she 
renewed a relationship with an ex-boyfriend and they moved in together after her relationship 
with Mr. Severson ended (Tr. p. 2615). Ms. Watkins gave her married name at the beginning of 
her testimony (Tr. p. 2595). 
Again, Severson does not allege sufficient facts as to how counsel's failure to cross 
examine Jennifer Watkins on her subsequent marital status was deficient given the presumption 
of trial strategy and tactics within defense counsel's role, especially considering the Court's 
ruling that the defense could open the door to otherwise inadmissible 1.R.E. 404(b) evidence by 
way of cross examination of Miss Watkins. Given the presumption of sound strategic choices 
within professional norms, the defense's election not to cross examine this witness was 
proficient. Even if it was deficient, the Petitioner has made now showing of how this fact shows 
a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different given the substantial evidence of Petitioner's guilt presented at 
trial. The conclusory allegation that counsel should have cross examined Jennifer Watkins does 
not present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel so the allegation in paragraph 
60 and 61 of the amended petition is DISMISSED. 
c. FNU Buccholtz and Mellea LNU 
Severson's affidavit states the Petitioner wanted state's witnesses FNU Buchholtz (sic) 
and Mellea LNU (sic) cross-examined on whether they owed Petitioner money to show 
motivation and bias in their testimony. Id. ,r 45(d). Teresa Mallea testified on the second day of 
t.-ial (Tr., pp. 96-100) and was recalled later (Tr. pp. 762-769). Teresa Bucholtz testified on 
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Wednesday, October 
either of these 
2004 (Tr., pp. 2198-2222). Here, there is no factual basis established 
nm~ss€!S owed Severson money-all the court has is Mr. Severson's 
assertion. Whether to impeach a witness is a tactical decision with a "stong presumption" that 
the decision fell within the acceptable range of choices available to counsel. McKenney, 10 I 
Idaho at 152,609 P.2d at 1143; Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511,988 P.2d at 1185. There is nothing 
in reviewing the record and affidavits presented to cause the court to disturb that presumption. 
Both witnesses were cross-examined, just not on the issue of whether they owed the Petitioner 
money. Severson does not allege sufficient facts to show counsel's failure to cross examine on 
this issue was deficient given the presumption of trial strategy and tactics within defense 
counsel's role, and, if it was deficient, how there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different given the substantial evidence of Petitioner's guilt presented 
at trial. Therefore, the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to cross examine 
Teresa Bucholtz and Teresa Mallea is DISMISSED. 
d. Unnamed State's Witness on Unhappiness and Drano Purchases 
Severson's affidavit also alleges Frachiseur refused to cross-examine unnamed state's 
witnesses about (1) "Mary Severson's unhappiness emanating:from her relationships with her 
children, family, and money problems as 'it would make her look bad"' Id. ,i 36(g) and (2) 
whether the Petitioner had ever purchased Drano. Id ,r 43. Related to Mrs. Severson's 
unhappiness, evidence was elicited from several witnesses that Mrs. Severson was upset when 
she went to Colorado (Tr., p. 92), was having some marital discord (Tr., p. 100), and had no 
money in her bank account (Tr. p. 604). Evidence was also introduced by the State through the 
testimony ofNancy Ellwanger (Tr. pp. 710-762), Carol Diaz (Tr. pp. 1004-1038), and Teresa 
Mallea (Tr. pp. 96-100, 762-769). During the examinations of Ms. Ellwanger and Ms. Mallea, 
substance of conversations the witness had with Mary Severson about these issues was not 
elicited because the court had ruled it was inadmissible hearsay (Tr. pp. 92, 589-595, 657-707). 
The court was very specific about its ruling on inadmissible hearsay and Mr. Frachiseur stated 
there were continuing defense objections based upon the written brief presented to the court so 
they would not interrupt ever time a statement was made (Tr. 595, 702). Whether counsel's 
performance was deficient must be examined in light of the Court's pretrial ruling that 
statements that Mary Severson had made when she was alive that she believed her husband was 
trying to kill her were inadn1issible tLrtless the defense "opens the door" regarding Mary 
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Severson's state of mind. (Orders RE Motions Concerning Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements 
Deceased, September 2004, pp. 1 528). the opportunity for admission 
statements prejudicial to the defendant if cross examination veered into the state of mind of Mary 
Severson, it is reasonable that questions would not have been asked by the defense about Mary 
Severson's state of mind or her unhappiness with evidence prejudicial to the defense looming. 
Pursuant to this Court's review of the trial transcript, there was adequate evidence in the record 
based on previous examinations to establish the facts Severson contends should have been 
asserted in cross-examination so cross-examination on these issues was not necessary. 
Related to whether the Petitioner purchased Drano, the Petitioner's allegation is bare and 
conclusory, especially since Mr. Severson would have had many opportunities to purchase a 
common item such as Drano while unobserved by any of the witnesses called at trial so cross 
examination on this issue would have been futile. 
Related to counsel's failure to cross examine witnesses on these issues as deficient 
performance, the Petitioner has not overcome by his affidavits the strong presumption that the 
petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent with sound trial strategy or that trial counsel's 
decision of whether to cross examine on these issues was anything other than a trial tactic or 
strategic choices. The Petitioner has not shown a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel by averring sufficient facts to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different if counsel would have asked about Mary Severson's more frequently 
about unhappiness or the Petitioner's Drano purchasing habits. The allegation of ineffective 
assistance for failure as these questions on cross examination of unnamed witnesses is 
DISMISSED. 
3. Failure to Test Hair in Evidence Bag for DNA 
Severson's affidavit alleges Matthews had requested ofFrachiseur that the hair found in 
an evidence bag containing the tampered Hydrocut bottle should be DNA tested to establish it 
was not Petitioner's hair but that the hair was not tested because Frachiseur "did not want to 
mess with it." Id. ,I 44. Again, no affidavit of Matthews or Frachiseur is offered by Severson or 
the Respondent. Any discussion of what Matthews told Frachiseur is hearsay and not admissible 
at trial. The hair, found by the FDA investigator in the evidence bag, is discussed on the record 
and that it "didn't have any evidentiary value per se because of the fact that the bottle had been 
opened. It could've been John Ba.'1ks' hair, Detective Wolfe's hair, anybody sitting in that room's 
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hair. It could've been somebody else's hair." (Tr. pp. 1115-1118). Additionally, the presence of 
the bag was used by Mr. Matthews during cross-examination Mr. Banks to attack 
investigation and the defense established that "Larry Severson was not around at any time" 
the evidence was collected or sealed (Tr. pp. 1138-1139). It was used in the re-cross-
examination of Mr. Banks (Tr. p. 1143) and raised by the defense in cross-examination of Dr. 
Heitkemper (Tr. p. 1258). 
"[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, 
need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901. The Petitioner 
bears the burden of showing prejudice and prejudice turns upon the likelihood the discovery of 
exculpatory evidence overlooked by counsel would have changed counsel's prediction as to the 
outcome of a trial. Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901,905,894 P.2d 134, 138 (Ct.App. 1995), 
rehearing denied; Fox v. State, 125 Idaho 672,675, 873 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct.App. 1994). 
4. Failure to Object to New Evidence During Welch's Testimony Not 
Fundamental Error 
The verfied amended petition alleges that Frachiseur and Matthews stated on the record 
during cross examination of Dr. John Welch that they were still receiving new evidence but 
failed to request a continuance or move for exclusion of the evidence. (Amended Petition 154). 
Neither affidavit filed addresses this allegation. The direct appeal of this case addressed two late 
disclosures (the first related to documentation regarding the testing and calibration of equipment 
and laboratory litigation packet (Tr. pp. 1039-1044, 1112-1115, 1118, 1361-1363)) and a second 
oflitigation notes prepared by the FDA (Tr. pp. 1360-1361)). The Supreme Court held nothing 
about the prosecution's late disclosures went to the foundation of Severson's case or otherwise 
deprived him of his rights. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,717,215 P.3d 414,437 (2009). 
"Accordingly, the late disclosures were not fundamental error." Id. Mr. Severson's affidavit 
stating the exhibits ''must be examined over the lunch hour" does not not comport with the 
record. The defense received the full litigation packets on the "Wuesthoff and other two labs" 
before noon recess on Tuesday, October 19, 2004 (Tr. p. 1112) and the defense was offered 
additional time to review (Tr. pp. 1118-1119, 1120). Dr. Welch testified late in the morning the 
following day, October 20, 2004 (Tr. pp. 1307-1359). There is no statement by the defense on 
the record during cross-examination of Dr. Welch that they were still receiving new evidence 
(Id.) There is a statement on the record on Friday, October 22, 2004 by Mr. Frachiseur where he 
says, "The fact that so far we have been able to handle [late disclosures] doesn't mean that if 
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL -24-
materials are forthcoming that we will be able to be ready to go." (Tr. p. 1362). This 
statement shows that defense had been able to prepare as the materials were received but is 
prc>spect1ve that defense would need more if additional materials were disclosed. Dr. 
Stout did not testify for the defense about the litigation packets and calibration until Monday, 
October 25, 2004 (Tr. pp. 1724-1864). 
A Court is not required to accept the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law in deciding whether to 
grant a motion to dismiss. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is not to religate matters 
raised on direct appeal. LC. § 19-4901 (b ). There are no additional facts alleged in response to 
the motion for summary dismissal. This allegation in the post-conviction proceeding is merely 
rephrased as ineffective assistance because of the failure to object. The Supreme Court 
examined whether the late disclosure and the lack of objection to it prejudiced Severson and 
found that it did not. Severson, 147 Idaho at 717,215 P.3d at 437. The Supreme Court found 
that even if the late disclosures prejudiced the defense, that the prejudice was cured by remedial 
measures to offer the defense additional time to prepare its case. (Id.) The late disclosures were 
not fundamental error on direct appeal and sufficient proof has not been provided in this 
proceeding to disturb that determination. Therefore, the allegation in paragaph 54 of the 
amended petition is res judicata and DISMISSED. 
5. No Alleged Error Related to Witnesses Bledsoe, Leann Watkins, or Besler 
The Amended Verified Petition alleges there was testimony of Mary Bledsoe (Amended 
Petition 158), Leann Watkins (Id. 159), and Tracy Besler (Id. 162) but does not allege how 
counsel was ineffective related to these witnesses and none of these witnesses are addressed in 
either affidavit filed. Summary dismissal is appropriate since ''the petitioner has not presented 
evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. A post-conviction 
petition requires more than a short and plain statement of the claim: it requires verification "with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records, or other 
evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or ... state why such supporting evidence is 
not included with the application." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 628-
29 (Ct. App. 2002). Since paragraphs 58, 59 and 62 of the amended petition fail to state a claim, 
these paragraphs are summarily DISMISSED. 
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E. Third Cause Of Action: Ineffective Assistance by Failure to Object 
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is detailed 
paragraphs 9(b) as failure to object during trial and during closing arguments and perhaps 9(e) 
failure "call mistrial." Severson's Third Cause Of Action (paragraphs 63-64) in the amended 
petition further details these claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel as failure to object 
to evidence that was inadmissible, lacking proper foundation, highly prejudicial, and failure to 
object to the improper comments by the state and closing arguments. 
Related to whether counsel's failure to object during the trial constitutes "deficient 
performance," the element of deficient performance "requires a showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Since prejudice is 
not presumed in this case, the accused bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice to the 
outcome. Giles at 924. "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as 
basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that 
decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373, 941 
P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921,924,877 P.2d 365,368 (1994)). A court 
is not required to accept the applicant's mere conclusory allegations or the applicant's 
conclusions of law in deciding this motion. The court is not required to speculate what objection 
would have made had he objected. That burden of proof falls upon the Petitioner. 
1. Lack of Foundation for Death Certificates 
The Verfied Amended Petition alleges Marla Spence, a Coroner's Office employee, 
testified about two death certificates and makes the assertion that the testimony was comprised of 
hearsay to which defense counsel should have objected and required witnesses to testify as to the 
proper foundation for the death certificates. (Amended Petition -,r 48). Neither affidavit 
addresses this allegation or states which witnesses should have been called. Additionally, the 
trial transcript reveals extensive questions on the death certificate and the fact that the cause of 
death on State's Exhibit 6-1 was received from a pathologist by Ms. Spence, the deputy coroner. 
It was Ms. Spence's job to complete death certificates recorded with Vital Statistics (Tr., pp 325-
328). Ms. Spence was cross-examined about a second death certificate, Defense Exhibit A (Tr., 
pp. 329-338). The record contains Mr. Fraschier's ai,alysis of the adm.issibility of the death 
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certificates under the public records exception to hearsay, which included his hearsay analysis of 
cause of death State's Exhibit 6-1 p. 340). The next witness called in the trial was Dr. 
Glenn Groben, the pathologist who completed the autopsy who was allowed to testify as to the 
cause of death over the lengthy objection of lack of foundation by Mr. Frachiseur. (Tr., pp. 350, 
370-379). The record shows the failure to object to lack of foundation for the death certificates 
was a strategic decision by defense counsel and is presumed to be within the wide norms for the 
practice of law. 
Severson fails to meet his burden of proving a prima facie case of ineffective assistance. 
He fails to explain how the admission of the death certificates violated his right to confront 
witnesses and simply assumes a violation of that right. A Court is not required to accept the 
applicant's "mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law" in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss. Id. ( citing Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 989, 901 (Ct.App. 1994)); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 
716 P.2d 369,373 (Ct. App. 1986). The Petitioner's allegation that defense counsel should have 
objected as hearsay for lack of foundation is merely conclusory and not supported by sufficient 
facts to prove how the outcome of the trial would have been different if additional witnesses had 
been called to lay the foundation for the death certificates ... especially considering Mr. 
Frachiseur's analysis of the public record exception since the cause of death was received from 
the very next witness at trial and Mr. Frachiseur challenged his opinions repeatedly for lack of 
foundation. There are no facts alleged as to the deputy coroner's testimony showing that 
counsel's failure to object for lack of foundation was an error "so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" required by 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact raised and the 
allegation in paragraph 48 of the amended petition is DISMISSED. 
2. Dr. Groben's Testimony Samples Were Sent to Two Labs for Testing 
The verified amended petition alleges defense counsel objected without stating the proper 
grounds to Dr. Glen Groben's testimony to samples sent to two labs for forensic testing, and the 
evidence was admitted. (Amended Petition ,r 49). Neither affidavit addresses this allegation or 
states why the objection was improper nor what the basis of the objection should have been. Dr. 
Groben's testimony is in the trial transcript from pages 350 through 476. There was testimony 
by Dr. Groben of many tests conducted a.rid sent to laboratories to be evaluated. Throughout the 
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testimony, Mr. Frachiseur objects repeatedly to the admissibility of the results, including asking 
questions of Dr. Groben in aid of those objections. Additionally, the results of tests sent to two 
labs were used in lengthy and capable cross-examination and re-cross-examination of Deputy 
Dawson by Mr. Frachiseur (Tr. pp. 943-973, 1001-1004). 
The Petitioner's allegation that defense counsel should have stated other grounds of 
objection to the laboratory testing is bare and conclusory and nothing beyond a simple statement. 
Related to whether counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner has not met his burden of 
proving (1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide range of professional norms; 
and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct as required in Pratt. 134 
Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. The Petitioner's allegation and affidavits have not overcome the 
strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent and possessed a 
sound trial strategy. It also does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such 
deficiency in the objections given (ifthere was any deficiency) prejudiced Petitioner's case by 
showing a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome 
of the trial would have been different" as required by Aragon. 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 
1177. The Petitioner has not shown that material facts exist as to the element of deficient 
performance or to the element of prejudicial outcome and the record supports the presumption of 
performance within professional norms. There has been no showing that Mr. Frachiseur "made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). Therefore, the 
allegation of deficient performance related to objections to laboratory tests in paragraph 49 of the 
amended petition is DENIED. 
3. Detective Barclay Pills Eating Through Surface and Test Where No 
Medication Detected 
The V erfied Amended Petition alleges Detective Mike Barclay testified without 
objection to pills eating through the surface leaving the jury with the perception that 
poisonous/caustic pills had been located but does not allege what the objection should have been. 
(Amended Petition ,r 50). Neither affidavit addresses this allegation. Mr. Banks testified later in 
the trial that he had found degraded, decomposing capsules (Tr. pp. 1103-111) and that Mr. 
Severson had called the FDA about adulterated pills (Tr. p. 1127). The chain of custody for the 
pills was established through Detective Barclay and Mr. Banks with Mr. Urban testifying that 
they contained a substance similar to Drano. Detective Barclay testified of his own observation 
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of the pills and what he saw. Mr. Severson does not state how an objection to this observation 
have overcome the later evidence that the pills were tested and contained a 
poisonous/caustic substance. Therefore, no prejudice to the outcome of the trial by the failure to 
object to Detective Barclay's observation has been proven by Mr. Severson. 
The Verfied Amended Petition alleges Detective Mike Barclay testified without 
objection to a test performed at the state lab where no medications were detected. (Amended 
Petition 1 51 ). Neither affidavit addresses this allegation or states what the basis of the objection 
should have been made. Detective Barclay's testimony related to no medications being found in 
pudding cups and other items in the kitchen was exculpatory and elicited by the defense (Tr. pp. 
870-871). Interestingly, this testimony developed an inconsistency that another test had detected 
medications to impeach the state's evidence which supports the presumption of effectiveness of 
counsel. Deputy Dawson testified to an analysis of the stomach contects where very, very low 
quantities of drugs were detected when compared with the contents detected in blood meaning 
the stomach contents had already been absorbed by the body (Tr. pp. 892-893, 899-905) and 
their presence had been unlikely to cause death (Tr. p. 921 ). 
The strong presumption is that petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent with 
sound trial strategy. The Petitioner has not shown a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel by averring sufficient facts to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different if counsel would have objected to this inconsistency in lab results. 
Therefore, the allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Barclay's 
testimony of a test performed where no medications were detected is DISMISSED. 
4. John Urban: Various Capsules and Substances Handled/fested by Others 
The Verfied Amended Petition alleges John Urban, a FDA chemist, testified without 
objection to tests on various capsules and substances that were handled by other unknown 
persons and tests performed by other unknown persons. (Amended Petition 152). John Urban 
testified about the receipt and tracking of evidence in the FDA laboratory and his maintenance of 
the custody of tested samples (Tr. pp. 1147-1172) and that he conducted tests on the samples (Tr. 
pp. 1172). He testified he was the lead analyst and oversaw testing by other groups with other 
specialties (Tr. pp. 1185-1193) which was eventually reviewed by Dr. Doug Heitkemper, the 
team leader (Tr. p. 1192). The Verified amended petition also alleges David Bourne, a FDA 
criminal investigator, testified without objection about residue found by others sent to a 
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laboratory in Ohio. (Amended Petition ,r 55). Neither affidavit addresses these allegations or 
states what the basis of the objections should have been. Mr. Bourne testifed (Tr. pp.1385-
14499). Mr. Bourne's testimony was that he received two bottles from Mr. Banks (who had 
testified in the trial previously about the receipt of the bottles), marked and packaged them, then 
sent them to the FDA Forensic Chemistry Center in Cincinnati, Ohio (Tr. pp. 1396-1399) which 
is the lab in which two previous witnesses, John Urban and Dr. Heitkemper, worked (Tr. pp. 
1147). Prior to Mr. Bourne's testimony, Mr. Banks had already testified about his receipt of the 
bottles and Mr. Urban and Dr. Heitkemper had already testified about the testing of the content 
of the bottles. This testimony was completing the chain of custody testimony. 
The strong presumption is that counsel was competent and his performance fell within 
the wide range of acceptable professional norms. This is especially true given that the Supreme 
Court of the United States opinion in Crawford v. Washington, related to confrontation of 
witnesses of testimonial statements, had only been issued seven months before this trial. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The court and counsel routinely have discussions in the record 
about the applicability of Crawford and it is obvious from the record that the defense team was 
not ignorant of the case. Additionally, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts interpreting Crawford as 
applying to reports by lab analysts was not decided until five years after this trial. Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). Counsel's examinations of Mr. Urban or Dr. 
Heitkemper were not outside the range of acceptable professional norms and presumed effective. 
The court is not required to accept Severson's conclusory allegation that there should 
have been objections to the testimony of these two witnesses without showing what the objection 
should have been. The petitioner has also not met his burden of showing that these failures to 
object were deficient, not tactical or strategic given the previous testiony about the receipt of the 
items and testing, and how the outcome of the trial would have been effected had these 
objections been made. Therefore, these allegations related to a vague objections to John Urban's 
testimony and David Bourne's testimony are DISMISSED. 
5. John Heitkemper: Cumulative Tests Performed by Others 
The Verfied Amended Petition alleges John Heitkemper, a FDA research chemist, 
testified without objection to tests performed by other unknown persons resulting in cumulative 
evidence about a "Drano like substance." (Amended Petition ,r 52). Neither affidavit addresses 
this allegation. Nothing states clearly what the objection should have been but seems to infer ai, 
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objection to evidence that was cumulative under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. Dr. Heitkemper 
as a team leader for the FDA tests responsible for assigning and reviewing work in the 
laboratory and providing advice to the lead analysts (Tr. pp. 1243-1260). 
Again, the court is not required to accept Severson' s conclusory allegation that there 
should have been an objection without an adequate showing of what the objection should have 
been. The petitioner has also not met his burden of showing that the failure to object was 
deficient and how hearing about the testing a second time in a much more cursory fashion 
effected the outcome of the trial in a way that prejudiced Mr. Severson. Therefore, this 
allegation related to a vague objection to John Heitkemper's testimony is DISMISSED. 
6. Failure to Object to State's Closing Argument 
The paragraph 64 of the verified amended petition also alleges that Justice Jones's dissent 
and Justice Pro Tern Kidwell's concurrence in the dissent establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel due to counsel's failure to object to the state's closing argument. This issue is not 
addressed in affidavits or detailed in the response brief and the amended petition only mentions 
the dissenting opinion and the concurrence in the dissent as basis for an allegation in this action. 
Severson's first affidavit states that "During trial petitioner's court appointed attorney 
failed to object to improper, prejudicial, and inflammatory remarks and statements by the 
Prosecutor" and cites the dissent in the direct appeal as its basis. (Severson A:ff., Oct. 13, 2009, 
p. 3). Severson specifically identified prosecutor's comments alleged as error in the direct 
appeal and the Idaho Supreme Court found that most were not improper but found ''the single, 
isolated [improper] comment made during the course of a seventeen-day trial, [where] there was 
substantial evidence of Severson's guilt" was not prejudicial. Severson, 147 Idaho at 719,215 
P.3d at 439. The Supreme Court's finding that there was no fundamental error in the comments 
will not be relitigated here. When legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, 
the defendant is barred by the doctrine of resjudicata from raising them again in a post-
conviction relief proceeding. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 10, 966 P.2d 1, 10 (1998) (citing 
State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988)). 
F. Petition 7(a) and 9(e): Ineffective Assistance by Failure to Call Mistrial 
The Petitioner claims in paragraph 7(a) of the petition "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
(Petition, p. 2). Later in the petition, paragraph 9 states, "If your application is based upon the 
failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to 
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do when representing your interests." (Petition, p. 3). Severson used a continuation page titled 
"what trial counsel failed to do" and listed "( e) failure to call mistrial." (Petition, unnumbered 
continuation page). 
Severson's first affidavit states, "During the hearing on defence [sic] Motion in Limine, 
this Honorable Court deemed that certain evidence was admissible and if entered into testimony 
trial would be deemed a mistrial. Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial during testimony 
of Detective." (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 4) Beyond that allegation in the affidavit, there 
is no further evidence of what evidence in which Detective's testimony was inadmissible that 
would be the basis of a mistrial. In reviewof the record, there are comments on the record 
beginning at page 1433 during Mr. Bourne's testimony about why Mr. Bourne did not refer the 
matter for prosecution. Mr.Howen, the prosecutor, stated "It would be [Mr. Bourne's] 
investigative jurisdiction if this matter was not tampered with anywhere but at the end of the 
consumer line." (Tr. p. 1432). Mr. Matthews stated on the record, 
Your Honor, what the Prosecutor did in response to my objection was, in essence, 
to tell the jury that the end user was the responsible tampering party. That, in 
front of the jury is as close as you can get, in my opinion, to giving us a basis for a 
motion for mistrial. I don't wish to make that motion at this time .... 
(Tr. pp. 1433-1434). The defense asked for a limiting instruction and the limiting instruction 
was given by the Court (Tr. pp. 1433-1434, 1438-1439). The defense's statement of"is a close 
as you can get ... to giving us a basis for a motion to mistrial" is different than a request for a 
mistrial. The statement show~ that Mr. Matthews knew he could ask and that not asking was 
obviously a tactical or strategic decision. 
Severson's first affidavit states, "Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial based on 
prosecutors improper, prejudicial improper, and inflammatory comments" as ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 4) The amended petition alleges the 
same information in paragraph 56 with no additional detail. 
Severson's second affidavit states Matthews objected to the prosecutor's statement about 
the Petitioner's refusal to tum over capsules to an FDA investigator. (Severson Aff., May 9, 
2012, ,r 37). Severson then states Matthews stated he should ask for a mistrial, but there was too 
much time invested. Id ,r 37(a). The affidavit continues about a discussion between the 
Petitioner and Matthews about what a mistrial was and whether the petitioner would be released 
if the mistrial was granted. Id. ,r 3 7 (b )-( f). Matthews explained to Severson that if they did not 
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ask for a mistrial the issue would not be preserved for appeal and that he would discuss the issue 
Frachiseur. Id. 1 37(f)-(g). Counsel did not move for mistrial. Id. 1 37(h). petition for 
post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will survive a motion for 
summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether 
counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether 
deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 
1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). Related to whether 
counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner has the burden of proving (I) that his 
attorney's representation fell outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner 
was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. This 
objective standard embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent 
and diligent (Schoger, 148 Idaho at 624, 226 P.3d at 1271) and sound trial strategy. Davis v. 
State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To prove that such deficiency 
prejudiced Petitioner's case requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 
114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. The facts as alleged by the Petitioner show that Mr. 
Matthews was aware he could have requested a mistrial after his objection was overruled but 
made a strategic decision not to request a mistrial. The Petitioner has made no showing that 
there was a reasonable probability that the trial would have been different if Matthews had 
requested a mistrial since the facts alleged by the Petitioner show that the judge was unlikely to 
grant a mistrial even if requested and limiting instructions were given to the jury to cure any 
comments made in front of the jury. The Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence either that the defense counsel's performance was deficient or that the Petitioner was 
prejudiced by the failure to request a mistrial; and to survive summary judgment the Petitioner 
has the burden of proving both. The Supreme Court had already applied the harmless error 
doctrine in considering the errors of the prosecution at trial and determined a conviction will 
stand if the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been 
reached by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct not occurred. Severson, 147 Idaho at 716, 
215 P.2d at 436, citing State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839,844,655 P.2d 46, 51 (1982). Therefore, 
if the comments were not prejudicial error, then the failure to object to the comments was also 
not prejudicial to Mr. Severson and paragraphs 7(a) and 9(e) of the Petition are DISMISSED. 
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G. Fourth Cause Of Action: Ineffective Assistance Through Cumulative Error 
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is detailed 
paragraph 9(h) as trial counsel's cumulative errors. Severson's Fourth Cause Of Action 
(paragraphs 65-66) in the amended petition alleges further detail, that in the alternative, the 
cumulative effect of the deficient performance in the first three alleged causes of action 
prejudiced the petitioner and deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. 
The Amended Verified Petition alleges all of the facts used to support the previous causes 
of action and states, "The cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficient performance cause 
Severson to be prejudiced." (Amended Petition 166). 
"While [the Idaho Supreme Court] has recognized the doctrine of cumulative error, a 
necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of error in the first instance." 
Borman v. State, 129 Idaho 520,527,927 P.2d 910,917 (1996). Since an evidentiary hearing is 
required for the First Cause of Action, a material question of fact exists as to whether there is any 
error(s). Since whether counsel's performance was deficient must be determined before the 
court can examine the cumulative effect that the errors may have had in prejudicing the 
Petitioner, the Court cannot at this time make a determination whether there were errors so a 
material issue of fact still remains and the motion to summarily dismiss the Fourth Cause of 
Action in the amended petition and paragraph 9(h) of the Petition is DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning set forth above, the court GRANTS an evidentiary hearing on 
whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in 
his own defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in 
the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraph 9( a) in the original 
petition. 
The remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate and trial defense counsel 
in the petition and amended petition are DI~J!SED. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED thisl::f.1iay of June, 2012. 
~ 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S. MAIL 
Dated this 29th day of June, 2012. 
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BARBARA STEELE 
CJvL~ C.o~ 
~~kt ~ . ~ 
l_ E . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
I 29 PM 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY o:t~tl9l~.,E,~, ,.~~t:. 
CLERK OF HIE,Af JftiT 
LARRY M. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ndent. 
DEPUT 'j1d 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
ORDER FOR WAIVER OF 
ATTORNEY /CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
This Court having reviewed the record and pleadings in this matter, having determined 
that an evidentiary hearing on whether counsel was ineffective by preventing Mr. Severson from 
testifying at trial as alleged in the First Cause of Action in the Amended Petition in the above 
proceedings, and the Court being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attorney/client privilege is waived, as to all 
information held by defense counsel, Ellison Matthews and E.R. Frachiseur, concerning 
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleged in the First Cause of Action in the 
Amended Petition only. 
Dated this 29th day of June, 2012. 
L~ 
District Judge 
ORDER FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
- 1 -
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S. MAIL 
Dated this 29th day of June, 2012. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICJ 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMO~, I\ RA :.. i. 
LARRY M. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Appearances: 
OF THE ''rl!'IH 
OEPUT~ 
Case No. CV -2009-1408 
SECOND PARTIAL SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS 
David Smethers for Petitioner in person, Mr. Severson did not appear telephonically 
Kristina Schindele for Respondent 
This matter came before the Court on July 16, 2012 for a hearing on the Respondent's 
Second Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal on Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief. 
In Mr. Severson's first appearance before the court in this proceeding on May 9, 2012, he 
stated that he had not abandoned the claims in the original petition by filing the amended verified 
petition. Since the Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss was filed two and one-half years prior to 
this hearing and the Petitioner has since been appointed counsel, and because the court had never 
addressed the status of the amended petition, the Respondent was granted additional time to 
address the claims in the original petition. The court previously heard arguments on the Motion 
for Order Granting Summary Dismissal that had been filed addressing the ineffective assistance 
claims and has previously issued a decision summarily dismissing some of the claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in this matter. The court has now considered the remaining 
claims in the original petition and the additional briefing. 
The Court considered the Respondent's Second Motion for Order Granting Partial 
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support filed June 8, 2012 (hereinafter "Respondent's 
Motion"). The Petitioner did not file a response to the Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal. 
Tne court also considered the Affidavit of Larry M. Severson filed on May 9, 2012, the 
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Petitioner's Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition filed on October 22, 2009, 
and the pleadings which include the Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief filed 
October 22, 2009, the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 18, 
2011, and the Respondent's Answer to Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
filed on August 5, 2011. 
At the hearing, Mr. Smethers represented that the Petitioner would withdraw the 
remaining claims in the original Petition. However, since Mr. Severson was not available at the 
hearing and had previously represented he did not want to withdraw his original claims, the court 
considers those claims in this decision. 
BACKGROUND 
The factual and procedural background in this case is cited in this court's Order for 
Partial Summary Dismissal of Ineffective Assistance Claims. 
The Petitioner filed a sworn prose Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief on 
October 13, 2009, within one year of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on the direct appeal 
(hereinafter "Petition"). The Petition makes the following claims: (1) corpus delecti; (2) 
ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence; ( 4) due 
process: State's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence; (5) due process: State use of perjured 
testimony; (6) court error and failure to declare a mistrial; and (7) ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel: failure to appeal both counts. 
A Notice of Intent of Partial Summary Dismissal and Order Appointing Counsel was 
filed on December 11, 2009 by Judge Wetherell. In this Notice, the Court found each of the 
claims in the original petition incompletely pied and patently frivolous to the point that they were 
unable to be developed into a valid claim but appointed counsel to provide the Petitioner an 
opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts as required 
in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). 
Mr. Severson filed a handwritten Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent on 
January 7, 2010 before counsel had actually been appointed. The response was not sworn and is 
not considered by this Court as an affidavit. 
A renewed order appointing conflict counsel was filed on January 27, 2010 and an 
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed with the assistance of 
counsel on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter "amended petition"). The amended petition was is subject 
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to this court's earlier summary dismissal except (1) ineffective assistance of counsel: defense 
counsel's refusal to allow defendant to testify at the jury trial and (4) in the alternative, the 
cumulative effect of the defense counsel's performance deprived petitioner of effective 
assistance of counsel at trial, which will be set for evidentiary hearing. 
The Respondent's Counsel filed a request for the court to take judicial notice of"the 
transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County 
criminal case, CR 2002-158. The court considered the trial transcript with opening and closing 
arguments, the Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal, and the Supplemental Clerk's 
Record in that appeal. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911, allows 
individuals convicted and/or sentenced for a crime to petition the Court for relief in the following 
situations: (1) the sentence is in violation of the constitution; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (3) 
the sentence exceeds the maximum provided by law; (3) there is evidence of material fact, not 
previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice; (5) 
the sentence has expired; (6) the petitioner is innocent, subject to the provisions for DNA testing 
in the statute; (7) or the sentence is subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error. 
I.C. § 19-4901(a). After the Court's review an application for post-conviction relief, if satisfied 
that the applicant is not entitled to relief and that no purpose would be served by any further 
proceedings, the Court can indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its 
reasons for doing so. I.C. § 19-4906(b). The applicant shall have an opportunity to respond to 
the Court's notice of intent to dismiss within twenty (20) days of the proposed dismissal. Id. 
Summary disposition under I.C. § 19-4906 is the "procedural equivalent of a summary judgment 
motion under I.R.C.P. 56." Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000); see also 
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994). In "determining 
whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, the Court reviews the facts in a 
light most favorable to the petitioner and determines whether the facts would entitle petitioner to 
relief if accepted as true." Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. 
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if ''the petitioner 
has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon 
which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Id. Idaho's Supreme Court has stated that an 
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application for post-conviction relief requires more than a short and plain statement of the claim 
rather, requires verification "with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, 
or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application." 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 628-29 (Ct. App. 2002). If the 
application fails to include such evidence supporting its allegations, the application will be 
subject to dismissal. Id. at 271, 61 P.3d at 629. A Court is not required to accept the applicant's 
"mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions oflaw" in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 989, 901 (Ct.App. 1994)); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 
716 P.2d 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1986). At summary disposition of a post-conviction petition, 
affidavits must satisfy Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure which requires affidavits to be made upon 
personal knowledge setting forth facts that would be admissible at trial. Where petitioner's 
affidavits are based upon hearsay rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without 
an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80-81, 844 P.2d 706, 709-710 
(1992). Summary disposition is also appropriate where the affidavit doesn't address a claim at 
all. 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is not a substitute for an appeal from the 
sentence or conviction. "Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, 
is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the 
court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing, by affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, that the 
asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and 
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." I.C. § 19-4901(b). 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature. 
It is distinct from the criminal action which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 
494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991). 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden 
of proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 797 
(2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action, 
and that "[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the 
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claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008) (quoting Goodwin, 138 
at 271, 61 P.3d at 628). 
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by 
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 
517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 19-4903. Facts within the personal knowledge 
of the applicant and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the 
application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and correct. Id.; I.C. § 19-4902. The 
applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846, 875 P.2d at 941; Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d 
546, 551 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and must rely 
on substantial evidence in the record, although the evidence may be conflicting. Martinez, 125 
Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 943; Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,314,658 P.2d 983,985 (Ct. App. 
1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, 
need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994); Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 617,651 P.2d at 551supra. If the allegations fail to frame a 
genuine issue of material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary prima facie elements of a 
claim for relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and 
the reasons for so doing." I.C. § 19-4906(b); I.C.R. 57(c); Roman, supra; Parrottv. State, 117 
Idaho 272, 274, 276, 787 P.2d 258, 260, 262 (1990). However, if the application raises a 
material issue of fact, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific 
findings. LC. § 19-4907(a); Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846, 875 P.2d at 943. 
DISCUSSION 
This decision only addresses claims other than the ineffective assistance of counsel in 
Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on October 22, 2009, as rephrased in the 
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel on April 18, 2011. For 
purposes ofthis order, the court has considered the following claims in the original petition: (1) 
corpus delecti; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence; (4) due process: State's 
failure to divulge exculpatory evidence; (5) due process: State use of perjured testimony; and (6) 
court error and failure to declare a mistrial. 
A. Petition 7(b): Failure to Establish Corpus Delicti 
SECOND PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 5 -
Petitioner's affidavit filed October 22, 2009 addresses "corpus delicti procedure" on 
pages one and two that alleges the same argument raised on direct appeal related to the state's 
burden of proof to show corpus delicti. (Severson Aff., Oct. 22, 2009, pp. 1-2). Idaho Code§ 
19-4901(a)(4) allows claims when "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard .... " (emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b) states that "[a]ny issue 
which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings[.]" The Petitioner litigated the issue of corpus delicti 
in his underlying appeal. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 712-715, 215 P.3d at 432-435. 
A "convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the same factual questions in his 
application in virtually the same factual context already presented in a direct appeal." Gilpin-
Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860,863,908 P.2d 162, 165 (Ct.App. 1995), citing Whitehawkv. 
State, 116 Idaho 831,833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct.App. 1989). The Petitioner has alleged only 
material facts previously presented and heard to support the conclusory allegation so the 
allegation that the State did not prove corpus delicti at trial is DISMISSED. 
B. Petition 7( d): Due Process: Failure of the State to Preserve Evidence 
Mr. Severson's first affidavit states makes conclusory statements about Hydrocut diet pill 
being banned from sale, causing problematic symptoms, and being "know to have caused over 
250 deaths." (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 5). These statements are conclusory and outside 
of the personal knowledge of Mr. Severson and will not be considered. The next paragraph 
alleges, "The state has the duty to take and preserve [blood or tissue] samples for defence (sic) to 
use, but failed to do so. It is argued that the testing done by the state is questionable. Defence 
(sic) was not allowed and could not have their own testing done due to lack of samples." 
(Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 5). Again, these statements are conclusory, outside the personal 
knowledge of the defendant, and unsupported by affidavits or other admissible evidence. 
Therefore, allegation 7(d) is DISMISSED. 
C. Affidavit Page 6: Due Process: Failure of the State to Divulge Exculpatory 
Evidence 
The applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at 
hearing. Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 941; Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 617,651 P.2d at 
551. To justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent on 
the applicant to tender written statements from potential witnesses who are able to give 
testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge. Id See also Self v. State, 145 Idaho 
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578, 581, 181 P.3d 504,507 (Ct. App. 2007). No affidavits of potential witnesses showing there 
was any exculpatory evidence were filed in support of Severson's vague assertions. The 
Petitioner's allegation that the State was required to inform a potential defendant of an ongoing 
investigation is incorrect. The next portion of the allegation is that "Exculpatory evidence stands 
a remote chance of being destroyed, and is required to collect exculpatory evidence for defence 
(sic)." (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 6). This seems to be a continuing allegation of the 
failure to preserve evidence and is summarily dismissed for the same reasons discussed supra. 
D. Petiton 7(c): Due Process: State Use of Perjured Testimony 
Severson's affidavit states Detective Wolfs grand jury testimony was perjured and 
should not have been used without an attempt to correct it. (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 6). 
Severson was not convicted based upon the grand jury testimony. Detective Wolf was called, 
and recalled, to testify at trial. The contents of the testimony and the alleged "perjury" are 
discussed in this court's first order of summary dismissal within the context of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in failing to call the prosecutor as a witness to question him about the 
"perjury" in the court's previous order. The prosecutor brought to the court's attention early in 
the trial that there had been a discrepancy and a lengthy discussion ensued on the record related 
to discrepancies in testimony between Detective Barclay, Deputy Sterling and Detective Wolfe 
(Tr. pp. 559-563). Detective Barclay was examined by Mr. Bazzoli about evidence collection 
(Tr. p. 503-519). The court allowed the prosecution to call witnesses to explain testimony which 
may have been incorrect and Detective Wolfe is then called to the stand by Mr. Howen (Tr. pp. 
565-656), an inconsistency in testimony was not allowed because of defense objection (Tr. pp. 
648-649), and the color of a pudding bowl was clarified (Tr. p. 652). Detective Wolfe is recalled 
later in the trial (Tr. pp. 1462-1547, 1562-1575). 1462-1547, 1562-1575). Mr. Severson's 
conclusion that the testimony was "perjured" is bare and conclusory, especially since Detective 
Wolfe was confronted with inconsistencies and given the opportunity to explain. The motion to 
summarily dismiss the allegation of use of perjured testmimony is GRANTED. 
E. Petition 7(t): Court's Failure to Declare a Mistrial 
The issue of ineffective assistance of defense counsel alleged in paragraph 7(e) of the 
Petition for not asking for a mistrial is addressed in the court's previous ruling. Whether the 
court erred in not sua sponte declaring a mistrial is discussed below. Severson' s first affidavit 
states, "During the hearing on defence [sic] Motion in Limine, this Honorable Court deemed that 
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certain evidence was admissible and if entered into testimony trial would be deemed a mistrial. 
Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial during testimony of Detective." (Severson Aff., Oct. 
1 2009, p. 4) During Mr. Bourne's testimony, Mr. Howen, the prosecutor, stated "It would be 
his [Mr. Bourn's] investigative jurisdiction if this matter was not tampered with anywhere but at 
the end of the consumer line." (Tr. p. 1432). Mr. Matthews stated on the record, "Your Honor, 
what the Prosecutor did in response to my objection was, in essence, to tell the jury that the end 
user was the responsible tampering party. That, and in front of the jury is as close as you can 
get, in my opinion, to giving us a basis for a motion for mistrial. I don't wish to make that 
motion at this time," and then the defense asked for a limiting instruction (Tr. pp. 1433-1434), 
and the limiting instruction was given by the Court (Tr. pp. 1438-1439). 
Severson's first affidavit states, "Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial based on 
prosecutors improper, prejudicial improper, and inflammatory comments." (Severson Aff., Oct. 
13, 2009, p. 4) 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed all of the comments in the direct appeal and did not 
find that any rose to the level of fundamental error, especially given the court's limiting 
instructions. Therefore, the issues raised on direct appeal will not be relitigated here as 
rephrased as the court's failure to sua sponte order a mistrial. This issue is res judicata and the 
Motion for Summary Dismissal on this issue is GRANTED. 
F. Fourth Cause Of Action: Ineffective Assistance Through Cumulative Error 
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is detailed 
in paragraph 9(h) as trial counsel's cumulative errors. Severson's Fourth Cause Of Action 
(paragraphs 65-66) in the amended petition alleges further detail, that in the alternative, the 
cumulative effect of the deficient performance in the first three alleged causes of action 
prejudiced the petitioner and deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. 
The Amended Verified Petition alleges all of the facts used to support the previous causes 
of action and states, "The cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficient performance cause 
Severson to be prejudiced." (Amended Petition ,r 66). 
"While the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of cumulative error, a 
necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of error in the first instance." 
Borman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P .2d 910, 917 ( 1996). Although an evidentiary 
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hearing is required for the First Cause of Action, the court has now considered all claims in the 
original and amended petition and has only granted an evidentiary hearing on one issue conceded 
the State that there remains a material question of fact exists as to whether there is any 
error(s). Since one error cannot be "cumulative" and there remains only one error within this 
court's consideration., the motion to summarily dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action in the 
amended petition and paragraph 9(h) of the Petition is GRANTED. 
- CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning set forth above, the court DENIES an evidentiary hearing on any 
of the claims in the original petition and on the cumulative errors in the Fourth Cause of Action 
in the Amended Petition, except whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to 
permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of 
Action.," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
and paragraph 9(a) in the original petition. ~ 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this2ilay of July, 2012. 
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the 
following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S.MAIL 
Dated this 2ih day of July, 2012. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody 
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary 
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County, 
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home, 
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Friday, the 7th day of 
September, 2012 at the hour of 3:00 o'clock p.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Idaho State Board of 
Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore 
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned 
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho, 
to hold said defendant until such time as he is ordered returned 
to the Board of 
Dated this 
Co~on. 
day of August, 
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2012. ~ 
L~RON 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Barbara Steele, hereby certify that on this a~ day of 
August, 2012, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served or 
mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Carolee Kelly 
Records Administrator 
Dept. of Corrections 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Faxed to: 327-7444 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S. MAIL 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Sheriff 
Prosecutor 
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It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody 
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary 
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County, 
State of Idaho, b ng the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home, 
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Wednesday, the 19th 
day of September, 2012 at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Idaho State Board of 
Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore 
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned 
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho, 
to hold said defendant until such time as he is ordered returned 
to the Board of Correction. 
Dated this 1/J}v day of September, 2012 '_____CJ~ 
LY~ 
District Judge 
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Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
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Case No. CV-2009-0001408 
ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT 
THE COURT, Having read and considered the State's Motion for Transcript, and good cause 
appearing; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDEREDThataDeputyClerkofthe Elmore County 
Court copy the transcript of the Motion Hearing held in Zachary Diaz, etal vs. Larry Severson, on July 1, 
2002, case no. CV-2002-0000584. 
IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that the transcript shall be prepared at State's expense. 
DATED This u.Jll, day of :iip}en0:el 2012. 
JU~ 
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Inter Dept. Mail 
Dated this 11th day of September, 2012. 
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It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody 
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary 
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County, 
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home, 
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Friday, the 5th day of 
October, 2012 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Idaho State Board of 
Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore 
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned 
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho, 
to hold said defendant until such time as he is ordered returned 
to the Board of C~ion. 
Dated this day of September, 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 1 
:r.;~ 
District Judge 
JEW.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Barbara Steele, hereby certify that on this .2'tJ,1. day of 
September, 2012, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served 
or mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Carolee Kelly 
Records Administrator 
Dept. of Corrections 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Faxed to: 327-7444 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S. MAIL 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Sheriff 
Prosecutor 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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David J. Smethers 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
208-3361145 
Fax 208-336-1263 
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BAR\3ARt:. STEILE 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
OEPUTa-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY M. SEVERSON 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Defendant 
INTRODUCTION 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-2009-1408 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
This Court should grant petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
vacate the conviction, and grant plaintiff a new trial. Petitioner requests this Court 
consider the pro se petition, the amended petition, all arguments and materials 
submitted in support of said petitions, and the testimony and arguments made at 
hearings when deciding this case. During his testimony, the plaintiff affirmed the 
pro se, amended petition, and the affidavit in support. 
Petitioner is entitled to post-conviction re 1 i e f because he did not receive the 
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel from his trial attorneys, (hereafter 
"attorneys" denoting Ed Frachiseur and Ellison Matthews, and/or "Frachiseur" 
denoting Ed Frachiseur, and/or "Matthews", denoting Eliison Frachiseur), as he was 
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prevented from testifying by Frachiseur' s bullying, lack of communication, erroneous, 
improper, and deficient legal advice, the fact Frachiseur did not request the Court to 
advise the defendant concerning his right to testify and obtain an affirmative and 
knowing waiver of said right, and the fact Frachiseur prevented the plaintiff from 
addressing the Court at the time the defense rested and before the case was submitted 
to the jury. 
In addition, the Sixth Amendment right to testify claim is meritorious. The 
testimony of the Plaintiff, Frachiseur, and Scott Summer at the hearings on this matter 
clearly establishes that the plaintiff was not allowed testify, did not understand he had the 
constitutional right to testify until after discussion with Summer after the verdict had been 
returned, even though he repeatedly requested to do so at every opportunity prior to, 
during, and even after the case was submitted to the jury before the verdict was returned. 
THE INNEFFECTIVE ASSISATANCE OF COUNSEL GATEWAY HAS BEEN 
ESTABLISED 
The law on ineffective assistance of counsel is also well-established. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668 (1984), established a two-prong test. 
First, counsel's representation must be deficient, i.e., that it "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Second, the deficiency must be prejudicial. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692. Prejudice exists when "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. 
Plaintiff raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his pro se and 
amended petitions. 
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As the United States Supreme Court has written: "[t]he right to testify on 
one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the 
Constitution. It is one of the rights that are essential to due process of law in a fair 
adversary process." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987) (internal quotations 
marks omitted). "The right to testify is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment, which grants a defendant the right to call 'witnesses in his 
favor,' a right that is guaranteed in the criminal courts ofthe States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id, quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). "Even 
more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation . . • 1s 
an accused's right to present his own version of events in his own words. A 
defendant's opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is 
incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness." Rockv. Arkansas, supra. 
And our own Supreme Court has written, "(a] defendant in a criminal proceeding has 
the right to testify in his own behalf. Although a defendant can and should consult 
with counsel about the risks and benefits of testifying, the ultimate decision of 
whether to do so must be left to the defendant." DeRuslu'! v. State, 146 Idaho 
599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009). In other words, Frachiseur could not refuse to allow 
plaintiff to testify, yet that is what happened here. 
This case should be analyzed under ineffective assistance of counsel and as a 
claim of a violation of a constitutional right. The Court of Appeals held in State v 
Rossignol, 152 Idaho 700, (2012), as follows: 
"Our review of Darbin , Hoffman , Cootz, Kuehl, DeRushe , and Barcella, leads 
to the following conclusions relevant to this case. Darb in indicates that the issue of the 
failure of a defendant to testify may be viewed in post-conviction proceedings either as 
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a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a claim of a deprivation of a 
constitutional right. With respect to Hoffman, we first note that Hoffman's claim that 
his attorney prevented him from testifying on his own behalf came to this Court on 
appeal from the denial of Hoffman's motion for a new trial. As such, this Court could 
not review Hoffman's claim as ineffective assistance of counsel because such a claim is 
not a ground for which a new trial may be granted. LC. § 19-2406. However, of 
relevance here, Hoffman indicates that a defendant may not be found to have waived 
the right to testify unless the defendant was aware he or she had such right and also the 
ultimate authority to decide whether to testify, regardless of counsel's 
advice. Cootz demonstrates that the issue of the failure of a defendant to testify may be 
viewed in post-conviction proceedings both as a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and as a claim of a deprivation of a constitutional right when both are 
presented to the district court. Kuehl indicates that, when a post-conviction claim that 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by depriving a defendant of the right to 
testify is presented only as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appropriate 
inquiry is that pursuant to Strickland. Similarly, DeRushe indicates that, if a defendant 
alleges that he or she was deprived by trial counsel of the right to testify on his or her 
own behalf, without also alleging ineffective assistance of counsel related to such 
claim, it should be analyzed as a claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. 
Finally, Barcella specifies that the appropriate inquiry depends upon on how the claim 
is pied and argued before the district court. Barcella, 148 Idaho at 476-77, 224 P.3d at 
543-44.", (emphasis added for plaintiff Severson's case). 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS 
The deprivation of these constitutional rights requires relief on post-
conviction. Under DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009), this 
particular constitutional deprivation is subject to the Chapman harmless error 
standard. Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. !8, 24 (1967), the burden of 
proof is on the State to prove that the error in not permitting p 1 a inti ff to testify 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It has not met its burden here. Frachisuer 
and Matthews were ineffective for failing and refusing to call the defendant to 
testify. 
In short, the testimony plaintiff would have provided, (see examples infra 
ad nauseum), would have negated and invalidated the state's evidence. The record of 
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what the plaintiff's testimony would have been and the record of the criminal trial 
establish that the plaintiff would have been acquitted of murder had he testified. 
The post conviction hearings in this case encompassed some ten hours of 
testimony. Plaintiff will present his closing arguments in a sequential fashion the 
same as presented during the hearings. 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT HEARINGS 1 
This case essentially comes down to what evidence the plaintiff would/could 
have produced had he been allowed to testify, and the plaintiffs credibility vs. 
Frachiseur's. 
The defendant testified that his relationship with Frachiseur was "rocky from the 
beginning"2 of the case to the point where plaintiff sought to have Frachiseur removed 
and new counsel appointed numerous times. Plaintiffs testimony was as follows: 
Frachiseur had a bad attitude, "blew me, (plaintiff), off', would not listen, did not have 
time for the case, did not want the case, refused to communicate or discuss the case, 
would not take his calls from the jail. .. 
The plaintiff told Frachiseur that he wanted to testify on numerous occasions, 
and he did not ever tell Frachiseur that he did not want to testify. Frachiseur advised the 
1 The post conviction hearings in this case encompassed some ten hours of 
testimony. Plaintiff will present his closing arguments in a sequential fashion the 
same as presented during the hearings in order to hopefully provide some modicum 
of coherence. 
2 Information in quotation marks not otherwise attributed is from counsel's review of the 
audio recordings of the hearings and not from ai,y transcript. 
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plaintiff that the judge could not prevent him from testifying, but whether or not the 
plaintiff testified was ultimately up to Frachiseur. The plaintiff testified that this meant 
to him that his ability to testify was up to Frachiseur. 
During plaintiffs initial testimony on direct exam, plaintiff testified he told 
Matthews that he wanted to testify, and was asked what Matthew's response was, at 
which time the Court sustained the states' objection as to hearsay. At that time, the 
plaintiff cited IRE 804( 4)3 and argued that Matthews was unavailable as he was 
deceased. Plaintiff argues as an offer of proof that Matthew's statement to the plaintiff 
which would have disclosed that Matthews told plaintiff he was second chair and it was 
up to Frachiseur if the plaintiff testified and there was nothing Matthews could do-
should have been considered by this Court.4 Mathews told the plaintiff that he was 
second chair, and all important decisions were to be made by Frachiseur. 
Plaintiff then testified that he told Matthews that he wanted to testify on 
numerous occasions; the plaintiff did not ever tell Matthews he did not want to testify. 
3 
"Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable - (a) Definition of 
unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant -
( 4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing 
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or" 
4 The state objected to this testimony on the basis of hearsay, which the Court sustained. 
Plaintiff additionally argues that the proper objection to this question is that it calls for 
negative evidence. The state did not make the proper objection, which would have 
allowed the Court to rule on the matter, so plaintiff argues that the Court should consider 
this testimony as given. This testimony further bolsters plaintiffs contention that he was 
unaware the decision on whether to testify was his and his alone, and that he was never 
disabused of this legal advice by either of his attorneys. 
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A the time during jury trail that Judge Wetherell explained a defendant's right to testify 
on the record, the plaintiff told Frachiseur he did not understand what the judge had 
said, asked Frachiseur to request that the judge explain again, and attempted to address 
the Judge concerning what the judge had just said. Frachiseur refused plaintiffs 
request. 5 The plaintiff later discussed his right to testify with Frachiseuer after the jury 
had the case but before said jury had reached a verdict at the Elmore County Jail's old 
facility. 
Frachiseur would not allow the plaintiff to speak with him during the trial, and 
insisted that the plaintiff write everything, ( which included comments, concerns, 
questions, discrepancies in witness testimony, suggestions for cross examination issues, 
requests for legal advice), on yellow legal pads, (hereafter "notes"). Frachiseur ignored 
the notes, the plaintiff did not observe Frachiseur ever read any of the notes, and did not 
ever discuss the contents of the notes with the plaintiff. Plaintiff attempted to draw 
Frachiseur' s attention to the notes by underlining and pointing, but "it was like I was 
not there". Plaintiffs testimony established implicitly and explicitly that he wanted to 
testify. When Frachiseur did communicate with the plaintiff, he assured him many 
times that the plaintiffs concerns in the notes would be addressed when the plaintiff 
testified, which confirmed from plaintiffs perspective that he would be allowed to 
testify. Frachiseur told the plaintiff forty to fifty times he would be allowed to testify. 
Frachiseur took the notes with him at the end of the trial every day as the plaintiff could 
5 Further argument concerning the advice of rights by the Judge is included later in this 
document, not included here to maintain the sequential presentation. 
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not have the notes in jail. Plaintiff asked Frachiseur numerous times to see the notes, 
and was told they were not available. 
The plaintiff desired to testify that his financial condition was good at the time 
of the victim's death, with $11,000 in one account. Frachiseur informed the jury in the 
opening statement that the plaintiff was successful and the cash flow was more that 
adequate, (Jury Trial Transcript, (hereafter "Ct Tr, (vs. "App Tr")6, p 47, 11 8-23). 
Plaintiff testified that his business in a bad month was netting twelve to fifteen thousand 
dollars. Frachiseur told the plaintiff that he would be able to attest to the businesses 
profitability when he testified. The state presented evidence that money and life 
insurance proceeds were partial motivations for the plaintiff killing the victim because 
the plaintiff was experiencing money problems. 
Felicia Gartung testified for the plaintiff at trial. Gartung waited on the couple 
on Valentine's Day the night of the victim's death, and told the jury that the victim 
asked about ordering cheese sticks, the plaintiff told her she could not have cheese 
sticks, and the victim put her hand to her mouth "and said it would be soft", (Ct Tr p 
2751, 11 7-25, p 2752, 111-3). Plaintiff testified that the bread sticks were not ordered 
due to an existing injury in the victim's mouth. Had the plaintiff been allowed to 
testify, he would have told the jury how the victim's mouth had been recently injured 
when the victim had been on a ladder at their residence cleaning the blades on a ceiling 
fan when the family dog rushed through, hit the ladder, which resulted in the victim 
6 The "Ct Tr" transcript was ordered by Judge Wetherell for use by the sentencing 
attorney, and the "App Tr" was used for the appeal. 
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falling onto the coffee table and cutting her lip. This detail alone is enough to grant 
plaintiffs petition in that a main focus of the state's case was that the plaintiff caused 
the victim's death by smothering her with his hand or by the use of some other 
implement which left the cut on the inside of her mouth. This damning evidence that 
the plaintiff smothered the victim was never countered by the defense. Plaintiff testified 
that he wrote Frachiseur numerous notes concerning this issue and Frachiseur 
threatened to leave the case if he continued to show him the notes. 
Plaintiff would have told the jury that he was unaware of the victim's life 
insurance policy until after her passing when he was informed by Carol Diaz. When 
plaintiff first learned of the policy, he assumed he was the beneficiary, and later 
discovered that the policy had been changed to benefit Carol Diaz. 
Plaintiff testified that the victim had problems with money due to her son's 
profligate behavior, she was mad at herself as she put on weight, and she suffered from 
depression. This information was not presented to the jury for their consideration in 
determining the plaintiffs guilt. 
The plaintiff is the only person that could have countered Lean Watkins 
testimony that he had told her he was separated and contemplating divorced from the 
victim versus Watkins' testimony that he had told her he was divorced, (Ct Tr p 2589, 11 
10-14). The jury is the finder of fact, if a defendant is precluded from supplying the 
jury with all relevant admissible evidence due to actions by his counsel, said defendant 
has been denied due process of law. 
The plaintiff was prepared to counter some of the most damaging evidence 
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against him, that of Jennifer Watkins, and would have testified as follows: he did not 
tell her he was already divorced, (Ct Tr p 2599, 11 10-11), he did not stalk her or park 
outside of her house, (Ct Tr p 2615, 1118-25; p 2616, 11 7-25), he loaned her $1,100 for 
the down payment for a residence with a backyard for her son, (which was never 
repaid). 
Teresa Buckholtz testified that plaintiff obtained Lorazepam prescription pills 
from her on two occasions, (Ct Tr p 2214, 1114-25; p 2215, 11 1-25). The defendant 
would have testified this did not happen. 
The plaintiff would have testified he attempted to call 911 using the pre-
programmed phone when he found that the victim was not breathing, and there was no 
answer at the 911 Call Center. Pliantiff would have testified that he had witnessed 
many occasions when the 911 Call Center was not staffed at the Elmore County Jail. 
After the defense rested without calling him to the stand, the plaintiff testified he 
was in shock, wrote Frachiseur another note which was not read, at which time 
Frachiseur went to the jail to meet with the plaintiff. When questioned, Frachiseur told 
the plaintiff he did not need to testify, the jury would acquit him, many things you need 
to say should not be said and are irrelevant, and you do not need to testify. 
The plaintiff testified that after his conversation with Scott Summer, he was 
aware that he had the right to testify. 
On cross examination, the plaintiff established the following: 
The plaintiff testified that when Judge Wetherell asked the defense how many 
witnesses would testify, Frachiseur told the judge two, (Ct Tr p 3922, 11 9-18), and the 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT Page 10 of 19 
plaintiff testified that at that time, Matthews pointed to the plaintiff and said, "What 
about the guy next to you", to which Frachiseur responded, "Oh, yeah, yeah". 
The state introduced Defendant's Exhibit 4, the transcript where Judge 
Wetherell pronounced a defendant's right to testify. The plaintiff testified that he was 
writing a note to Frachiseur, did not hear the entire pronouncement by the judge, he was 
not paying attention, and did not know at the time the judge was talking to him. 
The plaintiffs rendition is credible in light of the circumstances at the time. In a 
court room during a jury trial, unless the defendant testifies, the colloquy is between and 
among the trial attorneys, the judge and various witnesses for both parties. This trial 
lasted approximately five weeks, and the Court did not address the plaintiff at all. 
When pronouncing a defendant's right to testify, the judge starts by speaking of 
other matters, specifically, "I can understand that. And neither party has gone beyond 
the time scheduled for this trial. And if Mr. Severson chooses to testify, clearly, you 
will have the opportunity to meet anything that you're not clearly aware of that he might 
testify to.", (Ct Tr p 3932, ll 5-10). What is significant in this passage is the record does 
not show in any way that the plaintiff acknowledges that he was listening to the 
pronouncement. Plaintiff estimates that this pronouncement took approximately one 
minute out of this five week trial. Judge Wetherell did not ask the plaintiff if he 
understood this right, and did not elicit any acknowledgment of any waiver. The 
passage ends with the Court asking, "Is there anything further, Counsel?", at which time 
the Bailiff is the first to respond concerning an unrelated matter, (Ct Tr p 3933, 1113-
17). 
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The plaintiff testified he discussed the issue of testifying with attorneys Clark 
and Summer, and they both advised the plaintiff he should testify. The plaintiff testified 
Frachiseur did not ever tell him it was not a good idea to testify, and did not discuss 
with plaintiff about his concerns on potential cross-examination and opening the door to 
possible damaging evidence. 
The plaintiff testified that the police report out of Colorado did not prove a 
gunshot wound was self-inflicted, so the possible evidence would not have been 
harmful. 
The plaintiff testified that the hiding of assets was not an issue, most assets were 
in the victim's name, but he was not worried about losing the business to her as the 
customers were his and not the business's. 
Plaintiff called Scott Summer to testify who testified that the plaintiff called him 
from the jail after the verdict and was upset that he was not allowed to testify. Summer 
explained that it was the plaintiffs absolute right to testify. Plaintiff attempted to elicit 
the legal advice that was given to the plaintiff by Summer, the Court ruled that what 
Summer said on an earlier occasion is hearsay.7 Summer responded to the Court's 
inquiry by stating that he advised the plaintiff he had a constitutional right to testify 
after the verdict was reached. 
7 Plaintiff argues that the testimony the plaintiff was attempting to elicit was not hearsay 
as the declarant was present in court and testifying, so the testimony was not an out of 
court statement made by someone other than the declarant. Plaintiff argues he was 
prejudiced by what he characterizes as an erroneous ruling by the Court ruling as he was 
not able to present a full and accurate portrayal of the conversation between plaintiff and 
Summer. 
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The state called Ed Frachiseur at this point in the proceeding. 
Frachiseur testified he did not remember when he discussed the plaintiff's right 
to testify as it had been eight years ago. Frachiseur went on to relate many justifications 
why the plaintiff should not testify: damaging evidence would come in, the affair 
would be rehashed, divergent stories regarding hydroxycut, and the possible self-
inflicted gun shot wound in Colorado. This evidence elicited by the state further proves 
that the plaintiff was not well served by counsel. All of these factors are strategic 
decisions that should have been discussed with the plaintiff, followed by a 
recommendation on whether to testify, and then a full and frank dialogue with the 
plaintiff ultimately making the final determination. 
This Court allowed State's 7 into evidence of plaintiffs objection, and ruled that 
only certain portions would be considered. The fifth bullet point from the bottom of 
State's 7 proves the plaintiffs contention that Frachiseur decided that he would not 
allow the plaintiff to testify, "Ed wants to decide whether we are going to put Larry on 
the stand: Probably not. We discussed pros and cons." This statement comports with 
all of the evidence in front of this Court save Frachiseur's testimony to the contrary. 
State's 8 admitted over objection states at the second bullet point form the 
bottom, "Larry wishes he could sit in on our meetings: we said so far he would have 
nothing to contribute. We have ask (sic) him to help us on defense theories: nothing 
forthcoming so far". Plaintiff argues more than two yellow legal pads full of his notes 
would constitute contributions and defense theories. State's 8 proves the plaintiff was 
kept in the dark and not consulted about his case, and he consistently attested to this at 
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the hearings. 
Frachiseur did not remember that Judge Wetherell had stated that a defendant 
has the right to testify on the record, and his memory had to be refreshed with the 
transcript. At that time, Frachiseur was asked if he remembered discussing the 
plaintiffs right to testify after the Court's pronouncement, to which he answered "No". 
Frachiseur went on to testify that the plaintiff may have told him he wanted to testify, 
and when then asked if the plaintiff demanded to testify, Frachiseur answered "He may 
have". Any doubt this Court may have should be construed in plaintiffs favor. Based 
on this testimony, Frachiseur could and should have cleared up the matter of plaintiff's 
right to testify. 
The state then inquired about Frachiseur's understanding about the plaintiffs 
right to testify at the time the defense rested, and he answered over objection that it was 
his understanding the plaintiff did not want to testify. The next exchange between the 
state and Frachiseur is telling. When asked the time he was aware that the plaintiff 
wanted to testify, he replied when he was notified of "this" hearing. The state then 
reminded Frachiseur about the affidavit prepared by Jay Clark, and Frachiseur's 
withdrawal from the case. Frachiseur continued to testify he did not remember, was 
handed State's 2 & 3, then asserted his memory is refreshed and he did sign the affidavit 
withdrawing as counsel. This questioning by the state and the responses from 
Frachiseur call into question his memory, credibility, and the trustworthiness of all of 
his testimony. Once again, the only evidence in front of this Court that the plaintiff was 
aware of and waived his right to testify is in the form ofFrachiseur's testimony. 
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Cross examination. 
Frachiseur did not at first remember that the plaintiff used yellow pads to 
communicate, acknowledged that use of these pads was his practice, and this had been 
done in approximately 70 to 80 percent of his jury trials. Frachiseur then acknowledged 
he did not remember how many pads were used, did not know where the pads were, and 
conceded that the plaintiff could not take the pads with him as he was in jail. The 
plaintiffs case file was damaged in a flood and Frachiseur had retrieved what was left 
of the file. 
What is dispositive in this case is that Frachiseur testified that he does not have 
any notes of any date and time when the plaintiffs right to testify was discussed and 
waived by said plaintiff. Frachiseur acknowledged that these matters are important and 
should be preserved, and as lead counsel he was responsible for the criminal file. 
Frachiseur was asked how many times Matthews informed him that the plaintiff wanted 
to testify, Frachiseur replied that he had "No idea". Frachiseur was then asked if there 
were some occasions when Matthews informed him of plaintiffs desire to testify, and 
he replied, "Certainly, certainly". 
Frachiseur testified that he believed he told Judge Wetherell on the record that 
the plaintiff would not be testifying. The record clearly indicates he did not. The 
plaintiff has testified he desired to testify and never wavered in this desire, and this 
Court should believe the plaintiff. Once again, competent representation of a client 
includes making sure the Court fulfills the mandates of the constitution- obtaining an 
informed and knowing waiver. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT Page 15 of 19 
Frachiseur was asked if he remembered the plaintiff informed him that he 
wanted to testify at the time the state rested and before the jury was out, to which 
Frachiseur responded, "Not to my recollection". It is noteworthy that Frachiseur did not 
answer definitively, he equivocates. Frachiseur did not remember telling the plaintiff he 
need not testify as the jury would acquit him, but he though the jury would indeed 
acquit. Further equivocation and a convenient memory. When asked about the plaintiff 
summoning him to the jail after resting but before the jury reached a verdict, Frachiseur 
said he did not remember but it could have happened. The plaintiff clearly remembered 
all of these events, and so testified. Our judicial system mandates live testimony so the 
trier of fact can observe the witness's body language, expressions, mannerisms, and 
hear voice inflections in addition to the actual testimony from the witness. The 
plaintiff's testimony was credible. 
Further evidence casting doubt on all of Frachiseur's testimony, his ability to 
recall, and his judgment in this proceeding is his action of drafting and executing State's 
2 & 3 when he withdrew from the case. The motion and affidavit contain privileged 
information that is now contained in the court file and part of the public record. 
Frachiseur did not obtain a waiver from the plaintiff or the Court before drafting, 
signing, and filing these documents. This was done prior to sentencing, and arguably 
cast a bad light on the plaintiff from Judge Wetherell' s perspective. This Court is well 
aware of the procedure for an attorney to withdraw from a case when said attorney has a 
conflict with the client, and this procedure does not involve or require the violation of 
numerous Rules of Professional Conduct. Frachiseur' s relationship with the plaintiff 
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interfered with his judgment and this Court should consider State's 2 & 3 accordingly. 
The state called CJ Nemeth, who was present at the time Judge Wetherell 
announced the right of a defendant to testify. Nemeth was not in a position to hear 
anything said at the defense table. At the time of the admonishment, Nemeth saw a 
discussion between Frachiseur and Judge Wetherell, and then between Frachiseur and 
the plaintiff. The state did not establish what was being said when. This testimony 
corroborates plaintiffs testimony that he was speaking with Frachiseur and not listening 
to the judge. Nemeth testified during the admonishment, plaintiff leaned over and 
spoke with Frachiseur, then shook his head. The state was attempting to show that the 
plaintiff heard the Judge's admonishment and was shaking his head "No". This line of 
questioning establishes just the opposite, the plaintiff was speaking and interacting with 
Frachiseur at the same time Judge Wetherell was talking. 
The plaintiff was recalled, and established the following: 
He told Frachiseur about the cut lip caused by the dog knocking the victim off of 
the ladder and on to the coffee table before, during and after the trial, and wrote 10-12 
notes on the subject. 
After the case was submitted to the jury, the plaintiff insisted on seeing 
Frachiseur at the jail. There was a heated discussion, the plaintiff had tears in his eyes, 
got down on one knee, his body was shaking, and he begged Frachiseur to allow him to 
testify. At this time, Frachiseur requested that the jail staff sedate the plaintiff, and he 
was given a blue pill by the staff. Plaintiff requests that this Court review its notes 
concerning this testimony about what happened at the jail. Once again, credibility is 
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. . 
determined by observing how a witness testifies about what happened at a particular 
place and time. It is obvious that the plaintiff was telling the truth during this 
testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The state presented evidence attempting to establish and justify Frachiseur's 
decision to not allow the defendant to testify as somehow being strategic. "Strategy" in 
the context of this case is of no consequence. The right to testify is a basic fundamental 
constitutional right and Frachiseur' s strategy should have been discussed with the 
plaintiff, but the ultimate decision rests with the plaintiff. It is important to note that 
the material that the plaintiff was precluded from presenting represents a double edged 
sword, much of said material arguably could have been detrimental to plaintiffs case, 
but plaintiff still had the fundamental constitutional right to present it. Frachiseur' s 
concerns about testimony that could be harmful, potential impeachment issues, and 
apprehensions relating to IRE 404(b) materials cannot be used to prevent the plaintiff 
from exercising his constitutional right. 
The plaintiff has proven this case by the requisite preponderance of the evidence. 
This Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and grant the plaintiff a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this [ 1 day of ~' 2012. 
David J. Smethers 
Attorney for Plaintiff Larry M. Severson 
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David Smethers 
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Severson v. State 
CV-2009-001408 
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BAR8ARA $"1EELE 
CLERK OF TH:yf~RT 
OEPUT~..J 
The State respectfully submits the following as and for its closing argument herein. 
The sole issues before the Court following the evidentiary hearing held in this matter 
are: 1) whether trial counsel violated Severson's due process rights by refusing to call 
Severson to testify; and 2) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel 
when counsel recommended to Severson that he not testify in his own defense at trial. While 
Severson's initial and amended petitions both phrase the claim as ineffective assistance of 
counsel for refusing to allow Severson to testify, the Court clarified, upon request of the State, 
that Severson intended to proceed with respect to the related claims - an alleged violation of 
Severson's constitution rightto testify in his own behalf and ineffective assistance forfailing 
to call Severson to testify 1• 
Idaho's appellate courts have iterated the general standards applicable to the Court's 
inquiry following this evidentiary hearing. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may 
1 In Rossignol, the Court of Appeals recently reiterated that a claim alleged as ineffective 
assistance of counsel for not permitting the defendant to testify should not be converted to a 
free-standing constitutional claim. Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, _, 27 4 P .3d 1, 9 (Ct. 
App. 2012). However, upon a request for clarification from the State, it appears that Severson 
did assert both an ineffective assistance and a constitutional deprivation claim. See id. 
(where post conviction counsel tried the issue under both theories after having only pied 
ineffective assistance, and the trial court analyzed both claims, the appellate court likewise 
analyzed both claims). The State therefore argues both in this argument. 
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properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 
924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that 
the defendant was prejudiced bythedeficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To 
establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must 
show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome 
of the trial would have been different. 19.:. at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. This Court has long-
adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be 
second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. 
State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The trial court should make findings offact. Hoffman v. State, 125 Idaho 188, 192, 868 
P.2d 516,520 (Ct. App. 1994). The Court's findingsoffactwill not be disturbed unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Reeves v. State, 105 Idaho 844, 673 P.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1983). The 
Court's ultimate decision will be affirmed so long as competent and substantial evidence 
supports the decision. Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App.1983). 
The State urges the Court to make the following findings of fact, supported by the 
testimony and exhibits adduced at the hearing herein. 
• Severson wanted to be represented at trial by Scott Summer or Jay Clark. 
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Severson wrote notes to trial counsel Ed Frachiseur on yellow notepads. 
Severson obtained these notepads from Mr. Clark. 
• Severson's proposed trial testimony contradicted various State's witnesses' 
testimony. Severson's proposed trial testimony invited the jury to believe him 
and discredit several State's witnesses, including Teri Buchholtz, Teresa 
Mallea, Felicia Gartung, Nancy Ellwanger, Carol Diaz, Rebecca Deppen, 
Steven Bock, Jennifer Watkins, Leeann Watkins and Tracy Besler. Specific 
portions of the under1ying trial transcript, related to testimony from Steven Bock, 
Rebecca Deppen, Leeann Watkins, Jennifer Watkins, Tracey Besler, and 
Felicia Gartung were admitted at the evidentiary hearing as State's exhibit 11. 
These portions contain the testimony Severson specifically contradicted in his 
proposed trial transcript. 
• Severson testified with great detail regarding his version of events to which 
each of these State's witnesses testified. 
• Severson did not recall that Judge Wetherell advised him of his right to testify 
in his own defense or not. 
• Severson did not recall all of the prosecuting attorney's statements during 
opening statements, only those that related to Severson's litany of "incorrect" 
testimony. 
• Severson described his relationship with Mary Severson in these words - "We 
were great." 
• Severson admitted Mary Severson had gone to see a divorce attorney. 
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Severson admitted he was "aggravated" and beginningtodoubtwhetherthey 
should stay married. 
• Severson admitted Mary Severson was not happy. 
• Severson offered his opinion that his business was "solvent" so he would have 
discredited the State's theory regarding his need for life insurance proceeds. 
Severson failed to present any evidence supporting his claim that his business 
was "solvent." Furthermore, the State's financial motive at trial was not limited 
to Severson's belief that he would receive life insurance proceeds. Rather, 
Severson thought Mary would receive all or most of the couple's assets in a 
divorce because the couple bought everything in his name due to financial 
issues Severson had with his first wife. Whether Mary would have actually 
received all of the couple's assets was not important. Severson's belief 
regarding the community property was the important factor. Mr. Frachiseur 
testified that he was concerned about Severson's ability to meet the State's 
evidence concerning Severson's beliefs about the property. 
• Severson perjured himself during the July 1, 2002, hearing on Carol Diaz' 
request to return the cremains of Mary Severson. Severson, under oath, 
testified before Judge William Hart that Mary's cremains had been scattered. 
See State's Exhibit 10. Carol Diaz withdrew here motion based on Severson' s 
sworn statements to Judge Hart. In truth, the cremains were in his daughter's 
possession and later turned overto him. Detective Michael Barclay seized the 
cremains from Severson's possession. 
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Mr. Frachiseur and co-counsel Ellison Matthews advised Severson and 
recommended that Severson not take the stand in his own defense. Mr. 
Frachiseur had concerns about Severson's ability to withstand cross-
examination. Mr. Frachiseur was concerned that Severson had not been 
honest with the trial team. Mr. Frachiseur was concerned that Severson's 
proposed and intended testimony that he did not poison Mary would not be 
accepted by the jury because the State's testimony regarding the safety 
mechanisms used by the hydroxycut packagers made his testimony impossible. 
See State's Exhibit 9. Mr. Frachiseur believed Severson and Mary adulterated 
the pills in an attempt to swindle the hydroxcut manufacturers in a product 
liability lawsuit. Mr. Frachiseur did not believe the jury would find Severson 
credible. Mr. Frachiseur believed the jury would not convict Severson based on 
the circumstantial case where the State could not, in his opinion, pinpoint the 
exact manner of death-asphyxiation versus poisoning. Mr. Frachiseurdid not 
think Severson should testify. 
• During the course of the underlying criminal case, Mr. Frachiseur and Mr. 
Matthews met with their investigators and staff in team meetings. On August 
18, 2004, the team discussed whether Severson should testify. The team 
recommended that Severson not testify. Severson had provided a "latest 
version" of events. The team voiced concerns that a jury would believe Mary 
would have voluntarily taken hydroxycut containing Drano. See State's Exhibit 
7. On August 23, 2004, the team again discussed whether counsel should 
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recommend putting Severson on the stand. The team again recommended 
against Severson testifying based on a perceived change in Severson's 
version of events in light of recently disclosed evidence. The team expresses 
concerns with Severson's failure to tell counsel the truth. See State's Exhibit 8. 
• Judge Michael Wetherell clearly advised Severson that Severson had the right 
to testify in his own defense or to stand on his to remain silent. See State's 
Exhibit 4. 
• Severson never made any statement to Judge Wetherell evincing a clear intent 
to testify in his own defense. 
• Severson first advised Judge Wetherell that he wanted to testify at trial in March 
2005 - approximately five months after the jury returned a guilty verdict. 
• Severson signed an affidavit on March 18, 2005, prepared by Jay Clark. The 
affidavit included a statement that Severson had been advised of his right to 
testify by the trial court, which Severson denied recalling during this evidentiary 
hearing. The affidavit is admitted as State's Exhibit 1. 
• Mr. Frachiseur's memory has faded since 2004. 
• Mr. Frachiseur clearly understood in 2004 and understands today that a criminal 
defendant has the rightto testify. Mr. Frachiseurtestified that he would not, and 
did not, tell Severson that it was his - Mr. Frachiseur's - decision whether 
Severson should testify. In direct testimony, Mr. Frachiseurtestified that he met 
with Severson between 40 and 50 times prior to trial and that he talked to 
Severson about his right to testify approximately 8 to 10 times. Upon cross-
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examination, Mr. Frachiseurtestified that Severson did not unequivocally assert 
his right to testify. When asked if he told Severson that the decision whether 
Severson would testify was "his call," Mr. Frachiseur specifically testified that 
"I know that I did not tell him that." 
• Mr. Frachiseurftled a motion to withdraw as counsel and supporting affidavit in 
March 2005, when the events of the trial were more clear in his mind. See 
State's Exhibits 2 and 3. In his March 21, 2005, affidavit, Mr. Frachiseur stated 
he and Mr. Matthews had discussed Severson's constitutional rightto testify or 
to assert his Fifth Amendment right on numerous occasions. Mr. Frachiseur 
stated he and Mr. Matthews repeatedly advised Severson against testifying. 
Mr. Frachiseur stated Severson had agreed with counsels' joint 
recommendation to not testify and remain silent. 
• Scott Summer testified that he never discussed Severson's right to testify as 
he always intended to have Severson testify at trial. Severson did not talk to Mr. 
Summer after Mr. Frachiseur. Rather, Severson spoke with Mr. Summer after 
the jury's verdict came back. The timing of Severson's call to Mr. Summer is 
convenient - after Severson unsuccessfully rolled the dice with the jury. 
• C.J. Nemeth served on the trial team in 2004. Ms. Nemeth testified that she 
was present during a conference with Severson right before trial commenced. 
During pre-trial preparation, Severson had waffled back and forth regarding his 
desire to testify. On the advent of trial, Severson agreed with counsels' 
recommendation that he not testify. During trial, Ms. Nemeth sat in the 
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courtroom. As Judge Wetherell advised Severson regarding his right to testify 
orto invoke his Fifth Amendment right and not testify, Severson shook his head 
back and forth. Ms. Nemeth has seen such a gesture on many different 
occasions. While the gesture could have many different meanings, in her 
experience, a head shake generally means "no." 
• Based on all of the foregoing, the Court does not find Severson's testimony 
regarding Mr. Frachiseur's pre-trial and trial communications credible. The 
Court finds that Mr. Frachiseur, after adequate investigation and preparation, 
advised Severson that he should invoke his Fifth Amendment right and not 
testify. Mr. Frachiseur's recommendation that Severson not testify was 
reasonable, strategic and tactical. Severson has failed to meet his burden of 
rebutting the strategic and tactical decision of trial counsel. Severson has failed 
to meet his burden of establishing prejudice. The Court finds that Mr. 
Frachiseurdid not prohibit, bar, forbid or prevent Severson from testifying in his 
own behalf. The State has met its burden and established that Severson freely, 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify and stood on his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent. 
A. Because Severson freely, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify 
and chose to stand on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, Severson' s 
constitutional challenge fails. 
A defendant in a criminal case has a fundamental right to testify in his or her own behalf 
and the defendant is personally vested with the ultimate authority to decide whether or not to 
testify. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689,690, 778 P.2d 811,812 (Ct. App. 1989). The Court 
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of Appeals noted, "Ordinarily, such an allegation, made by a convicted defendant after trial, 
would be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism." Id. In Hoffman, trial counsel advised the 
defendant to not testify because counsel was concerned Hoffman would offer perjured 
testimony, which would be caught and capitalized on by the State during cross-examination. 
kL. However, during a hearing held on motion for new trial on the grounds that counsel 
deprived him of his right to testify, Hoffman testified to certain facts, and "[t]he record 
discloses no specific ground upon which Hoffman's trial attorney might have concluded that 
the foregoing testimony would constitute perjury. Indeed, when the attorney was asked at the 
post-trial hearing why he thought Hoffman would have testified falsely, he gave a nonspecific 
response relating to other matters in the case." kt at 691, 778 P.2d at 813. 
The Court of Appeals further addressed circumstances under which a criminal 
defendant may be deemed to have waived his right to testify by acquiescing to trial counsel's 
insistence that he refrain from testifying. kt A defendant may be found to have acquiesced 
in trial counsel's recommendation where he ''was aware of his ultimate right to decide whether 
or not he would testify." kL. at 692, 778 P.2d at 814. This knowledge can come from trial 
counsel's advice or the trial court's informing the defendant of his right. kt 
In the present case, Severson clearly knew he had the right to testify. This Court does 
not have to credit Severson's after the fact assertion that he did not know he had the right to 
testify. In fact, the Court should discredit Severson's claim given Judge Wetherell's notice to 
Severson of his right to testify - notwithstanding Severson's self-serving testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing that he did not hear, pay attention to or recall the trial court's specific 
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notice to him on the record. In addition, Mr. Frachiseur advised Severson he had the right to 
testify. He also recommended Severson waive that right. 
Trial counsels' recommendation was reasonable. It was made after investigation. It 
was made after consultation with the investigators and a review of the facts. It was made after 
counsel discovered that Severson's story kept changing. It was made after Severson perjured 
himself in Judge Hart's court. It was made after Severson himself disclosed a witness who 
described Severson's physical ailments after Severson ingested drano. Trial counsel 
explained that a jury would never believe Mary ingested drano purposefully knowing the 
deleterious effects of the substance. In addition, it was all too clear that the hydroxycut had to 
have been sabotaged by the end possessors - Mary and Larry Severson. The Court should 
deny Severson's claims for these reasons. 
Even if the Court does not find that Severson in fact freely, knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to testify or knowingly acquiesced to trial counsels' recommendation that he 
not testify, the Court should deny Severson's constitutional claim as any error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Idaho Court of Appeals recently addressed the State's 
burden in Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, _, 274 P.3d 1, 5(Ct. App. 2012). "However, 
if the failure of a defendant to testify is considered in the context of deprivation of a 
fundamental constitutional right, then pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the defendant has the burden to show he or she was 
deprived of the right to testify, and the state must then convince the reviewing court beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not contribute to the defendant's conviction -that 
it was harmless error." kt at 5; see also Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 369, 924 P .2d 622, 
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631 (Ct. App. 1996) (the trial court could not have determined that Gootz knew of his ultimate 
right to testify and therefore that he had waived his right to testify; therefore appellate court 
considered whether the failure to testify effected the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt). 
The jury would have disregarded Severson's testimony. He did not offer any actual 
evidence to explain Mary's death. Rather, Severson's explanation of the injury to Mary's 
mouth was inconsistent with trial testimony from Felicia Hartung. Severson's repeated denials 
of pre-trial statements he had made to Jennifer Watkins, Leeann Watkins and Tracy Besler 
were not credible. Severson's denial of knowledge regarding Mary's life insurance was not 
credible. The State's witnesses were believable. While circumstantial, the State's case 
against Severson was strong. Mary Severson was killed. Severson was the only person with 
motive, means and opportunity. Any deprivation resulting from Severson's failure to testify is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Severson has failed to meet his burden of establishing that ( 1) trial counsel's 
recommendatation that he not testify was not strategic or tactical and (2) his trial 
testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. 
Mr. Frachiseur and Mr. Matthews engaged in extensive pre-trial investigation into the 
facts of Mary Severson's poisoning and death. They discussed the pros and cons of 
Severson's prospective testimony with the trial team and Severson himself. Severson 
vacillated in his desire to testify. Trial counsel made a reasonable decision and 
recommended Severson not testify in his own defense. The State has addressed this 
strategic and tactical decision infra. Mr. Frachiseurdetailed for the Court the reasons why he 
and Mr. Matthews believed Severson should not testify. These reasons are supported by the 
contemporaneous trial team memoranda adduced at the evidentiary hearing herein. Ms. 
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Nemeth also testified to the team's concerns regarding Severson testifying. The Court should 
find that Severson has failed to rebut the presumption that trial counsels' recommendation that 
Severson not testify was anything other than strategic and tactical. 
When a petitioner asserts he was prevented from testifying, his proposed testimony 
can be readily compared with the evidence adduced at trial in order to determine if the result 
would have been different. Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607,611, 181 P.3d 533,537 (Ct. App. 
2008). Where much of the petitioner's testimony merely pits his word against that of other 
witnesses, it is more likely that the jury would not have believed him. kt. Here, Severson did 
not establish prejudice as his proffered testimony merely pitted his version of events against 
the State's witnesses. He cannot explain why any one, let alone all, of the State's witnesses 
would have testified falsely or mistakenly. The jury would not have believed Severson. In 
addition, Severson was impeached by his prior perjured testimony to Judge Hart. He would 
have likewise been impeached at trial. 
C. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court deny Severson's 
claims. Severson has failed to demonstrate that he did not freely, knowingly and intelligently 
waive his right to testify. Furthermore, the State has met its burden of demonstrating that any 
deprivation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Severson was not credible during the 
evidentiary hearing here after having approximately eight years to prepare his response to the 
State's evidence. It is unlikely he would have been more persuasive in 2004. In addition, 
Severson perjured himself before Judge Hart. The jury would have discredited his testimony 
and so should this Court. Finally, Severson has failed to rebut the presumption that trial 
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counsels' recommendation was anything other than strategic and tactical or established any 
prejudice resulting from his failure to testify. The evidence of Severson's guilt, while 
circumstantial, was strong. Severson's repeated mantra that each of the State's witnesses 
were lying, absent a reason to provide false information, would not have been believed by the 
jury. Therefore, Severson's free-standing constitutional claim and ineffective assistance claim 
both fail and should be dismissed. 
Dated this 3rd day of December 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the 
following parties by the following means: 
David J. Smethers 
ATIORNEY AT LAW 
1000 South Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
Facsimile No. 336-1263 
davidj@smetherslaw.com 
The Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
Bench Copy 
lnorton@adaweb.net 
DATED this 3rd day of December 2012. 
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V Facsimile 
;?Email ( copied on email to Judge) 
_0mail 
Sal & Gatewood, PLLC. (FAX 3361263 P. 004/005 
David J. Smethers 
SMETHERS LAW OFFICE 
11 AH 9: 28 
l 000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, ID 83705 
Telephone: (208) 336-114S 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
BAR ARA Sl fE 
CLERK OF THFJ"f~K 
DEPUT 'f4t/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
SEVERSON, LARRYM. 
Petitioner, 
•VS-
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009·1408 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME 
TO Fll..E REPLY BRIEF 
TIDS MATTER, having come before the Court upon the Motion of Petitioner's 
counsel for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief, and the Court having reviewed said 
motion as well as the notes and records on file in this matter, and it appearini the State 
has no objection and that good and sufficient cause exists therefore, the Court hereby 
extends Petitioners Reply Brief deadline to the l 7'b day of December, 2012. 
SO ORDERED this I~ of December, 2012. 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO Fil..E REPLY BRJEF - 1 
2 
I 
~(TUE) 09: 42 Sa & Gatewood, PLLC. (FA 3361263 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this\~ of December, 2012, I caused a true a.nd 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be served upon the following by the method 
indicated below: 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
190 S. 4ih E. 
Mountain Home, ID 8364 7 
[ ] United States mail 
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 587-2147 ~ Other:\.\~d ()2.llDQ,l\J 
DAVIDJ. SMETHERS 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, ID 83705 
[ ] United States mail 
acsimile: (208) 336-1263 
Other: 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE REPLY .BRIEF - 2 
P. 005/005 
DEC-18-2012(TUE) 17:43 Sal Gatewood, PLLC. 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
To: Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
From: David J. SmetheI'$, Attorney for Appellant 
(FAX 
Copy To: Kristina Schindele, Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney 
December 17, 2012 
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Appellant will reply to the state's response in sequential fashion by page as listed 
in respondent's MEMO. 
Pue 2: The state requests this Court to make findings of fact. The: appellant will 
first nrgue the merit., of the state's requests then argue how this Court should utilize the 
infonnation contained in the request 
Page 2. first bullet point, (hereafter "pt''): The appellant readily acknowledges 
that he desired to be represented by attorneys other than Frachiseur, but this desire is of 
no consequence in the determination oftbe issues in front of this Court. After appellant's 
request for new counsel was denied, the record clearly shows that the appellant nttempted 
to fully cooperate with his assigned counsel and was rebuffed, bullie~ and ignored 
throughout the representation. Appellant furthers argues he would not sabotage his 
defense to murder charges because his request for certain counsel was denied by Judge 
Wetherell. 
Paw; 3. l si. pt: Appellant was given yellow legal pads by Fra.chiseur, which was 
Frachiscur's longstanding practice during jury trials. If a.ny pads were in fact supplied by 
Clark, the is.sue in this case is the information contained on the pads, not the source of the 
pads. The relevance is that these two legal pads :full of notes written by the appellant are 
gone and unaccounted for. The .information on these pads was not considered by 
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Fmchiseur or presented to the jury. The appellant testified truthfully and in great detail 
about the infonnation on the pads. Appel1ant argues that these notes would have 
definitively established that the appellant expressed his desire to testify at every tum, and 
never indicated he did not want to testify. 
2nd pt: Appellant agrees that his proposed testimony would have discredited various 
witnesses that testified at trial. The jury did not have this evidence to consider in 
reaching its verdict. 
3rd pt: Appellant agrees that his versions of the events contained great detail. Appellant 
further argues that these details were accurate and would have influenced the jury's 
verdict. 
4th pt: Appellant was writing a note to Frachiseur during Judge Wetherell's 
admonishment, later asked Fracluseur to request the Judge repeat the warnings, and the 
request was ignored. 
51h pt: Appellant testified he did not recnJI all of the statements made in the state's 
opening comments,. and he readily acknowledges be remembers the "litany of "'incoacct" 
testimony.". Appellant argues that erroneous and un•rebutted evidence that contributed 
10 his conviction for murder would be more easily recalled than neutral or favorable 
information during the intervening time period after appellant's trial. 
151.it pt: Appel1ant contends that his relationship with the victim was "great", and the jury 
should have heard this testimony in order to judge credibility in reaching its verdict. At 
trial, the state elicited damaging evidence concerning their relationship which was un-
rebutted except through ineffective cross examination, and the defense presented no 
evidence which could and would countered the state's. 
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7th pt: The victim had consulted with a divorce attorney, and the appellant would have 
expla.ined the circumstances surrounding this issue, and testified about their relationship 
with the attendant ups and downs that many/all maniagcs cndw-e. 
Page 4:, 1st pt: The appellant acknowledged that he had doubts about their 
marriage surviving, but once again, the jury should have heard his side of the story to 
ascribe whatever relevance and credibility they deemed important. 
2nd pt: See the response to 1st pt on page 4. 
3rd pt: The state once again lists issues in this point that go to the appe11ant's motive to· 
commit the crime. The state emphasizes, "Severson's belief regarding the community 
property was the imponant factor." Appellant agrees, and the jury did not hear this 
"belief'' from Severson with all the attendant factors present when one testi ties in front of 
the trier of fact. The state argues that Frachiseur was concerned about the appellant's 
ability to respond to this evidence. Frachiseur's concerns do not justify his act of 
precluding the appellant from testifying. 
4tl• pt: The irtnte argues that the appellant ••perjured himself'' in July of 2002. There was 
no court proceeding establishing this fact or any judgment of conviction. If the state had 
been allowed to place this evidence in front of the jury in the murder case, the appellant 
could have countered this issue with testimony about intra-family wrangling after his 
vme,s death and the jury could have decided if said testimony was credible. Once again, 
this decision lies strictly with a defendant and cannot be ignored/overridden by counsel 
for purported strategic purposes. 
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:eage S: 15* pt The state argues that Frachiscur and Matthews1 advised the 
appellant not to take the st.and. Once again, all concerns in this point should have been 
discussed with the appellant, but the testimony established said concerns were not as 
Frachiseur ref used to communicate with appellant. 
2nd pt: The team meetings and discussions between defense counsel and their 
investigators are of no consequence as the a.ppellnnt was not present and not aware of 
said discourses. 
Page 6: 1st pt: The record establishes that Judge Wetherell announced the admonishment 
about a defendant testifying on the record. "!'he record does not contain any proof that the 
appellant heard, understood, or acknowledged said admonishment. The appellant 
testified that he was writing a note to Frachiseur and did not hear or understand the 
Judge's admonishment. The appellant testified that he asked for the admonishment to be 
repeated by Judge Wetherell, and Frachiseur refused. The appellant's testimony 
established that his understanding of his right to testify was that it was Frachiseur's 
decision on whether or not he took the stand. 
2nd pt: Judge Wetherell did not ask for or obtain any/an affinnative waiver from the 
appellant. 
3rd pt: The appellant was represented by counsel and could not communicate with the 
Court except through counsel. 
4th pt: The record, as well as the appellant's testimony, establishes that he was never 
advised of his right to testify. The infonnation in State's 1 is telling. The appellant is 
1 Matthews did not testify as he Is deceased, this evid,mc:e Is possibly an exception to a hearsay rule that the 
Coun. could have considered had it been offered, but it was not. The appenw•s testimony was 
diam.etrJc:ally the opposJte; Matthews imcouraged the appcllllllt to testify and dJd not ever advise him not to 
testify. 
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unwavering in his assertions that he intended to testify, so informed his attorneys. and 
was shocked and caught off guard when Frachlscur rested without calling him to testify. 
The state placed this affidavit into evidence, it is the appellant's sworn statement made 
some seven years ago before post conviction was even a consideration. The appellant's 
inability to recall one phrase in this seven year old affidavit does not establish be 
understood and waived his right to testify. 
5tll pt: Appellant will stipulate that Frnchiseur's memory has faded since 2004, and the 
record adduced at the hearings in this case establishes that Frachiseur' s testimony was not 
credible. 
61.h pt: Once again, the credibility of witnesses is a large factor in this Court's 
determination. The appellant's testimony and demeanor during has been commented on 
at length. The only evidence this Court has that Frachiseur discussed the issue with the 
defendant and the defendant declined to testify is from Frachlscur. The state through 
Fracltlscur was not able to produce a single piece of evidence to establish the appellant 
was aware of and waived this right. The evidence that could have established the 
appellant's version of events was in fa.ct true- the appellant's notes .from five weeks of 
trial- are no where to be found and lost/misplaced/dnma.ged. AppeJlant argues Frachiseur 
was responsible for these materials and hnd an affirmative duty to make said materials 
available for post conviction relief proceedings. 
Page 7: 1st pt: Once again, the only evidence concerning these assertions comes 
from Frachiseur. The Motion to Withdraw as coW1Sel was precipitated by Frachiseur's 
actions of being ineffective. Any statement from Matthews is hearsay which the court 
excluded, (see argument above). 
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2nd pt: The appellant testified he did not understand his constitutlonal right to testify until 
after the discussion with Sum.mer after the jury trial. The fact Summer did not discuss 
appellant's right to testify at the time he represented him lends further credibility to 
appellant's testimony he always intended to testify- the conversation was not necessary at 
that time. 
3rd pt: Investigator Ncmcth's testimony was pure speculation and conjecture, Nemeth's 
deduction that a ''no0 shake of the bead by appellant meant appellant understood and was 
indicating he did not want to testify is specious at best and this Court should give it no 
credence. An experienced trial attorney would prohibit a defendant from acting out in 
this manner as any action while seated at the defense table could be misperceived by a 
judge or jury . 
.PH£ S: 1" pt: Sec above arguments. 
The state argues that even.if the appellant did not freely, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive his right to testify, this Court should find the error harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt The appellant provided abundant evidence that he was prejudiced by 
Frachiseur's uninfonncd cross-examination of witness. and Frachiseur's failure to elicit 
favorable and relevant evidence during the defendant•s case. The appellant testified that 
when ever he brought these issues to Frachiseur's attention, he was assured that he would 
be allowed to present the material when he testified. 
__ L ___,~~1.._~ ___ :_: _ 1'2.-i 7-t~ 
Da~ Date 
Attomey at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: This certifies that a true and correct copy oftbe 
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above and forgoing instrument was: __ Mailed; v;;:cd; _Hand Delivered, to: 
_Ada County Prosecutor; 
__ Boise County Prosecutor; 
_Boise City Prosecutor; 
~ ~~f'] 
Dated this \ ~ day ofA ~ . 2012 
~L-h. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT QE, 
f' ' ~ 4 ~' ' ' " <- ,r3 . ' V 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMO!W E CEPur,W:JT 
LARRY M. SEVERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
MEMORANDUM DECISION DISMISSING 
POST CONVICTION ACTION AFTER 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Appearances: 
David Smethers for Petitioner, Mr. Severson personally present throughout the hearing 
Kristina Schindele for Respondent 
This matter came before the Court on September 7, 2012, September 19, 2012, and 
October 5, 2012 for an evidentiary hearing required by Idaho Code 19-4907(a) on whether trial 
counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own 
defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the 
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraphs 7(a) and 9(a) in the 
original petition. 
All other allegations of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief were previously summarily dismissed by this court by way of 
orders previously entered.1 
Closing arguments were presented in writing with the Petitioner filing his argument on 
November 14, 2012; the Respondent's filed on December 3, 2012; and the Petitioner's Rebuttal 
filed on December 18, 2012. 
1 Partial Summary Dismissal of Ciaims Related to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, filed Jun. 29, 2012; Second Partial Summary Dismissal of Claims, filed Jul. 27, 2012. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the Petitioner was found 
guilty of two felonies, First-Degree Murder and Poisoning; the victim of both counts being the 
Petitioner's wife, Mary Severson, in 2004. The Petitioner was represented by a series of counsel 
between indictment and the trial2 but was represented at trial by Elmore County Public Defender 
E.R. Frachiseur and Ellison Matthews.3 Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without 
parole for murder and five years for poisoning food and/or medicine. Following his conviction, 
Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction, which was upheld in a 
May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 
414 (S. Ct. 2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case are found in that decision 
and incorporated herein by reference. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its Remittitur on 
September 4, 2009. 
The Petitioner filed a timely sworn prose Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction 
Relief on October 13, 2009, within one year of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on the direct 
appeal (hereinafter "Petition"). All claims in the Petition were summarily dismissed by previous 
decisions of this court except that the Petitioner was granted an evidentiary hearing on the 
ineffective assistance claim of trial counsel in paragraph 7 of the Petition which alleges more 
specifically in paragraph 9(a) counsel's "failure to allow Petitioner to testify in his own behalf."4 
An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed with the assistance of 
counsel on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter "amended petition"). The amended petition was verified 
by Mr. Severson as true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief as required by I.C. § 
19-4902(a). The portion of the amended petition that was not summarily dismissed and 
remaining for evidentiary hearing is the allegation in the First Cause of Action of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: defense counsel's refusal to allow defendant to testify at the jury trial. 
The Respondent's Counsel had previously filed a request for the court to take judicial 
notice of "the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore 
County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Filing and Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed Material 
by counsel on April 18, 2011 included the trial transcript with opening and closing arguments, 
the Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal, and the Supplemental Clerk's Record in 
2 Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal, pp. 12-13, fns. 3-5. 
3 Id. p. 13, fn. 5, Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 1I'15-6. 
4 Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, filed Oct. 22, 2009, W 7(a), 9(a). 
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that appeal. Because the G:ourt noted a difference in pagination between the hard copy of the trial 
transcripts in the court's file and the transcripts included in the electronic appellate record, the 
court required the parties to present portions of these judicially noticed materials they wanted 
considered at the hearing as exhibits. 
The following were presented for the Court's consideration at the hearing: Testimony of 
the Petitioner, Scott Summer, Ed Frachisseur, and Carol (C.J.) Nemeth. One exhibit was 
admitted on behalf of the Petitioner at the hearing (B) and ten exhibits were admitted on behalf 
of the Respondent (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). Exhibits 4, 9 and 11 were portions of the 
trial transcript in this case. Exhibits 7 and 8 are memoranda from counsel's files. Exhibit 10 was 
a transcript from Elmore County Case No. CV-OC-02-00275 and Exhibit 6 is the Indictment 
filed in that case. Exhibit 1 was Larry Severson's affidavit filed March 19, 2005 in the 
underlying criminal case, Exhibit 2 was his counsel's motion to withdraw following the trial, and 
Exhibit 3 is the affidvait of counsel accompanying that motion. 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, LC. §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911, allows 
individuals convicted and/or sentenced for a crime to petition the Court for relief in the following 
situations: (1) the sentence is in violation of the constitution; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (3) 
the sentence exceeds the maximum provided by law; (3) there is evidence of material fact, not 
previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice; (5) 
the sentence has expired; (6) the petitioner is innocent, subject to the provisions for DNA testing 
in the statute; (7) or the sentence is subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error. 
LC.§ 19-4901(a). 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature. 
It is distinct from the criminal action which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 
494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden 
of proving the allegations upon which the petition for post-conviction relief is based by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27,995 P.2d 794, 797 
(2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action, 
and that "[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the 
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claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. 
State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 628-29 (Ct. App. 2002). 
The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective assistance 
of counsel is two-pronged. Related to whether counsel's performance was deficient, the 
petitioner has the burden of proving (1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide 
range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient 
conduct. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000); see also Martinez v. State, 
125 Idaho 844,846,875 P.2d 941,943 (Ct. App. 1994) and Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d 
at 629 (citingAragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)). This objective 
standard embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent 
(Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622,624,226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)) and had sound trial strategy. Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). If a defendant succeeds in establishing 
that counsel's performance was deficient, he must also prove the prejudice element by showing 
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Roman, 125 Idaho at 
649, 873 P.2d at 903. A reasonable probability is "probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case 
requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, 
the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 
1177. The appellate courts require substantive proof of ineffective assistance of counsel rather 
than mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of one's trial. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921,924,877 
P.2d 365,368 (1994). 
Related to his claim that the Petitioner was denied the right to testify at his trial, recently 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not 
permitting a defendant to testify should not be converted to a free-standing constitutional claim. 
Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,706,274 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2012). The inquiry depends 
upon how the claim is pied and argued before the district court. Id. 
If viewed as a question of effective assistance of counsel, pursuant to Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the burden 
rests with the defendant both to identify the acts or conduct of counsel alleged to 
have been deficient and to show how such deficiency was prejudicial to the 
DISMISSAL AFTER EVIDENTIARY HEARING -4-
defense. Darbin, 109 Idaho at 522, 708 P.2d at 927. However, if the failure of a 
defendant to testify is considered in the context of deprivation of a fundamental 
constitutional right, then pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the defendant has the burden to show he or she 
was deprived of the right to testify, and the state must then convince the 
reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not contribute 
to the defendant's conviction-that it was harmless error. Darbin, 109 Idaho at 
522, 708 P .2d at 927. 
Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 706, 274 P.3d at 7. 
At an evidentiary hearing, the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the proceeding are all matters 
solely within the province of the District Court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P. 2d 439, 
440 (Ct.App. 1988). 
III. EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING 
The Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on October 22, 2009, as 
rephrased in the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel on April 
18, 2011, claimed that counsel's refusal to allow the Petitioner to testify was ineffective 
assistance of counsel.5 Within the Amended Verified Petition, counsel framed the allegation 
only as a denial of effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington."6 
The Respondent did not move for summary dismissal of these claims, conceding material 
issues of fact were adequately raised by the Petitioner on the issue of whether trial counsel was 
ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own defense at trial 
delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the Amended Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraph 9(a) in the original petition. 
At the hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence which included the testimony of Mr. 
Severson; the testimony of Scott Summer, counsel before the trial for Mr. Severson; and 
Petitioner's Exhibit B, the Register of Actions for the underlying criminal case. 
5 Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, filed October 22, 2009, 17(a): "State concisely all the grounds 
on which you base your application for post conviction relief: ... Ineffective Assistance of Counsel." Then 19, "If 
your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state concisely and in detail what 
counsel failed to do in representing your interest: (a) failure to allow Petitioner to testify in his own behalf.. .. " The 
continuation page (labeled pg. 2) then states, " ... Petitioner did not knowingly or volantarily (sic) waive his 
constitutional right to testify.... This constituted a denial of due process, and thus renders the trial fundamentaly 
(sic) unfair." 
6 Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April 18, 2011, First Cause of Action, ,i,r21-45. 
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Mr. Severson acknowledged there were strained communications with his defense 
counsel, Mr. Frachiseur, before and during the trial. On cross-examination, Mr. Severson 
testified he would have preferred to have been represented by either Scott Summer or Jay Clark, 
rather than his trial defense counsel, and he continued to prefer Mr. Summer's representation 
even after Mr. Summer was convicted of a felony and in spite of the fact that Mr. Summer was a 
potential witness in the murder case. Mr. Severson testified he was upset that Mr. Frachiseur 
would not hire Mr. Summer as co-counsel. 
Mr. Severson testified he told Mr. Frachiseur several times he wanted to testify at his 
trial. Mr. Severson testified that at trial he requested by writing notes or speaking to Mr. 
Frachiseur that witnesses' testimony be countered and that Mr. Frachiseur said that evidence 
would be covered when Mr. Severson took the stand to testify. Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged 
that Mr. Severson may have told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify. Mr. 
Frachiseur testified he discussed with Mr. Severson a defendant's right to testify at least ten to 
fifteen times before the trial. Mr. Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr. 
Severson should not testify and that Mr. Frachiseur had provided that advice to Mr. Severson. 
Mr. Frachiseur felt Mr. Severson should not testify because "exceedingly damaging" evidence 
would come in during the cross examination, including making previously inadmissible evidence 
under pretrial rulings admissible in cross examination or rebuttal. Mr. Frachiseur testified it was 
his understanding that Mr. Severson had taken his advice and did not want to testify and that Mr. 
Severson did not complain during the trial about not testifying. 
Although Mr. Severson initially testified he did not know about a defendant's right to 
testify until after the trial, he later acknowledged that Judge Wetherell explained a defendant's 
right to testify during the trial. Judge Wetherell explained to Mr. Severson during the trial on the 
record: 
Mr. Severson, one thing I will advise you that this point is that it is clearly your 
right to testify; it is also your right not to testify in this proceeding. Should you 
choose not to testify this court gets a standard instruction to the jury, which I am 
sure your counsel advised you of, that they can draw no conclusions or inference 
of guilt from the fact that you choose not to testify. It is your constitutional right 
not to do so. 
And that's a decision that is entirely in your hands and in consultation with your 
attorneys. And there are both benefits and dangers to testifying. If the jury 
decides that they like what you have to say, it could be to your benefit; if the jury 
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decides that they don't like what you have to say, just like any other witness, it 
could be to your detriment with regard to a finding of guilt or innocence. 
Once you testify, you open yourself up clearly to cross examination from the State 
with regard to those matters to which you do testify or anti-reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from that testimony. 
So, I will just advise you of that. You have got two competent counsel, and I am 
sure you will discuss at length with them before you make that decision .... 
State's Exhibit 4, pp. 3932-33. 
Mr. Severson acknowledged Judge Wetherell advised him of his right to testify, but Mr. 
Severson later testified he had no idea that he had the right to testify until the jury was in 
deliberations. When asked during cross-examination about Judge Wetherell's admonition of his 
right to testify admitted as State's Exhibit 4,7 Mr. Severson stated that he did not hear the whole 
conversation because he was busy writing notes to Mr. Frachiseur and was not paying attention. 
Mr. Severson also denied that Mr. Frachiseur had advised it was not a good idea for Mr. 
Severson to testify. 
Mr. Severson alleged that Mr. Matthews, the co-counsel, was present when Mr. Severson 
told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify.8 Mr. Severson then testified he "was in 
shock" when the defense rested without him testifying. He said Mr. Frachiseur later came to the 
jail and when asked, commented that Mr. Severson didn't need to tesify because the jury would 
acquit. Mr. Severson testified that he did not know until after the trial that he had the right to 
testify. Mr. Severson testified that Mr. Frachiseur had only explained, "He told me that the State 
or the judge cannot keep me from testifying, keep me off of the stand from testifying, but it was 
ultimately up to him whether I testified or not." Mr. Severson also testifed he requested that 
counsel let the Defendant talk to the judge about half a dozen times. 9 
On cross examination, Mr. Severson acknowledged his affidavit, State's Exhibit 1, signed 
by Mr. Severson on March 18, 2005 which states, "The day prior to when the defense rested at 
my own jury trial, the court and the State were both informed by my legal counsel that I was 
going to testify on the record and in open court. It was at that time that I was informed of my 
7 State's Ex. 4, pp. 3932-3933. 
8 The Court sustained hearsay objections to Mr. Matthews' response. At the time the objections were sustained, 
there was no evidence before the court that Mr. Matthews had passed away since the time of the trial. 
9 The State's counsel objected because a represented defendant does not have a right to talk to the judge, but the 
court considered the testimony to the extent that the Defendant testified the request was made. 
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Constitutional right to testify."10 The trial transcript does not reflect the Court or State's counsel 
were told Mr. Severson would testify. In fact, the transcript reflects that on November 5, 2004, 
Mr. Frachiseur represented to the Court when discussing future witnesses, "And of course, we 
still have issue as to for determination as to the defendant here."11 Later the same day, the 
prosecutor states in the transcript," .. .I haven't heard Mr. Frachiseur deciding whether or not he 
wants to call the defendant as a witness."12 Then, the Court advised Mr. Severson on the record 
about his right to testify or to remain silent.13 However, the Court did not get Mr. Severson to 
acknowledge the right or make his election whether to testify verbally on the record. After Mr. 
Severson's affidavit was filed in 2005 in the underlying criminal case, counsel for Mr. Severson 
moved to withdraw as appointed counsel.14 With the motion was filed State's Exhibit 3, Mr. 
Frachiseur's affidavit filed where counsel swore, "4. Your affiant and co-counsel Ellison 
Matthews have discussed with the Defendant his right to testify if he desired to remain silent, on 
a number of occasions. The advice of both appointed counsel has been that Defendant not 
testify. 5. Defendant has agreed, on more than one occasion, with counsels' advice. Defendant 
has never stated a desire to testify in this matter to Affiant [Mr. Frachiseur]. 6. The statements 
in the affidavit concerning an expressed desire on the part of the Defendant to testify are 
false .... " 
Mr. Summer, counsel for Mr. Severson before Mr. Frachiseur's appointment, testified he 
asked to withdraw from representing Mr. Severson three weeks before the original trial set 
because Mr. Severson could not pay him. Mr. Summer testifed he did not discuss with Mr. 
Severson before the trial that a defendant had a right to testify. Mr. Summer testified that Mr. 
Severson called Mr. Summer upset after the trial. Mr. Severson said he thought he would testify 
the day before the trial concluded but that Mr. Frachiseur rested the case without the Defendant's 
testimony the next day. 
The Respondent presented evidence that Mr. Frachiseur was the Elmore County Public 
Defender at the time he represented Mr. Severson and that Mr. Frachiseur had been an attorney 
for forty-one years in approximately three hundred jury trials. Mr. Frachiseur also testified this 
was about the last case tried before the county contracted out public defender services. He 
10 State's Ex. l, 'If 3. 
11 State's Ex. 4, p. 3929. 
12 State's Ex. 4, p. 3931. 
13 State's Ex. 4, pp. 3932-3933. 
14 State's Ex. 2, Motion of Appointed Counsel to Withdraw. 
DISMISSAL AFTER EVIDENTIARY HEARIN~ - 8 -
testified he had served as counsel on fourteen murder cases and he was death-penalty qualified. 
Frachiseur testified he had talked with Mr. Severson "many times" about Mr. Severson's 
right to testify at trial. He testified those conversations were frequently with Ellison Matthews, 
his co-counsel, who passed away after the trial.15 Mr. Frachiseur testified he was appointed to 
represent Mr. Severson in November of 2003 and represented Mr. Severson through the trial in 
October 2004 and then until March 2005. Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged it has been eight years 
since he represented Mr. Severson but that he discussed with Mr. Severson a defendant's right to 
testify at least ten to fifteen times. 
Mr. Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr. Severson should not 
testify and that Mr. Frachiseur had provided that advice to Mr. Severson. Mr. Frachiseur felt Mr. 
Severson should not testify because the evidence that would come in during the cross 
examination of Mr. Severson would be "exceedingly damaging" or would make admissible 
evidence that had previously not been permitted before the jury under pretrial rulings. Mr. 
Frachiseur then testified of his concern about evidence becoming admissible related to a business 
in Colorado that had burned perhaps for insurance proceeds; the opinion of police that Mr. 
Severson has falsely reported a self-inflicted gunshot wound as being shot by someone else; that 
Mr. Severson had an affair during his marriage to the victim in this case; that Mr. Severson had 
gotten engaged to another woman while his wife, the victim in this case, was out of state; and 
"most importantly" that Mr. Frachiseur could not get a "straight answer" from his client about 
what happened to the Hydroxycut pills since the evidence Mr. Frachiseur reviewed tended to 
demonstrate tampering with the pills. Mr. Frachiseur later testified that Mr. Severson did not 
have a consistent version of the presence of the pills in their house. Ultimately, Mr. Frachiseur 
testified he thought Mr. Severson's testimony would be more damaging than helpful to his case. 
Mr. Frachiseur relayed that during the trial, the judge was admitting "a lot" of l.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence for the purpose of motive "to an extreme degree" and that Mr. Frachiseur did not feel 
he could protect the defendant on cross examination from some "very ugly, marginally relevant 
material." 
15 The Plaintiff's Closing Argument, p. 6, challenges the court's ruling during the Petitioner's case in chief that 
statements made by Mr. Matthews were not admissible as hearsay. At the time the court made that ruling, the 
Petitioner had not established at the hearing that Mr. Matthews was no longer alive. Evidence that Mr. Matthews 
was deceased was not presented until the Respondent's case-in-chief &'ld the cou.."1:'s previous ruling was never 
renewed by Petitioner. 
DISMISSAL AFTER EVIDENTIARY HEARING - 9 -
Still, Mr. Frachiseur testified he had advised Mr. Severson of his right to testify at trial 
before the trial started although he could not recall exactly when these conversations occurred 
because of the passage of time. State's Exhibits 7 and 8 were admitted which were memoranda 
documenting discussions among the trial team related to whether Mr. Severson would testify and 
that they felt Mr. Severson had been inconsistent in his explanation of events and untruthful with 
the defense team. Mr. Frachiseur testified that most of defense counsel's records from the trial, 
and probably Mr. Severson's notes, were destroyed by flooding after the office closed. Mr. 
Frachiseur denied that the notes had been purposefully destroyed. Mr. Frachiseur's recollection 
of Judge Wetherell's admonition of the right to testify was refreshed and then Mr. Frachiseur 
testified he did not recall whether he specifically discusssed with Mr. Severson at that point a 
defendant's right to testify. However, Mr. Frachiseur was clear that Mr. Severson made the 
decision not to testify and that it was Mr. Frachiseur's understanding that Mr. Severson agreed 
with Mr. Frachiseur's advice not to testify. Still, Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged that Mr. 
Severson may have told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify. But Mr. Frachiseur 
testified it was his understanding that Mr. Severson had taken his advice and did not want to 
testify and that Mr. Severson did not complain during the trial about not testifying. Mr. Severson 
testified that after the jury was placed in deliberations, he requested that Mr. Frachiseur visit him 
in the jail and that during that visit, Mr. Severson asked Mr. Frachiseur to let him testify. Mr. 
Severson testified that Mr. Frachiseur told Mr. Severson "no" and that Mr. Frachiseur would not 
ask the judge to reopen the case. Mr. Frachiseur did not recall this conversation and stated, if it 
had occurred, he would have let Mr. Severson testify. After State's Exhibits 2 and 3 were 
admitted, Mr. Frachiseur testified he still did not recall Mr. Severson talking with him directly 
about his disatisfaction with the trial. Mr. Frachiseur again testified that he did not keep Mr. 
Severson from testifying and that Frachiseur would not have had the power to keep Mr. Severson 
from testifying. 
Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged on cross-examination that he does not have any notes 
recording his conversations with Mr. Severson about Mr. Severson's right to testify and that 
preserving any notes would be important for a murder trial although it was Mr. Frachiseur's 
impression that Mr. Severson wrote a lot of notes and just because there was a note would not 
mean that Mr. Severson had not later changed his mind. Mr. Frachiseur also acknowledged that 
Mr. Matthews had told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify. At the end of Mr. 
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Frachiseur's testimony, at the last meeting the trial team had before trial, they discussed with Mr. 
Severson the benefits and potential problems with testifying, that Mr. Severson indicated he did 
not wish to testify, that Mr. Severson did not change his mind during the trial, but that afterward, 
Mr. Severson did say he wished he would have testified. 
It was not Mr. Frachiseur's impression that Mr. Severson was more animated after the 
defense rested and Mr. Frachiseur testified that Mr. Severson always seemed agitated. Mr. 
Frachiseur testified that he thought after the presentation of evidence that Mr. Severson would be 
acquitted by the jury. Mr. Frachiseur did not specifically recall being summoned to the jail to 
talk with Mr. Severson while the jury was deliberating or telling Mr. Severson that it was too late 
to reopen the trial. Mr. Frachiseur testifed in response to cross examination that Mr. Severson 
did not request to take the stand and testify, and that if Mr. Severson would have made that 
request, Mr. Frachiseur would have put Mr. Severson on the witness stand like any other witness 
to testify. Mr. Frachiseur did not recall telling the State whether Mr. Severson would or would 
not testify and that it was a strategic decision not to tell either way. Mr. Frachiseur denied telling 
Mr. Severson that it was Mr. Frachiseur's "call" whether Mr. Severson testified. Mr. Frachiseur 
testified that Mr. Severson had not stated a desire to testify at trial up until Mr. Frachiseur filed 
an affidavit, State's Exhibit 3, in support of a request to withdraw as counsel. Mr. Frachiseur 
also testified that although he had consulted with accountants while preparing for trial, he did not 
call an accountant to the stand during the trial for tactical reasons. 
The State also called Carol (CJ.) Nemeth who testified she recalled a discussion at the 
Elmore County Jail with the defendant, Mr. Frachiseur, and another trial team member, Clint, 
about one month before the trial began. She testifed that at that meeting, the defendant said he 
did not want to testify. She also attended the trial. She testified that she could not hear what was 
being said at the counsel table but that she had an unobstructed view of the table. She recalled 
the judge's advice on the right to testify, then Mr. Severson leaned over and talked to Mr. 
Frachiseur. She observed J\la. Severson shake his head, meaning "no," several times during this 
conversation. 
Mr. Severson made respresentations during his testimony of how he would have testified 
if he had been allowed to testify. Mr. Severson testified he was with Mary when she purchased 
one bottle of Hydroxycut; that it did not appear that Mr. Frachiseur read the notes written by Mr. 
Severson; that Nancy Ellwanger called Mr. Severson and "hung around too much" after Mary's 
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death, and acted like she "knew something" after Mary's death; and that Carol Diaz (Mary's 
mother) called the house after Mary's death to ask about Mary's insurance policy but that he did 
not know about the policy until that time. Mr. Severson then testified that he would have 
testified that Mary changed the beneficiary on the policy from Mr. Severson to her mother, Carol 
Diaz. 
Mr. Severson would have testified that his business was doing great and "we weren't 
having any money problems whatsoever" and that Mr. Frachiseur had told the Defendant he 
could testify about the financial solvency of the business when the Defendant testified. Mr. 
Severson testfied "Mary and I were great" although he was "skeptical about whether we should 
stay together or not" because of debts and secrets Mary had kept. He testified that Mary was 
unhappy and had great financial pressures because she used their money to support her son. 
He testified that he would have testified in response to several witnesses' testimony 
including that he would have testified that Ms. Buccholz charged car repairs at his shop which 
she never paid and would have denied he ever received medication from her. He also would 
have testified Theresa Malea owed him $605 for car repairs. He said it was he, not Ms. 
Buccholz, that drove Mary to the airport to fly to Colorado. He testified there were two vehicles 
in Mr. Severson's name, a Mitsubishi in someone else's name, and a truck in Mary's name that 
was refinanced in Mary's name as her son was filing for bankruptcy. Mr. Severson testified his 
ex-wife had filed for bankruptcy after their divorce but that Mr. Severson denied he was trying to 
hide assets from bankruptcy proceedings, and that it was Mary's decision which car to keep. He 
also testified on cross-examination that he was aware there was a potential divorce before Mary's 
death and that most of his assets were in Mary's name. 
He denied asking the doctor to refill Mary's prescription and stated he picked up a 
prescription at WalMart at Mary's request. He also testified that when he found Mary 
unresponsive, he called 911 using a pre-programmed button on their phone but that number did 
not work. He testified he then called Mike (his son) and Nora on a preprogrammed number 
which worked. He also testified that Mary had sleep apnea and that he "shook her violently" 
"many times" to wake her up. 
After being shown State's Exhibit 6, Mr. Severson aknowledged he had been indicted for 
one count of perjury for lying about the location of his wife's remains before being charged for 
the murder for his wife. The transcript of Mr. Severson's previous testimony was admitted as 
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State's Exhibit 10 and Mr. Severson acknowledged his testimony had been false at the time he 
Barclay had later found the cremains at Mr. Severson's house after 
that hearing. Mr. Severson denied making a false police report in Colorado - he reiterated that 
his wound in that case was not self inflicted. He also testified to an accident where Mary fell off 
a ladder and could have incurred a cut on her lip but that he did not see any bruising on the 
outside of her mouth. 
The Respondent admitted State's Exhibit 9 which is a trial transcript of George Ellis 
Porter Ill's testimony, the quality control manager for HVL Incorporated, the company that 
made Hydroxycut in 2002. He testified about the manufacturing and quality control process for 
Hydroxycut pills. He testified that he had identified the lot number of the bottles of Hydroxycut 
that Mary Severson had and the only two bottles from the entire lot that had complaints about 
tampering were the two bottles at issue in this trial.16 He testified that based on his experience 
and familiarity with the manufacturing process, that it would not be possible that someone could 
dump a "can of Drano" into the mixture and have it make it all the way through the 
manufacturing and quality control process undetected.17 He also testified it was improbable that 
someone put several pills filled with Drano into this process to produce those two bottles because 
the pills would be mixed evenly with pills that had not been tampered with before filling the 
bottles18 or that the Drano would be diluted in each pill.19 Finally, he testified on cross-
examination that he was aware the company was working with the FBI on "counterfeiting 
problem with Hydroxycut"20 but later testified that had nothing to do with placing "an adulterant 
or something like Drano into a product. "21 
Additionally, the State admitted State's Exhibit 11 which including portions of the trial 
transcript including testimony of Steven Bock,22 Rebecca Deppen,23 Leann Watkins,24 Tracy 
16 State's Ex. 10, pp. 2205-2207. 
17 State's Ex. 10, p. 2207. 
is Id. 
19 State's Ex. 10, p. 2219-2220. 
20 State's Ex. 10, p. 2213. 
21 State's Ex. 10, p. 2219. 
22 State's Ex. 11, pp. 2836-2839, 2848-2851, 2868-2883, 2888-2899, 2908-2911, cross examination 2936-2947, 
2952-2955. 
23 State's Ex. 11, pp. 3474-3488. 
24 State's Ex. 11, pp. 3525-3526, 353-3538, 3559-3562. 
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Besler,25 Rob Crayne,26 and Felicia D. Gartung.27 That testimony is addressed below, along with 
Severson's response. 
Steven Bock testified he was a loan officer for Trinity Home Mortgage (Tr. 2836) when 
the Seversons came to borrow money for a residence on Poppy (Tr. 2848). He took a loan 
application from Mary Severson (Tr. 2849). His recollection was that Mary used a manufactured 
home valued around $10,000 as an asset toward obtainng this loan (Tr. 2850). Mary was the 
only applicant for the loan (Tr. 2851). In fall of 2001 or early winter of 2002, Mary approached 
Mr. Bock again about refinancing the house to take her equity out of the house and about buying 
the building on American Legion Boulevard where Auto Works, the Severson's auto shop, had 
previously been located (Tr. 2874). He stated he could not find any lenders for this because of a 
bankruptcy, even if Mary borrowed the money solely on her own (Tr. 2875). Mr. Bock testified 
about four loan applications Mary submitted (Tr. 2876): one for the house on Poppy (Id.), a 
home equity line or second mortgage for both the Petitioner and Mary which did not work out 
(Tr. 2876-2878), and a loan just for Mary for the home at 4375 Poppy Avenue (Tr. 2878) 
admitted over defense objection. Mr. Bock testified there was "some problem" with Mary's 
credit report during these transactions (Tr. 2888). He was also not able to use any credit report 
on the Petitioner for loans because of a bankruptcy he had and his credit score (Tr. 2888-89). 
Mr. Bock testified he had an account statement from First Security Bank on Mary Severson used 
in connection with the refinance that he used "to make sure that what they are claiming is true 
that they have money and what is in their bank account" (Tr. 2891). He also testified to a First 
Security Bank account statement for Mary L. Severson doing business as Auto Works (Tr. 2892-
93), Auto Works profit and loss statements which Mr. Bock verified (Tr. 2894-95), and a couple 
of W-2s from Grant Peterson showing Mary's income (Tr. 2896) submitted in an attempt to 
purchase the Auto Works business (Tr. 2892-93). Mr. Bock testified later that Mr. Severson told 
him Mary was dying of cancer and was taking some type of diet pills (Tr. 2909-10). Mr. 
Severson also told Mr. Bock, "he did not believe that it was cancer. He thought it was from her 
taking too many pills to get -to lose weight." (Tr. 2911). On cross-examination, Mr. Bock 
testified that Mary's assets increased with each successive loan application (Tr. 2938). Mr. Bock 
was then questioned by counsel, "by what means were you able to substantiate the increased 
25 State's Ex. 11, pp. 3567-3570, 3579-3594. 
26 State's Ex. l l, pp. 3890-3901, 3906-3913, 3918-3921. 
27 State's Ex. 11, pp. 3690-3701. 
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assets; that's my question? Does this involve listing some of Larry's assets as Mary's assets?" to 
Mr. Bock answered, was whatever they had under - whatever she said that was there 
under like Auto Works or whatever .... " (Tr. 2939). Then Mr. Frachiseur clarified he was aksing 
about the "total assets" of each of the forms, that was $325,500 for Exhibit 1-4, $309,000 for 
Exhibit 1-5, and $515,500 for Exhibit 1-6 (Id.). When asked for an explanation of the increase, 
Mr. Bock testified 
People acquire different things, net worth of the business increases. You take 
what they say it is worth and then you have to go and verify it. Like if they say 
their business is worth this much, then you have to go through the procedure of 
looking at their invoices and their statements that they give to their accountant, 
things like that, to verify what they put on here is true. 
(Tr. 2940). Then related to the profit and loss statements of the business, Mr. Frachiseur cross 
examined Mr. Bock, "And you then verified the figures in these documents by examining the 
acutal invoices?" to which Mr. Bock answered, "Yes." (Tr. 2941 ). Related to the Poppy Street 
loan, Mr. Bock testified he received the figures on those documents from Mary (Tr. 2945-46). 
Mr. Bock also testified that Mr. Severson told Mr. Bock within two or three months that he had a 
young lady as a girlfriend (Tr. 2952). 
Mr. Severson testified that if he would have testified at trial, he would have stated his 
business was doing great and "we weren't having any money problems whatsoever" and that Mr. 
Frachiseur had told the Defendant he could testify about the financial solvency of the business 
when the Defendant testified. Mr. Severson said he would have testified that his business, Auto 
Works, was netting $12,000 to $15,000 per month. Mr. Severson also would have testified the 
house on Poppy Street was in Mary's name, that he knew she could not afford to buy the house, 
and that Mary's income was $12,000 instead of the $97,000 he saw on the loan paperwork. 
The State presented the transcript of Rebecca Deppen's testimony. She was a home 
health registered nurse and had met Larry and Mary Severson when they both worked for Grant 
Peterson Auto Group with her husband (Tr. 3475-76). Her husband's vehicle broke down on 
February 14, 2002, the day before Mary died, so she took the vehicle to Auto Works and saw 
Larry Severson there (Tr. 3479). In the office Larry showed her an endoscopy photo performed 
on Mary (Tr. 3480) and told her Mary had been ill for two or three weeks since beginning taking 
some diet pills she had purchased at GNC (Tr. 3483). She explained several symptoms Mr. 
Severson had relayed and then showed her some capsules (Id.) in two containers; one was 
opened and the other was unopened (Tr. 3484). She saw the capsules in the open container and 
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there were "two different kinds" of different colors, some dark green and some light (Id.). She 
described the contents, "But the contents that could be seen through the capsule, some it was 
dark green; some of it was a pale turquoise color." (Id.). She testified she 
took two of the capsules and a piece of paper and I opened I took two capsules, 
each of a different color, and opened them both and dumped the contents on to a 
piece of paper. 
Q. All right. What happened? 
A. The dark green ground grassy looking stuff appeared to do nothing. It was -
appeared normal like a diet pill would like. The other one contained a mixture of 
light turquoise crystals, white crystals, and little shavings of what appeared to be 
metal. 
Q. What happened to the paper, to your observations, if you remember? 
A. The paper immediately melted. All parts of the paper that had this substance 
sitting on it melted, just melted away. 
(Tr. 3485). She testifed Mr. Severson said Mary had gone to the hospital and then returned 
home, which did not make sense to Ms. Deppen since Mr. Severson had said Mary was 
vomitting blood (Tr. 3486). She testified that Mr. Severson had told her Mary's skin was turning 
yellow (Id.) and that, based upon her training and experience, she suspected something was 
"going on" with Mary's liver and advised Mr. Severson to take her to a doctor (Tr. 3487). She 
said she learned of Mary's death the next day (Id.). 
Mr. Severson testified to a conversation with Becky Deppen, showing Ms. Deppen diet 
pills, showing her how the pills could be taken apart, and admitted the pills were thrown in the 
trash by Ms. Deppen. But he testified that if he had been allowed to testify, he would have 
denied that he told Ms. Deppen that Mary was dying. 
The State also introduced the trial transcript of Leann Watkins'. Leann Watkins testified 
she is Jennifer Watkins' mother (Tr. 3526) and that Jennifer was 21 years old in 2001 (Tr. 3535-
36). She testified that Mr. Severson had always told her he was divorced (Tr. 3531). In 
conversations with Mr. Severson, he told her that Jennifer made him feel "like he was young and 
alive" and that he was going to marry her daughter (Tr. 3532). In January 2002, Mr. Severson 
said he was frustrated because Jennifer had ended the relationship and there was another man at 
Jennifer's house (Tr. 3533-34). Shortly after that conversation, Mr. Severson called and relayed 
that "his wife was very ill. That she was dying. And that her pills were tainted and the FDA was 
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involved ... " and "that if she [Jennifer] would just have been patient, things would have worked 
out them." 3535). 
Mr. Severson testified that if he had testified at trial, he would have denied telling Leann 
Watkins that he was divorced or that Mary was dying, but admitted telling her he was 
contemplating a divorce. He would also have testified that Jennifer Watkins owed him $1,100 
from a loan. 
The State also presented the trial transcript of Jennifer Watkins' testimony. She testified 
that Mr. Severson told her on multiple occassions, including in October, that he had divorce 
papers and that she wanted to see them (Tr. 3559). She testified that in October, he called his 
attorney asking him to send the papers, he got mail in an envelope from an attorney so she 
opened them, and "they were bankruptcy papers." (Id.). He told her he had divorce papers a few 
times, including in January (Id.). She said the second time in January he said that Mary was 
dying and that she was so sick he sold her car, that she couldn't drive it anymore, and that she 
couldn't leave her house (Tr. 3560). 
During his testimony, Mr. Severson acknowledged he had a "romantic relationship" and 
had sex once with Jennifer Watkins but stated that if he would have testified, he would have 
denied telling her he was divorced. He also said he would have testified that Jennifer Watkins 
owed him $1,100 from a loan and that he would have denied writing letters or buying flowers for 
her after their relationship ended. 
The State offered into evidence the trial transcript of Tracy Besler's testimony. Ms. 
Besler testified she previously worked in Mountain Home (Tr. 3567-69). She testified she knew 
Mr. Severson and Mary (Tr. 3570), and also Mike, Larry's son, and Nora, his fiancee (Tr. 3579). 
She recalled a conversation with the Defendant before Mary's death "vaguely" that Mary had an 
ulcer or something wrong with her stomach, "Something was eating away at her stomach." (Tr. 
3582). Mr. Severson told her she shouldn't go to Desert Sage Health Center because "they don't 
help you. That his wife was dying and that they weren't helping her." (Tr. 3583). Mr. Severson 
told her Mary was taking "a lot" of Hydroxycut diet pills (Tr. 3584) and that Ms. Besler had 
taken Hydroxycut during a period of time while working out at the same gym where the 
Defendant worked out (Tr. 3584-85). She testified the Defendant did not go to the gym for about 
a month or two after Mary died (Tr. 3586). She testifed after Mr. Severson returned to the gym 
after his wife's death, around May or June of 2002, they dated three or four months (Tr. 3586-
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88). On one of these dates, the Defendant had a bottle of Hydroxycut pills that she had placed on 
counter (Tr. 3589-90). She saw Mr. Severson pulling apart the Hydroxycut pills and putting 
the contents in the sink and told her "That you could these will kill you and that you could fill 
these up." (Tr. 3590). "He said I shouldn't take them because they will kill me." (Tr. 3591). 
Mr. Severson testified that he would have testified in response that what he actually said 
was that he thought the pills had contributed to Mary's death. 
The State offered the trial transcript of Red (Bernard) Crayne's testimony. Mr. Crayne 
testified he frequented Auto Works for morning coffee with Larry Severson (Tr. 3893-94). On 
one occasion in early January 2002, he saw some capsules sitting on the Defendant's desk and 
that he observed the Defendant spitting up blood for ten or fifteen minutes (Tr. 3895). He said 
the Defendant's stomach was distended and he observed the Defendant cough up blood four or 
five times (Tr. 3895-96). Mr. Crayne looked at the pills on the Defendant's desk and saw two 
different kinds of capsules in the bottle (Tr. 3896); the half full bottle had a mixture of white and 
green capsules (Tr. 3913). Mr. Crayne testified he asked Mr. Severson what was wrong and Mr. 
Severson replied, "I took one of Mary's diet pills and they are killing me." (Tr. 3906). Mr. 
Crayne testified this took place around the 151h of January, 2002, and that Mr. Severson had 
mentioned his wife was sick and having trouble keeping food down (Tr. 3908). But when asked 
about his statement to Detective Barclay, Mr. Crayne acknowledged he had previously told the 
Detective that Mr. Severson said that Mary was taking the same pills but not having any 
problems (Tr. 3910) then, a couple of days later, that Mr. Severson had mentioned Mary was 
having problems with her stomach (Tr. 3911). Mr. Crayne testified that at the end of January, 
first part of February, he then took the bottle to a pharmacist for analysis (Tr. 3898-99). 
The State also offered the transcript for Felicia Gartung, a waitress at Smoky Mountain 
Pizza in Mountain Home, called by the defense (Tr. 3693). She recalled serving Larry and Mary 
Severson at dinner at the restaurant on February 14, 2002 (Tr. 3693-94). She testified they were 
going to order an appetizer and that Mary said, "what about cheese sticks" and the Defendant 
said, "you can't have those." (Tr. 3695). She said Mary was "like, well, okay, but it would be 
soft" and the Defendant said, "you can't have cheese sticks." (Tr. 3695-96). She recalled Mary 
"just put her hand to her mouth and said it would be soft." (Tr. 3696). The couple did not seem 
to argue (Tr. 3697) and she did not recall anything unusual. On cross-examination, she testified 
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that Mary did not seem to have trouble eating that night and did not seem to be in pain (Tr. 
She testified she did not observe any bruising around Mary's mouth (Tr. 3701). 
Mr. Severson testified he would have testified that Mary had shown Felicia her cut lip 
which is contrary to this witness' testimony. 
The Petitioner did not introduce the verified applications or affidavit of Severson in 
support of that application into evidence at the hearing, and therefore, these items do not 
constitute evidence considered by this Court. Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751 
(Ct. App. 2005); Willie v. State, 149 Idaho 647, 239 P.3d 445 (Ct. App. 2010). 
IV. ANALYSIS OF POST CONVICTION CLAIMS AFTER EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 
The petition only alleged ineffective assistance by counsel's failure to allow Petitioner to 
testify on his own behalf. Within the Amended Verified Petition, counsel again framed the 
allegation only as a denial of effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. 
However, both the Petitioner and the State argued after the evidentiary hearing these allegations 
both under the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel and as a constitutional claim. 
Therefore, this court will analyze Mr. Severson's claims under both standards pursuant to 
Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho at 706,274 P.3d at 7. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, "A defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right 
to testify in his own behalf. Although a defendant can and should consult with counsel about the 
risks and benefits of testifying, the ultimate decision of whether to do so must be left to the 
defendant." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009). 
Under the first element of both ineffective assistance of counsel by prohibiting a 
defendant from testifying under Strickland v. Washington and also that prohibition as a 
deprivation of a fundamental right pursuant to Chapman v. California, the burden rests with the 
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was prohibited by counsel from 
testifying at trial. The Plaintiffs closing argument skips this threshold element and begins 
simply by arguing the State's burden under the harmless error standard. However, in both 
analyses, the Plaintiff must first bear the burden to show counsel prohibited his testimony at trial. 
Although the Petitioner testified that he never told Mr. Frachiseur that he did not want to 
testify, his testimony is directly contradicted by the testimony of Mr. Frachiseur. Mr. Frachiseur 
acknowledged that Mr. Severson may have told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to 
testify but that Mr. Severson would change his mind during the representation. Mr. Frachiseur 
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also testified he discussed with Mr. Severson a defendant's right to testify at least ten to fifteen 
before the trial. Mr. Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr. Severson 
should not testify, that this advice was provided to Mr. Severson, and that it was Mr. Frachiseur's 
understanding that Mr. Severson had taken his advice and did not want to testify. Although Mr. 
Severson initially testified in this proceeding that he did not know he had the right to testify at 
trial until after the trial had concluded, he later acknowledged the Court had advised him that he 
had the right to testify or to remain silent at the trial. Additionally, in Mr. Severson's 2005 
affidavit, he acknowledged the Court advised him during the trial that he had the right to testify. 
So, whether Mr. Severson was aware of whether he had the right to testify is a credibility issue 
for this Court. Pursuant to Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho at 73, the credibility of the witnesses, the 
weight given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the 
proceeding are all matters solely within the province of the District Court. 
In the trial transcript, the Court advised Mr. Severson directly, "I will advise you that this 
point is that it is clearly your right to testify; it is also your right not to testify in this 
proceeding.... And that's a decision that is entirely in your hands and in consultation with your 
attorneys." Although Mr. Severson testified at this hearing that he was not listening to the 
court's admonition because he was writing notes to his counsel, this statement is simply not 
credible and not afforded weight by this court. Although the Petitioner argues there was no 
acknowledgement on the record by Mr. Severson so he must not have been paying attention, the 
State's argument that the judge would have stopped the admonition on the record if the judge felt 
he was being disregarded or ignored by a defendant is reasonable. In 2005, Mr. Severson signed 
an affidavit acknowledging the Court informed him of his right to testify on this day ... the day 
before the defense rested. To now claim that he never knew of the right to testify at trial is not 
credible. This Court finds the Defendant knew he had the right to testify or to not testify before 
the defense rested. 
Next at issue is whether Mr. Frachiseur then prohibited the Defendant from testifying 
contrary to the Defendant's desire. There was no evidence presented in this hearing that Mr. 
Matthews prohibited Mr. Severson from testifying at trial and the First Cause of Action was not 
pied to implicate Mr. Matthews.28 The only evidence offered by Mr. Severson was his own 
28 An1ended petition, ,i 21. 
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testimony that Mr. Frachiseur had incorrectly advised that it was Mr. Frachiseur's sole decision 
Mr. Severson would testify, and that Mr. Severson requested to Mr. Frachiseur to testify 
that Mr. Frachiseur prohibited the testimony without presenting Mr. Severson as a witness. 
This, too, is an issue of credibility for the Court. 
The Court observed hours of testimony from both Mr. Severson and Mr. Frachieseur 
from the witness stand in a small courtroom. The demeanor of both witnesses was sure, without 
distracting mannerisms, and confident in the courtroom. Mr. Frachiseur testified that he did not 
have the ability to keep a defendant from testifying and that, if Mr. Severson, had requested to 
testify, that Mr. Frachiseur would have been required to allow Mr. Severson to testify. Mr. 
Frachsieur testifed he did not have a recollection that Mr. Severson told him he wanted to testify 
at the time the State rested but before the case was submitted to the jury. While Mr. Frachiseur 
no longer had notes directly addressing Mr. Severson's requests to testify or specifically noting 
Mr. Severson declining to testify, C.J. Nemeth provided testimony that Mr. Severson 
equivocated back and forth about testifying in pretrial conferences she attended with the 
Defendant. She testified that during the last meeting she attended right before trial commenced 
where Mr. Severson stated he would not testify. Additionally after the court's admonition of the 
right to testify, she observed Mr. Severson shaking his head "no" while talking with Mr. 
Frachiseur. While she could not hear the discussion between the two, the inference of this court 
is that Mr. Severson discussed his right to testify with counsel at that point in the trial and 
indicated he did not wish to testify. Although the Petitioner alleges he told Mr. Frachiseur at the 
jail while the jury was deliberating that he wanted to testify, Mr. Frachiseur did not recall that. 
Again, in determining the credibility of witnesses, this Court finds that Mr. Frachiseur and Ms. 
Nemeth are credible and reliable witnesses with no motive to lie. While eight years have passed 
since Mr. Frachiseur's representation of Mr. Severson, Mr. Frachiseur's recollection is still 
reliable and credible before this court. While the Petitioner argues Mr. Frachiseur's testimony 
was vague and equivocal, this Court found some of the statements very early in the hearing to be 
equivocal but that Mr. Frachiseur's recollection became more detailed and reliable early on in 
the testimony as he began remembering long-ago events. The Court does not find Mr. 
Severson's testimony more reliable that Mr. Frachiseur just because Mr. Severson could testify 
in a more detailed manner. Mr. Frachiseur relayed to this Court the same testimony from his 
affidavit in 2005 that stated that Mr. Severson had not made a request to testify and that any 
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statement to the contrary was false. Mr. Frachiseur also testified credibly that Mr. Severson did 
not ask to testify before defense rested. When questioned about Mr. Severson's testimony 
that whether Mr. Severson would testify at trial was "his call," Mr. Frachiseur unequivocally 
answered, "I know that I did not tell him that." 
In weighing credibility, the Court considered Mr. Severson's false statement to a judge 
about the location of his wife's remains. He admitted during this hearing that he lied under oath 
to a judge during a hearing that preceded the murder case. Additionally, the court weighed the 
fact that the Defendant is sentenced to life in prison on this case and has great motivation to 
misrepresent facts in hope of getting a new trial and a new opportunity to prove his innocence. 
Finaily, the Court considered the evidence offered at this hearing of the trial proceedings and the 
number of discrepancies Mr. Severson's testimony had with so many of the State's witnesses. 
Two unrelated witnesses saw Mr. Severson with the Hydroxycut bottles in the weeks leading up 
to Mary's death and both Ms. Deppen and Mr. Crayne offered almost identical descriptions of 
the bottles and pills-and Mr. Severson did not challenge either of those witnesses testimony 
that he had a half-filled bottle of Hydroxycut with two different kinds of capsules immediately 
preceding Mary's death. Mr. Severson relayed Mary's illness and its proposed cause by diet 
pills to so many witnesses who testified at trial, yet Mr. Severson denied at this hearing telling a 
couple of those witnesses that Mary was dying and denied telling a couple of witnesses that he 
was divorced. 
Mr. Frachiseur was clear that his advice to Mr. Severson had been not to testify. Mr. 
Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr. Severson should not testify because 
the evidence that would come in during the cross examination of Mr. Severson would be 
"exceedingly damaging" or would make admissible evidence that had previously not been 
permitted before the jury under pretrial rulings. This assertion was examined in light of the 
Court's pretrial ruling that Mary Severson made statements before her death (that she believed 
her husband was trying to kill her) but that those statements were inadmissible unless the defense 
"opens the door" regarding Mary Severson' s state of mind. 29 Mr. Severson testified in this 
hearing about Mary's unhappiness, depression, and financial difficulties. Mr. Frachiseur 
testified of his concern about evidence becoming admissible related to a business in Colorado 
that had burned perhaps for insurance proceeds; the opinion of police that Mr. Severson has 
29 Orders RE Motions Concerning Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements of Deceased, filed Sept. 28, 2004. 
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falsely reported a self-inflicted gunshot wound as being shot by someone else; that Mr. Severson 
had an during marriage to the victim case; that Mr. Severson had gotten engaged 
to another woman while his wife, the victim in this case, was out of state; and "most 
importantly" that Mr. Frachiseur could not get a "straight answer" from his client about what 
happened to the Hydroxycut pills and Mr. Frachiseur' s investigation demonstrated tampering 
with the pills, especially since Mr. Severson never presented a consistent version of the presence 
of the pills. Mr. Severson denied at this hearing ever being told that he should not testify. 
However, State's Exhibits 7 and 8 documented discussions among the trial team related to the 
advice that Mr. Severson should not testify. Mr. Frachiseur was clear that Mr. Severson made 
the decision not to testify and that it was Mr. Frachiseur's understanding that Mr. Severson 
agreed with Mr. Frachiseur's advice not to testify. As in Hoffman v. State, circumstances in this 
case also show that Mr. Severson acquiesced during the trial to counsel's advice not to testify. 
116 Idaho 689, 690, 778 P.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. 1989). Based upon the substantial and 
competent evidence presented at this hearing, this Court finds Mr. Severson was aware of his 
ultimate right to decide whether or not he would testify because of the advisement of the Court, 
that Mr. Severson then did not testify before the close of this trial, and this choice was made 
knowingly, freely and voluntarily by Mr. Severson. Mr. Severson has not met his burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he requested to Mr. Frachiseur that he be 
allowed to testify while the jury was deliberating. 
Although this Court would have preferred to have the notes of counsel and the Petitioner 
made at trial produced for inspection at this hearing, the absence of notes is not dispositive. The 
explanation of the unavailability of the notes is reasonable. It is irrelevant to the court whether 
the yellow pads came from Mr. Frachiseur, Mr. Clark, or anywhere else. This Cout believes Mr. 
Severson that he made lots of notes throughout the trial and continually tried to draw Mr. 
Frachiseur's attention to the notes. However, Mr. Frachiseur's representation that Mr. Severson 
routine use of the notes and knocking on the table to draw attention to the notes during the trial 
was distracting while he was trying the case. While the notes may have shed some additional 
light on the issues at hand, the absence of notes does not make Mr. Frachiseur's testimony less 
credible or less reliable, nor does it make Mr. Severson's testimony more credible or more 
reliable. The court does not draw an inference for either party because of the absence of notes. 
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After a thorough examination of all of the evidence presented at the hearing, after 
detennining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence presented, this Court 
finds that the Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Frachiseur prohibited Mr. Severson from testifying in his own behalf. 
A. Ineffective Assistance purusant to Strickland v. Washington by 
Prohibiting Testimony 
The burden rests with the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial 
counsel prohibited him from testifying at trial, that the acts of counsel were deficient, and to 
show how the deficiency was prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The first requirement is that the Defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he "was precluded from testifying by lead counsel 
Frachiseur"30 and the Defendant has failed to meet this burden. The Defendant has not shown 
the Petitioner was prohibited from testifying by a probability sufficient to undermine this Court's 
confidence in the outcome of the trial as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Therefore, this Court is not required to address whether counsel's advice not to testify was based 
on strategic and tactical decisions related to Counsel's investigation and Counsel's assessment of 
the Defendant's case. 
B. Defendant was Prohibited from Testifying Argued as a Deprivation of a 
Fundamental Constitutional Right Pursuant to Chapman v. California 
Again, even for a constitutional claim, the burden still rests with defendant to show he 
was deprived of the right to testify by Mr. Frachiseur. If the defendant meets this burden, then 
the state must show "harmless error" or beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not 
contribute to the defendant's conviction pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18. 
However, as stated in the analysis above, the Defendant has not shown by a probability sufficient 
to undermine this Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial that the Petitioner was 
prohibited from testifying at trial by Mr. Frachiseur. Therefore, the burden has not shifted to the 
State to show that any error by counsel, if any, was harmless error. 
30 Amended Petition, First Cause of Action, ,r,r21-45. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is DENIED in all 
aspects. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this 21st day of January, 2013. 
Lynn G. Norton 
District Judge 
DISMISSAL AFTER EVIDENTIARY HEARING - 25 -
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the 
following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
SMETHERS LAW OFFICE 
1000 S. Roosevelt Street 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S.MAIL 
Dated this 22nd day of January, 2013. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
~ Deputy~ 
~----- . 
IN THE COURT 
BA ~i 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICQttJPC 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY M. SEVERSON, 
Case No. CV-2009-1408 
Petitioner, 
vs. JUDGMENT 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Based upon the Memorandum Decision and Order Dis~sing Post Conviction Action 
After Evidentiary Hearing entered by the Court on JanuaryZl.~2013, this court enters judgment 
on behalf of the Respop_.dent. 
Dated this Z/ ~ay of January, 2013. 
Ly~---~~----
District Judge 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may 
issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
,-F---
Dated this~ day of January, 2013. 
Ly~ 
District Judge 
JUDGMENT 
7 
.. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the foliowing: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
David J. Smethers 
SMETHERS LAW OFFICE 
1000 S. Roosevelt Street 
Boise, ID 83705 
U.S. MAIL 
Dated this 22nd day of January, 2013. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
B~ 
Deputy Clerk 
JUDGMENT 
rc.r?c.,~c:u1:::1\ 1nu1 
d ../Ir· .. 
I :J; :HI :Jell !Cl£ Cl OC!Lt:!ltlUUU, r'LLL. lrl11\JCUO .J.JOICO.J t'.UUI/UUr 
DAVID J. SMETIIERS 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
208-695-9318 
Attorney for Petitioner 
.. 
I E 
3 26 PH I: 29 
BARBARA .:_: '"ElE CLERK OF r~tcquRr 
DEPU~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF JDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2009-001408 
Petitioner ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
1. NOTICE TS HEREBY GIVEN That the above named petitioner, Larry Severson, 
appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in this case by the 
Honorable Lynn G. Norton on January 22, 2013. 
2. The defendant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 ( a)( 1 ). This appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law. 
The proceedings of the Judgment appealed from are recorded electronicaJly and 
are in the possession of the Elmore County Clerk. 
3. Issues presented on appeal including but not limited to: 
-Order Dismissing Po~1 Conviction Action; 
-Errors in evidentiary rulings by the Court; 
-Errors in substantive rulings by the Court; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page l of 3 
::ia11az ~ 1Jatewooa, t-'LLl. U"Hil.JC:Utl jjblc'.bj 
4. A reporter's transcript is requested for the hearings on the following dates: 
-February 24, 2012, Scheduling Conference; 
-March 9. 2012; 
-July 16, 2012; 
-September 7, 2012; 
-September t 9, 2012; 
-October 5, 2012. 
S. I certify: That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out as 
follows: M. Martorelli, 200 W. Front, Boise, Idaho 83702; That the appellant is 
exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of the record because 
appellant is indigent and represented by lhe public defender; That service has 
been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 and the 
attorney general of ldaho. 
DATED TIIIS ~ra.ay o~ • 2013. 
Da~ctb.e~:;:;;t.;:;.;;=~::»..----~--~ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: This certifies that a true and correct copy of the 
above and forgoing instrument was: _ Mailed; ~ed; __ Hand Delivered, to: 
__ Ada County Prosecutor; 
NO"rICE OF APPEAL Page 2 of 3 
I'. uuauu r 
rto-c;i\,-c:u1:il1nuJ 1:):D 
,f 
::lc:111 c:IZ CC tlc:ICl:!l!IOOCI, t'LLL. 
,I'_,_, .... 
__ Boise County Prosecutor; 
_Boise City Prosecutor; 
/~~,~ 
Dated this 2.. P,- day of 'f"..J.,: 2013 
~J!Jq~----
David J. Smethers/ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 3 of 3 
lrHll}C:UO jj01Ctlj t'. UUj/UU I 
::ia11az ~ tH1tewooa, r'Lll. ll"Hl\}C:Ul::I jjblcbj P. 006/007 
IL 
DAVID J. SMETHERS 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 8370S 
20S..69S~9318 
13 - I PM 12: j 5 
Attomey for Petitioner 
BARBARA Slt.ELE 
CLERK OF THt._OOURT 
DEPUTW& 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUR.TH JUDICIAL 01s·rrucT OP THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
LARRY SEVERSON ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2009-001408 
Petitioner ) 
) ORDER APPOINTING STATE PUBLIC 
vs. ) 
) DEFENDER., ORDER WANING FEES 
STATE 01.' IDAHO ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
After consideration of the petitioner/appellant's MOTION FOR APPOINMENT 
OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND WAIVER OF FEES BASED ON 
INDIGENCE, the State Appe11ate Public Defender is hereby appointed to represent the 
petitioner/appellant in this appeal. Due to the defendant/appellant's indigence, all fees 
and costs associated with this appeal shall be waived. So Ordered. 
Lynn~Judgc 
ijzB/r3 
Date 
(SEAL) 
CERTTFICA TE OF MATLTNG 
I hereby certify that on the \~. day of Ua:ic.l. 2013, a true and 
comet copy oflhe foregoing Document was served by placing the same in the respective 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER., ORDER 
W AlVlNG FEES AND COSTS OF APPEAL Page l of2 
::ldl !Cl.I: Cl IJCL~IJJUUU, t"'LLL. 
courthouse mail boxes or by regular service to the following: 
FILE COPY 
Copy to: Elmore County Prosecutor; 
Copy to: David J. Smethers 
Copy tQ: State Appellate Public Defender 
C9py to: Idaho State Attorney General 
~~y:£ 
BARBARA STEELE 
~~ of CoLUd 
ORDER APPOINTING STAIB APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, ORDER 
WAIVING FEES AND COSTS OF APPEAL Page 2 of 2 
43 
I'. uu f /007 
EXHiijIT LIST Page i of Pages 
--
E No,0\/-8C(B#\4D'6 
Wa£h~,.f:tl)Q~ 
vs. 
c\enh or~ iliClru'VJ /< f 
~'FRIA.b DATE &p:t. '7 &DI d q-/Cf·I~ IO·S· 
' r ta 
~\)lci S(Y)QfuCS . 
ounsel for Plaintiff(s) 
S±=o:t& o~ IdO))() 
Defendant (s) 
Kflo±I .JNh: &ru_nctelr-< 
Counsel for defendant(s) 
*******************************************
************************************ 
I 9 l_f\ • - I I IADMl11TED 
I IVJG~~ - \Jolu.n'\.O ~ l9.55-Ych31 I V I V"° I . I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I i 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY SEVERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) 
-----------------
Supreme Court 
Case No. 40769 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
EXHIBITS 
I, Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Elmore, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of exhibits which were offered 
or admitted into evidence during the Preliminary Hearing in this 
case: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the seal of the said Court this day of April, 2013. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - Page 1 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
LARRY SEVERSON, 
- Petitioner-Appellant, 
V. 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO 
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40769-2013 
Elmore County No. 2009-1408 
Respondent. 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE was filed by 
counsel for Appellant on January 7, 2014, requesting that this Court augment the record with 
documents and take judicial notice of the record, transcripts and exhibits in Appellant's prior appeal, 
State v. Severson, Supreme Court Docket No. 32128. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed 
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Petitioner's Request that the Court Take Judicial Notice, file-stamped April 18, 2011; 
2. Filing and Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed Material, file-stamped April 18,201 l; 
3. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Objection, Motion to Enlarge, Requests for Extension 
and Scheduling Conference, file-stamped February 8, 2012; 
4. Motion to Take Judicial Notice of All Exhibits Introduced in the Underlying Criminal 
Case, file-stamped February 13, 2012; 
5. Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal, file-stamped 
February 13, 2012; 
6. Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal, file-stamped February 13, 2012; 
7. Brief in support of the State's Second Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal, 
file-stamped June 8, 2012; 
8. Motion to Take Additional Judicial Notice, with attachment, file-stamped September 10, 
2012;and 
9. Affidavit of Larry M. Stevens, file-stamped May 9, 2012. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the Court shall take judicial notice of the Clerk's 
Record Reporter's Transcripts and Exhibits in Supreme Court Docket No. 32128, State v. Severson, 
Elmore County case number 2002-158. 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE Docket No. 40769-2013 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall submit the Exhibits from 
Elmore County case number 2002-158, State v. Severson, to this Court on or before fourteen (14) 
days of the date of this Order, as they were returned to the district court after the remittitur was filed in 
Supreme Court Docket No. 32128. 
DATED this J3! day of January, 2014. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE-Docket No. 40769-2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY SEVERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
-----------------
) 
) 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 40769 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Elmore, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct 
and complete record of the pleadings and documents requested by 
Appellate Rule 28. 
I further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in 
the above entitled cause, see Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, 
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with 
the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this day of April, 2013. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY SEVERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
-----------------
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 40769 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BARBARA STEELE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Elmore, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, 
by United States Mail, one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and 
CLERK'S RECORD to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as 
follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Statehouse Mail 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Sara Thomas 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3050 N Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this day of April, 2013. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
